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FOREWORD 
When concepts become slogans, intelligent debate is extinguished. The term "globalization" 
is now on that slippery slope. After a decade of researchers' breast-beating about its evil 
impacts, a growing body of opinion (backed up by trade figures) asserts that economies were 
just as open at the end of the 19th century as they are today. It is reassuring then that a 
number of essays in this book secure their analyses firmly within historical and geographical 
boundaries. So let us just say that globalization is a fact and get down to the task of 
understanding how, by whom, and for whom social policy is made and how it is financed. 
After all, Canada, with one of the world's most open economies, has built a reasonably 
equitable society and, for years, has been ranked number one in the league tables of the 
Human Development Report of the United Nations Development Programme. 
An important contribution of the essays in this book is to remind us that it is impossible to 
divorce social policy from political institutions. The concept of social policy itself is linked to 
the specific historical evolution of modern Western societies. It is appropriate then that in 
1998, the 150th anniversary of the 1848 revolutions in Europe, we review how societies are 
tackling issues of social inequality. 
The political evolution that one century later gave us the welfare state gathered speed during 
a time that was remarkably like our own. The "champions of progress" were as enthusiastic 
then as their counterparts in business associations are today, with their confidence that the 
free forces of commerce will lead us to a happier, wiser, and peaceful civilization. 
At the national level, the political changes in response to the dark side of this progress were 
muted but satisfactory for the middle classes, resulting in constitutions that may have been 
antidemocratic but were definitely antiaristocratic. They put paid to feudalism. However, in 
international politics, Europe (and particularly the United Kingdom) was dominant. 
Institutional change at the national level was nourished by the injection of political 
consciousness and permanent political activity among the masses, which was the great legacy 
of the French Revolution. Today, international mechanisms to achieve a global social balance 
persistently elude us, as they likely will for some time. Just as in the last century, when trade 
and capital flowed across geographic boundaries, the political developments of nation-states 
determine the nature of their social policies, although given the structures of colonial 
economies some of that trade may have closely resembled the intrafirm transfers of today. 
The essays in this book address the challenge of designing transnational policies to achieve 
social balance in different countries with quite different political and economic histories. The 
search for transnational social policies will only bear fruit if democratic nation-states with a 
concern for social balance invest in the construction of international institutions. The example 
of Canada suggests that a country with a significantly open economy and a democratic 
political system can also build a fair society. 
Maureen O'Neil 
President 
International Development Research Centre 
Ottawa, Canada 
INTRODUCTION 
FROM NATIONAL TO TRANSNATIONAL SOCIAL POLICIES 
Daniel Morales-Gómez 
At the close of the 20th century, new expectations for a better society — prompted by forces 
of economic, political, and cultural globalization, changing demographics and new 
communication and information technologies — accelerate demands for comprehensive and 
effective public-policy reforms. This is happening at a time when governments are 
preoccupied with making more efficient and effective allocation of scarce resources and the 
international community realizes that existing development paradigms are inadequate to 
respond to the needs of the world's poor. 
Developing countries in particular continue to struggle to identify developmental options, 
implement feasible growth strategies, and overcome persistent poverty and domestic social 
inequality. Industrialized countries, in turn, are beginning to realize that current consumption 
patters are a liability in maintaining basic domestic standards of social equity, social security, 
and human development. Internationally, there is an increasing lack of control over future 
market directions, global trade, the capacity of countries and regions to sustain achieved 
levels of economic growth, and the rapid social impacts of science and information 
technologies. 
To compete in an increasingly interconnected world, developing countries are improving 
their international competitiveness, adapting to rapid technological change, and 
accommodating their production systems to external rather than domestic demands. In the 
process, social safety nets are weakened, and, as the research in this book indicates, social-
sector reforms have been insufficient to strengthen these systems. In the attempt to find 
feasible solutions, available resources have been shifted away from costly social programs, 
and responsibility for the social well-being of people is being transferred from the state to the 
private sector. The effect of these changes is that greater responsibility for survival is placed 
on the shoulders of the poor and the communities in which they participate. Troubling, under 
these circumstances, is the growing transnational character of the factors influencing public-
policy reforms in the area of basic needs, which have been dealt with until recently almost 
exclusively within the national domain. 
The issue of transnational influences over national policies is not per se a new phenomenon. 
Traditionally, however, what has been understood as the "transnational dimension" of 
national development has been mostly limited to the fields of politics and economics. In this 
context, the notion has referred to a complex set of factors and influences determining 
decisions across established geopolitical boundaries. In economic terms, for example, it has 
been instrumental in understanding North–South relationships in regard to monetary issues, 
trade, and capital flows and accumulation. In political terms, it has been an explanatory factor 
in the role of national development in the larger scheme of power relations between 
developed and developing countries. 
Today, the transnational dimension is acquiring an even more complex meaning. In a world 
geopolitically and economically more unidimensional, the transnational dimension of 
development is more than ever before an effect of globalization (Morales-Gómez and Torres 
1995). Although the notion of globalization itself is controversial, central to its transnational 
character is the scope and magnitude of its intended and unintended impacts. In the past, the 
influence of capital flows, information and communication technologies, consumption, 
cultural products, trade, and transfers of science and technology had more limited influences 
on national decisions. Today, these factors affect national-policy boundaries and are 
necessary ingredients in national public policies and their reforms. In this sense, transnational 
influences are no longer single variables affecting only economic and foreign-policy relations 
between countries but complex sets of factors acting on a wide range of national public-
policy decisions that are key to the management of national affairs. How this new scenario 
ultimately affects national policies linked to human and social development is a question not 
yet fully addressed. 
Public-policy reforms in key social sectors are being promoted by a growing number of 
governments from industrialized and developing countries, as well as, international 
organizations, and, in particular, international financial institutions (IFIs). The underlying 
justification for action has several aspects. It is asserted that such reforms will improve 
efficiency of public-policy systems; that they are required to implement plans to reduce 
public deficits; that they will deliver more effective social programs and services; and, that 
they will ultimately help to improve the capacities of national economies. In this context, 
economic growth continues to be a dominant goal of public-policy reforms in order to reduce 
deficits, generate employment, and expand trade. Social development is then simply seen as a 
byproduct of these reform schemes. The chief focus remains market liberalization, 
privatization, smaller and more financially accountable governments, targeting, and less state 
intervention in service provision. In this framework, the challenges for social development 
and poverty reduction are seen as those of the availability rather than the redistribution of 
resources. Policy reforms are thus expected to maximize the use of resources — "doing more 
with less." 
In all these concerns, an overarching issue is not being addressed: the character of the new 
social ethos guiding policy reforms, an ethos which is increasingly determined by 
transnational cultural values. Policy changes at the macro- and microlevels are promoted as 
good and desirable without anyone's questioning the nature of the society pursued through 
these processes. 
Social-policy reform: a shift in the social-policy paradigm 
The current emphasis on social development is reflected in actions by international 
organizations and governments to bring issues related to social and human development to 
the forefront of the international development agenda. Events such as the 1990 World summit 
for Children, the 1990 World Conference on Education for All, the 1992 UN Conference on 
Environment and Development, the 1993 UN Conference on Population and Development, 
the 1995 Fourth World Conference on Women, and the 1995 World Summit for Social 
Development are prominent indicators of this emphasis. Following the economic downturns 
of the 1970s and 1980s, which deeply affected the developing world, social development has 
become a priority in the mid-1990s. Development trends during this period made the state, 
evolution, and health of macroeconomic policies the main developmental concerns of 
governments and international organizations. John Ralston Saul (1995, pp. 122–123) argued 
that 
in imitation of the nineteenth century and the 1920's, we are deregulating 
everything in sight and even restructuring government and education along 
industry lines. We have fallen back in love with an old ideology that has never 
paid off in the past. 
Now, there are those who will mistake what I say for an anti-market tirade. 
They will be wrong. I love the market. I like trade, money markets, global 
economic patterns, all of it. It's like a game. It's fun for those who can afford to 
have a sense of humour. But I'm not fool enough to mistake these necessary 
and important narrow mechanisms for a broad, solid, conscious force that can 
lead society. The history of the marketplace has been repeatedly written by its 
actions. To ignore that history is to withdraw into severe unconsciousness. 
Only the recent signs of the relative failure of a development model based on capital 
accumulation has made evident that macroeconomic equilibrium alone is not a development 
solution. Despite this evidence, "we keep hoping that we will rediscover prosperity through 
this mechanism called market forces" (Saul 1995, p. 122), and with such a goal in mind 
public policies are being changed on a massive scale. 
Reaching macroeconomic equilibrium by itself is not likely to render the type of longer-terms 
results expected in terms of increased social well-being, better social welfare, and less 
poverty. This is particularly true if social- and human-development inequalities remain 
untouched by the reform processes. In this context, a trend is emerging to focus increasingly 
on social policy in a framework of public-policy reform. The aim is to achieve social-
development objectives with more equity, effectiveness, and efficiency. This is the case in 
most of Latin American and Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD) countries (Altimir 1997; Bonvin 1997). In a number of cases, this emphasis is 
leading to social-policy reforms in key social sectors. However, the emphases, results, and 
impacts of the experiences are very different, largely unknown, and not critically analyzed. 
In some cases, governments and development agencies are stressing the need to put "people 
first" as a public-policy goal and to give development a "human face" to affirm ways to 
address social-development needs (Preston 1993; World Bank 1991). In other cases, 
emphasis is primarily on efficiency, cost-cutting, and balancing fiscal deficits and only 
secondarily on the needs of human development (Bardhan 1995). What is important here is 
that the overall tendency to reform public policies is not an isolated phenomenon; rather, it is 
part of a global trend to change the parameters and role of the welfare state in its various 
versions in developed and developing countries. The catalyst for this process in the 1970s and 
1980s was a set of economic-stabilization measures and structural-adjustment policies to 
overcome inflation, fiscal deficits, foreign indebtedness, and trade imbalances. 
From a broader developmental perspective, the policy-reform approach also reflects a deeper 
shift in the concept of what is a modern, efficient, and just society. At one level, this is the 
expression of the forces of economic globalization. In this regard, the OECD Development 
Centre argued that "an increasing number of developing countries have been pursuing policy 
reform to promote their integration into the global economy" (Bonvin 1997. p. 40). At 
another level, it manifests a series of profound social, demographic, and political changes 
shaping the profile of today's modern industrialized societies and those of many developing 
countries. Among these changes are rapid rural– urban migration, demographic growth, and 
democratization. They are added pressures that help to make current social policies 
unsustainable, inefficient, or ineffective. Perhaps more deeply still, the evolving change in the 
concept of a modern, efficient, and just society is a reflection of slow but profound changes in 
the ethics of modernization and development occurring in the second half of this century. 
The combination of these factors explains a series of features of social development in 
developed and developing societies both as they appear today and as they are likely to unfold 
well into the first decade of the next century. These include persistently unsatisfied basic 
needs, evident as chronic, even deepening, poverty in some regions; a widening spectrum of 
altering social needs and increasing social and economic expectations that widen the gap with 
the growing frustration of vast sectors of the population, especially youth, who are unable to 
find productive work or access to new social opportunities; and a growing demand for 
alternative public and private, profit and nonprofit mechanisms to better handle the fiscal 
deficit and debt crisis while reducing the social costs of reforms. Beyond these most visible 
features are the continuing impacts of transnational private business, development 
organizations, and IFIs as they continue to alter the global social-development landscape; the 
deterioration of the role of traditional and family support systems; and, the emergence of 
pervasive social destitution, expressed in the phrase "social exclusion" (Rodgers et al. 1995). 
Although policy reforms take different forms depending on the specific social, economic, and 
cultural environments in which they are implemented in Africa, Asia, Latin America, and the 
industrialized North, they also share common trends. First, they often have short-term 
objectives but long-term economic, social, and institutional effects. Second, the assessment of 
the available options to reform social-policy systems under various forms of welfare state is, 
at best, constrained by financial considerations and is in most cases nonexistent. Third, 
because in developing countries, national wealth is still distributed unequally and 
international development assistance, on which many rely to implement human-development 
programs, is unlikely to increase, government investments in social development are limited, 
despite international protocols, such as the various United Nations declarations. Measured in 
constant United States dollars (USD), total net flows of official development assistance to 
developing countries have remained stable between 55 billion USD and 60 billion USD since 
1986. Other development finance has declined slightly, but this has been more than offset by 
substantial growth in private flows. Private flows now account for about 60% of net resource 
transfers, and overseas development assistance has fallen to about 33% of the total (OECD 
1996). Fourth, despite changes in the international discourse about the debt burden, the size 
of external debt continues to constrain countries' freedom to redirect their investments into 
social-sector policies (Giddens 1995). Fifth, because of the obvious financial constraints of 
reforms everywhere, the OECD argued that earnings, savings, and tax revenues should be the 
main sources of investment in economic and social progress (OECD 1996). Sixth, at the 
recommendation of organizations like the OECD and the IFIs, participation in the global 
economy and the opening up of competitive business opportunities, rather than relying on 
international aid funds or state investments, is the emerging policy approach for overcoming 
poverty and for sustaining social-policy reforms (World Bank 1994; Bonvin 1997; Oman 
1997). 
Given the likely persistence of these trends, the need to examine the challenges posed by 
current policy reforms is even more urgent. Yet, it is safe to say that the international social-
policy agenda is being "reformed" and implemented with almost a total absence of systematic 
assessment of the outcomes. In most cases, reforms are implemented not only without a 
reliable knowledge base but also with little input from recipient countries (Taylor et al. 1995). 
Although, as some of the chapters in this book will show, the cases are very diverse, most 
countries in Latin America are better prepared to face the challenges of public-policy 
reforms, given their history of state and civil-society organizations, than most countries in 
Africa (Amin 1990; Gruat 1990; Gayi 1995). Some Southeast Asian countries have been able 
to adapt more quickly to the short-term objectives of policy reform than the majority of 
countries in Latin America (Osteria 1996). In other cases, such as in West and Central Africa, 
the notions of public- and social-policy reform have only recently entered the vocabulary of 
policymakers and social-sector practitioners. This is partly because the state is weak and its 
social-protection role is limited or almost nonexistent or because there are no consolidated 
policies to forward change. Yet, in other cases, the policy agenda for reform is more 
reflective of global, Western trends than the local necessity for change (UNRISD 1995; 
OECD 1997). Across the globe, and particularly in developing countries, policy reform often 
becomes almost exclusively a strategy to overcome poverty in the face of the constraints of 
external debt, the scarcity of international aid, the depletion of national development funds, 
and the lack of sustainable solutions to these problems through social policies developed on 
the basis of the welfare-state model. 
Accordingly, a series of questions should be asked by anyone looking at particular national 
experiences: How is one to better understand the current process of social-policy reform? 
What does today's notion of social-policy reform mean in the context of social development? 
Is the policy-reform approach important in societies with a weak public-policy base to 
reform? What are the longer-term implications of social-policy reform for social and 
economic development? Are the current approaches to policy reform the most appropriate? 
Are there other options for public-policy change in the social sectors? The chapters that 
follow address some of these questions and open a discussion on the meaning, risks, and 
potentialities of the reform process for developing societies. 
Poverty alleviation or human development? 
A key issue in the current social-policy reforms is the extent to which public-policy reforms 
should be guided by poverty-alleviation goals or aim at broader human concerns. Experience 
to date indicates that this issue is not yet resolved. 
Since the early 1980s the approach to the reform of economic policies has been to open 
societies to the market and, in the process, break down barriers impeding the free flow of 
capital, consumer goods, and information (Thurow 1996; Altimir 1997). The opening of 
markets has been aided by a number of powerful forces: the revolution in communications 
and information technologies that allows the overnight transfer of capital that is equivalent to 
the economies of several poor countries; changes in the international geopolitical landscape; a 
growing emphasis on knowledge-based production systems; the formation of new trading 
blocks; and increasing flows of labour between countries. This is evident among countries of 
the European Union, the Southeast Asian Tigers (Osteria 1996; Mittelman 1995), other 
countries in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, as well as those in the North 
American Free-Trade Area and MERCOSUR (Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uraguay). In 
several cases, developing countries have been active in adopting economic reforms — and 
their attached public-policy packages — for diverse reasons, including loan conditions set by 
the IFIs, the search for new market opportunities in the global economy, and changes in 
national political structures that reflect moves to the political right. 
From the point of view of economic-growth indicators, the results are mixed and, in most 
cases, questionable, especially in Africa, where structural-adjustment programs form the core 
of the policy-reform debate (World Bank 1993b; Mosley 1994; Ponte 1994), and in Latin 
America, where poverty and extreme poverty have increased (Beneria and Mendoza 1995; 
Helwege 1995; Altimir 1997). The most recent troubles of the Asian economies, which have 
served as models for the rest of the world, cast further doubts. 
There have been, however, important social advances (UNDP 1996). Large sectors of the 
population in some developing countries have greater access to social services, including 
basic education, literacy, basic health care, and drinking water; greater exposure to mass 
media and information in terms of access to radios, televisions, and newspapers; and, better 
and more democratic conditions for political participation. Still, however, across the 
developing world, social problems have increased in magnitude, despite advances in global 
development. Latin America is a very telling example. With the exception of a handful of 
countries, the region exhibits the greatest inequality in the world. In 1990, global social 
welfare in the region, measured in terms of real per capita income, was 15% lower than in 
1980. Today, more households are living in poverty than 20 years ago. In 1990, the number 
of people living in poverty in the region reached 115.5 million (Altimir 1997). 
Much of the progress witnessed today in countries in Latin America and Africa only brings 
the gains in social and human development back to the levels some of these countries had 
reached before the debt crisis. In this sense, the gains in social and human development are 
relative. In many instances, poverty has actually increased, and new forms of poverty have 
appeared, particularly in middle-class sectors (Helwege 1995; Stahl 1996). The compound 
effects of poverty, unemployment, lack of political participation, inequality, and various 
forms of discrimination have greater exclusionary effects on larger sectors of the population 
today than before. This has obvious implications for basic-needs satisfaction, social-service 
provision, and prevention of the social disintegration expressed in violence, extreme poverty, 
and urban crowding. 
The reform of social policies is perceived as a practical response to these problems. At least 
two reasons are given as a rationale for this view. First, persistent social- and human-
development problems are perceived to be linked to the inequity caused by the poor 
effectiveness and efficiency of welfare-state policies and state mechanisms. Second, the 
advocates of the reform approach assume that there is a positive correlation between 
reformed policies, better policies, higher growth, and higher human development (Ponte 
1994). This, however, is rarely the case. The assumption that reform processes help to put the 
"right" policies in place to improve the role of the state, to correct economic distortions, or to 
better deliver social-sector services raises at least two basic questions: Why is a reform 
approach the most feasible solution? What concept of social development inspires these 
policy reforms? 
The various cases presented in this book show that the notion of social development is 
differently interpreted in different settings, ranging from an emphasis on poverty alleviation 
and eradication, to human-resources development, to social integration and capacity 
development. In principle, these emphases complement each other. In practice, however, they 
imply very different points of departure for understanding why, how, and when a policy-
reform approach may be an appropriate strategy to meet basic needs as well as different 
points of departure for identifying the policy-reform options that take into account financial 
considerations without excluding social, cultural, and environmental variables. 
The reasoning behind current policy reforms follows a recognizable pattern (Meier 1993). In 
1991, after considerable international debate, the World Bank acknowledged that investing in 
people provides the firmest foundation for lasting development (World Bank 1991). For the 
World Bank and for other international organizations, this meant in principle better 
education, higher standards of health and nutrition, less poverty, a cleaner environment, more 
equality of opportunity, greater individual freedom, and a richer cultural life. However, 
reaching these ends requires economic growth, which, under current global economic 
conditions, depends heavily on productivity, technological progress, and human capital. To 
increase productivity, countries must therefore compete effectively in the global market and 
make optimum use of new technologies. Accordingly, governments have to favour the factors 
that positively influence the achievement of these ends, such as investment in human capital, 
liberalization of the economy, and improvement in the efficiency of governance systems, 
including democratization. At the same time, they are to avoid negative factors, especially 
those that distort the market (World Bank 1991). Concretely, this means reforming the state 
and its social and economic policies. 
According to the World Bank, governments need to spend fewer resources more efficiently in 
social services, shift spending priorities, target expenditures, and increase resource 
mobilization. However, the challenge is not to expand the role of the state but to exploit the 
complementarities between the state and the market (World Bank 1991), particularly between 
government, nongovernment, and profit-oriented private organizations. In this view, social 
development is both a prerequisite and a consequence of economic growth and the setting for 
collaboration between state and market institutions. The reform of social policies is needed 
because, as the argument implies, current policy models are inadequate. 
However, interpretations of these issues vary. The Canadian International Development 
Agency's (CIDA's) definition of social development, for example, focused in 1987 on the 
concept of human-resource development. Sharing Our Future identified four principles of 
social development: poverty alleviation must be put first; people must be helped to help 
themselves; development priorities must prevail; and partnership must be the key (CIDA 
1987). This interpretation was shared by the World Bank: it recognized that adjustment must 
be complemented by poverty alleviation, its "refound" goal (World Bank 1990). However, in 
1991, CIDA modified these principles. CIDA's new mission statement was to support 
sustainable development in developing countries. Social development became an element of a 
much larger objective. Still, in the broader picture, in 1995, Canada set as a target to invest 
25% of its official development assistance in basic human needs: basic education, primary 
health, safe water and sanitation, and family planning (GOC 1995; Van Rooy 1995). The 
total CIDA envelop for basic human needs is 21% of Canadian official development 
assistance, which falls short of the 25% target announced by Canada in 1995. The distribution 
of funds in Asia, Africa, and the Americas represented 16.4, 12.8, and 9.7%, respectively, of 
total disbursements (Van Rooy 1995). In terms of programs, CIDA's approach emphasizes 
poverty alleviation and self-help through its focus on basic human needs. 
The Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) promotes an 
approach driven by technological and economic considerations as outlined in its proposal, 
Transformación Productiva con Equidad (productive transformation with equity; ECLAC 
1990). In this proposal, development is characterized as the increase in the level of well-being 
of the population resulting from multiple factors: the prevalence of human rights; democratic 
political regimes; a minimum of equity, social solidarity, and growth; and the availability of 
goods and services to all sectors of the population. Growth and the availability of goods and 
services may come only through economic growth, which in turn is fostered by 
competitiveness. 
This proposal is not, on the whole, new to the region. Its novelty is in its emphasis on 
competitiveness through the introduction of technological innovation, rather than depressing 
salary levels, overexploiting natural resources, or implementing successive devaluations — 
mechanisms that proved ineffective in the past. The rationale for this view of development in 
general and of social development in particular is as follows: to be economically competitive, 
countries need, for example, to offer more or better products or offer the same products for 
less. Because an increase in productive capacity is essential to development, technological 
change is a condition sine qua non of development, being the only means to increase 
productivity. However, technological change is a systemic process and requires human 
resources capable of understanding, learning, managing information, and adapting 
innovations to local conditions. ECLAC's assumption is that a growth strategy based on the 
introduction of technological change has a "proequity" bias, as it improves flexibility and 
competitiveness of the labour force between and within sectors. ECLAC also indicates that 
equity cannot be left exclusively to the care of a production strategy, but it should be pursued 
in a complementary and coherent way through other public policies, including education and 
other social policies (CELADE 1996; IADB 1996). 
In the case of Africa, the human- and social-development situation is far more complex; 
accordingly, the ways to approach it are different, as the chapters by Aina and by Osei-
Hwedie and Arnon Bar-on show. At one level, it is urgent to address basic human needs. Key 
social indicators for the region are worse than in most low-income countries. A comparison 
between sub-Saharan Africa and low-income countries as defined by the World Bank, shows 
that subSaharan Africa has 11 years less in average life expectancy (52 compared with 63 
years), 9% higher adult illiteracy, 34% higher infant mortality, 2.6% higher fertility, and 34% 
lower primary-school enrolment for girls (OECD 1997). Between 1980 and 1987, for 
example, gross national product per capita in subSaharan Africa declined by an average 2.8% 
annually. This situation is even more critical for countries in the Sahel. Countries in the Sahel 
show an average of 48 years life expectancy, compared with 52 years in sub-Saharan Africa 
and 63 years in low-income countries; 71% adult illiteracy, compared with 43 and 34%; 
112‰ (per thousand) infant mortality, compared with 92 and 58‰ 6.6% fertility, compared 
with 5.9 and 3.3%; and 35% primary-school enrolment for girls, compared with 64 and 98% 
(OECD 1997). 
Yet, despite this critical situation, social development is, in practice, held as secondary to 
other development issues deemed more critical as a foundation for sustainable human and 
social development (Herbold Green 1996). The World Bank's Adjustment in Africa: Reforms, 
Results and the Road Ahead is one of a series of documents outlining the issue of adjustment 
in Africa (World Bank 1994). The premise of the World Bank's approach is that growth is an 
outcome of having the right policies (World Bank 1994). Structural-adjustment measures are 
needed to ensure this. Once corrective measures are implemented, basic education and basic 
health care become intervening factors that help to raise the income of the poor and thus 
social and human development. In this view, the main social- and human-development 
challenges are those posed by the factors affecting economic growth. These include lack of 
peace and social stability, poor governance, an inefficient public service, political corruption, 
lack of macroeconomic viability and market liberalization, absence of a skilled labour force, 
and unreliable infrastructure. 
OECD puts people up front, proposing a social-development concept in terms of capacity 
development at all levels — national, regional, local, and individual. This view applies across 
the spectrum of public-sector and civil-society organizations. In the OECD's perspective, this 
framework not only reflects a major shift in the dominant paradigm of development thinking 
but also parallels a more general paradigm shift in economic thinking under the rubric of the 
"new growth theory." This theory emphasizes human and social capital as the capacities of 
individuals, groups, and whole societies to learn, adapt, and cooperate (Paye 1996). Social 
capital is the whole web of norms and networks of social engagement. It is an asset that 
grows out of the relationships between and among people and their organizations. Whereas 
human capital relates to the capacity of individuals to make efficient decisions, social capital 
relates to the capacity of a collective entity to make competent decisions (OECD 1996). The 
broad concept of capacity development embraces human and social capital and the "new 
institutional economics" (that is, the study of the economic impact of constitutional rules and 
norms at the macrolevel and the behaviour and performance of individual institutions at the 
microlevel; OECD 1996). Social development is much more than just poverty alleviation 
because it involves the idea of capacity development across the board, involving both the 
poor and the nonpoor. 
One of the most comprehensive approaches to social development to date came from the 
World Summit for Social Development (WSSD). The United Nations (995, pp. 41–42) 
summarized WSSD's understanding of social development, arguing that it 
is inseparable from the cultural, ecological, economic, political and spiritual 
environment in which it takes place. It cannot be pursued as a sectoral 
initiative. Social development is also linked to the development of peace, 
freedom, stability and security, both nationally and internationally. Promoting 
social development requires an orientation of values, objectives and priorities 
towards the well-being of all and the strengthening and promotion of 
conducive institutions and policies. ... The ultimate goal of social development 
is to improve and enhance the quality of life of all people. 
Two social-policy implications of this view of social development should be highlighted. 
First, the perception is more or less explicit that social policies developed on the basis of the 
welfare-state model are inappropriate in most countries to meet current social needs and their 
levels of demand. Second, independently of the point of departure in understanding social 
development, poverty alleviation is only part of the problem, despite the fact that poverty is 
what often attracts the most political attention. 
Social development is a multiple and interrelated undertaking that involves all levels of a 
society, not just the poor. In a broad developmental context, poverty is a systemic problem 
and not one affecting only a particular fraction of the population. To see the factors causing 
poverty and impeding social development as set of problems constrained by demographic, 
age, gender, or geographic boundaries is to see only a partial picture of the conditions 
affecting developing countries. In most instances, countries suffer poverty in Africa, Asia, 
and Latin America because wealth is concentrated and unequally distributed, productivity is 
low, learning opportunities are disparate or entirely unavailable, and access to power is 
uneven. Behind each one of these causes are ingrained social structures and institutions, 
political agendas, values, and practices of specific actors and social groups, whose choices 
make them reinforce inequality while protecting their class interests. 
Because of this, from a policy-analysis perspective (Boothroyd 1995; Burdge and Vanclay 
1995), the social-development agenda in developing countries cannot be reduced to a number 
of single goals: to adjust the economy, correct corrupt forms of governance, provide more 
education, or deliver more health care. Social development should include a wide range of 
actions across policies, sectors, and institutions and especially across a wider spectrum of 
social groups. The actual social-development challenge that most countries face is to design 
policies that can realistically and sustainably address the needs of the traditional poor and 
those in mid-socioeconomic sectors now excluded from the benefits of progress and 
modernization — the "new poor" (Bradford 1993) — and that involve the elites key to the 
policy- and decision-making processes affecting the distribution of the benefits of 
development. 
Social development is thus a fundamental premise and not a linear outcome of economic 
growth or a follow-up effect of economic restructuring. This is why it is so important to take 
society as a whole into account, rather than individual sectors. This is also why it is important 
to consider the wide range of development policies and not only those aimed at poverty 
reduction or alleviation. And this is why taking action implies more than overcoming 
poverty. Without doubt, the alleviation of extreme poverty is a priority (Chambers 1994; 
Helwege 1995). However, it must be recognized that in isolation, poverty alleviation is a 
short-term concern. The critical issue is how to address poverty in the broader framework of 
public policies and how, in so doing, to lay the base for sustainable development over the 
long term. 
A good example is education. Without question, we need to provide basic education. 
Empirical evidence indicates a positive correlation between years of primary schooling and 
basic income, particularly among women. However, from a social- and human-development 
perspective, the most critical issue is to provide education of high enough quality and 
relevance across the complete educational system. Educational reforms intended to improve 
basic education alone, without a broader, longer-term aim, ignore the need to mobilize the 
entire spectrum of social groups to build countries' capacities to understand, use, and create 
knowledge. Educational reforms that only addresses the needs of a society to read or to write, 
although essential, do not address the broader issue of building the relevant knowledge and 
skills to understand and contribute to the production process. The educational field is littered 
with examples of educational reforms that addressed short-term political objectives and 
ended by creating internal conditions for more inequity and even stronger external 
dependencies, reinforcing the state of some countries as consumers and users of knowledge 
and technologies produced elsewhere. 
Within this perspective social development can be part and parcel of human development 
understood as the process of acquiring values and learning skills and participation capacities 
that individuals and communities must have to benefit from progress. From this perspective, 
social development is more than the satisfaction of basic needs — shelter, basic education, 
primary health care, and a minimum wage. Ultimately, social development is an issue of the 
values that lead a society to allocate equitably material resources and redistribute 
opportunities. 
This view of social development, that is, as a comprehensive process centred in the creation 
of learning and participation capacities, is not really new. The traditional notion of capacity-
building in international development has this idea at its core. What is new about this outlook 
in the context of policy reform is its insistance that social development should be 
reconsidered in systemic and not exclusively targeted terms. In the context of social policies, 
this indicates that social-policy changes should be the cutting edge of a broader strategy to 
deal with increased inequities in income distribution, unemployment, low productivity, and 
the lack of competitive capacity and opportunities for vast population sectors. This is the 
point of view with which policy reform is examined in this book. 
The purpose of this book 
The purpose of this book is to examine, using a comparative approach, some of the 
theoretical and practical challenges developing countries face in bringing social-policy 
reform to the forefront of their development agendas. This book identifies and critically 
analyzes the dilemmas developing countries must overcome while they are attempting to 
reach higher levels of social and human development. 
Each chapter assesses the options countries face to enhance social development in the context 
of policy reforms. Each discusses issues such as changing state–civil-society relations, the 
impact of transnational influences brought about by international development agendas that 
promote public-policy reforms, internal conflicts eroding an already weakened political 
consensus supporting the nation-state, and the crisis of resources exacerbated by, among 
other things, patterns of unequal distribution of wealth. 
Collectively, these chapters address some of the following questions: What are the 
assumptions in the current understanding of development that developing countries are 
expected to accommodate in reforming their social-policy systems? What are the implications 
of international agendas for nations attempting to implement social-policy reforms within a 
framework of local values and cultures? What are the obstacles developing countries face in 
implementing feasible approaches and institutional structures to reflect more closely the 
integration of the principles of social equality, equity, and participation? How are these 
countries responding to the demands for greater efficiency and effectiveness in formulating, 
implementing, and delivering their social policies and programs while maintaining acceptable 
levels of social justice? What consideration is given local attempts to identify innovative 
solutions to respond to evolving social demands? What types of policy options are available 
to developing countries in implementing effective social-policy changes with their limited 
resources? What are the new risks these countries will face in the years to come if adequate 
solutions are not found to prevailing social-policy demands? 
This book is divided into two parts. Part 1 identifies and analyzes from a political-economic 
perspective the factors influencing the focus, values, direction, and feasibility of policy-
reform options available to developing countries. It examines the global framework of 
assumptions and challenges faced by developing countries in their efforts to strengthen their 
social safety nets through social-policy reforms. The chapters in part 1 argue that although 
globalization is not a new phenomenon, it drastically affects the quality of life, the security of 
people, and their established sets of values. Globalization is resulting in local changes not 
only in the quality and composition of the labour force and production patterns but also in the 
social-security, protection, and value systems that depend on a stable economy. Health care, 
training, education, and key social programs for the poor are affected by a transnational 
paradigm of social and human well-being, based on a market ideology. This part of the book 
discusses the growing transnational character of the premises underlying social policies in a 
context of global social-development interdependencies and their effects on countries' 
capacities to provide social services to meet minimum standards of well-being. 
Part 2 examines the impacts of the economically driven model of public-policy reform on 
social-sector policies in selected countries. Owing to changes in the global economy and 
international trade, the competitive capacities of many countries determine the types of 
social-security and social-protection systems they put in place. They also determine the types 
of social-sector services they are able to make available. These chapters examine how 
countries in Africa, Asia, and Latin America are reforming social-delivery systems and 
mechanisms. Some questions these chapters address are the following: How do these changes 
affect the steps countries in these regions take to prepare new generations to enter a changing 
labour market? What efforts are these countries making to incorporate the sectors most 
affected by these changes (youth and women) into the design of short- and medium-term 
policies and programs to increase competitive economic and technological capacities. What 
kinds of appropriate social-security mechanisms are being put in place to compensate for 
rapid changes in labour-market structures, employment patterns, and social safety nets to 
maintain acceptable standards of social equity. These chapters discuss these issues from the 
perspective of selected social-policy reforms, showing the interplay between growing internal 
demands for more effective social policies, the constraints faced by governments in their 
strategies to respond to these demands, and the role of global factors in facilitating or 
impeding their ability to improve social and human development. 
The book's concluding chapter reflects on the reform dynamics affecting national policy 
decisions and reviews the basis for the belief that measures such as privatization, 
decentralization, free-market determination of wages, and budget readjustments facilitate a 
rapid transition from costly social-welfare systems to more effective and just systems of 
social protection. This final essay confronts some of the questions for which answers are still 
only rudimentary, including the longer-term equity effects of such measures on the social 
fabric of nations, on their basic cultures and value systems, and on basic social institutions. In 
doing so. it calls attention to the need to identify research entry points to help respond to the 




SOCIAL POLICY AND SOCIAL ORDER IN TRANSNATIONAL 
SOCIETIES 
Andrés Pérez Baltodano 
Social theory provides "the constitutive understanding necessary for continuing, reformed, or 
purified practice" (Taylor 1983, p. 16). Such understanding shapes social practice, and 
through it, the very institutions it tries to elucidate. "If theory is about practice," Charles 
Taylor points out, "then what makes a theory right is that it brings the practice out in the 
clear. And what this leads to is that the practice can be more effective" (Taylor 1983, p. 78). 
Concepts are the building blocks of social theories and explanations. Concepts are "data 
containers" (Sartori 1977, pp. 24–49). They "slice" and interpret different aspects and 
dimensions of a social reality (Sartori 1984). When a social reality changes, concepts have to 
change to grasp the new significance and constitution of social life and social phenomena. 
Modern social sciences show a tendency to use concepts in an ahistorical manner. The result 
is the frequent use of concepts as simple names or labels. The concept of the state is an 
example. It represents the specific historical experience of the organization of the territorial, 
social, political, cultural, and economic life of the Western world over the last 400 years. 
Nevertheless, the term is widely used to describe national structures of power around the 
world — in Asia, Africa, and Latin America — regardless of the different and unique 
historical foundations these structures may have. 
The ahistorical use of concepts has several implications. It affects the capacity of both social 
scientists and policymakers to define the nature of the problems they address and, 
consequently, the options they have in articulating solutions to those problems. This is 
especially true at times of radical social transformation, such as the world is undergoing 
today, that lead to new historical circumstances, unrepresented in the prevailing conceptual 
vocabulary. One of the results of this process is that many of the current social-science 
concepts are unsuitable for grasping and fully representing the nature of today's challenges 
and the choices that need to be made in dealing with them. 
This chapter argues that the concept of social policy is intimately linked to the specific 
historical evolution of modern Western societies. More specifically, this concept is linked to 
the evolution of the social strategies used by the modern state to achieve social order. 
However, the conventional notion of social policy, as a practice that is historically rooted in 
the formation and evolution of sovereign states, has been made inadequate by the forces of 
globalization. Today, the causes and consequences of the social issues and problems that the 
notion of social policy addresses transcend the physical, legal, and political boundaries of 
national states. This new historical situation needs to be reconceptualized to design new and 
more effective ways to confront the challenges of the future and meet the need for new forms 
of social intervention. 
The shortcomings of the conventional notion of social policy in a time of transnational 
influence are more serious in societies that have long used the conventional notion to explain 
social realities significantly different from those of Western developed societies. The state in 
Latin America, for example, never achieved the levels of sovereignty and the regulatory 
capacity of the European state. Moreover, the historical evolution of Latin America has never 
produced the civil societies needed to condition the roles and the functions of the state. As 
this chapter argues, the historical specificity of Latin American societies severely limits the 
capacity of the concept of social policy to grasp some of the fundamental dimensions of the 
relations between state and society in this part of the world. Under such circumstances, 
globalization often widens, rather than closes, the gap between the conventional concept of 
social policy and the given social reality. 
This chapter examines the phenomenon of globalization as a historical process that reduces 
both modern societies' capacity to overcome contingencies (Luhmann 1982) and the capacity 
of the state to provide citizens with a sense of "ontological security"; that is, it reduces 
confidence "in the continuity of their self-identity and in the constancy of their surrounding 
social and material environments of action" (Giddens 1990, p. 92). States such as those 
controlled by the Nazis or Pinochet in Chile provided this form of security to some sectors of 
their populations while instilling others with the utmost terror and uncertainty. States ruled by 
the elites of Guatemala or Peru deny to large segments of their populations some of the most 
basic forms of human security. A modern state, in a general, ideal sense, is nevertheless a 
political structure designed to provide people with a sense of ontological security, and 
different historical manifestations of the modern state represent different degrees of the 
realization of the ideal. The capacity of the modern state to fulfil this ideal depends largely on 
its capacity to compartmentalize history and thus contain and control, within legally defined 
territorial boundaries, the causes of a community's social, economic, and political evolution. 
By doing so, the modern state enables national histories to differ from world history 
(Luhmann 1982). 
As Reinhard Kosseleck (1985, p. 275) pointed out, "it is the tension between experience and 
expectation which, in ever-changing patterns, brings about new resolutions and through this 
generates historical time." The state is thus an active participant in the management of the 
tensions between social experiences and social expectations. One of its most important 
functions is to synchronize these two dimensions of history to create a sense of social order 
and continuity. Over the past 400 years, the development of the state's political and 
administrative capacity to perform this function made possible the formation of territorially 
based "communities of aspirations and memories" (Visscher 1957, p. 206). Central to the 
development of this administrative and political capacity was the emergence of social policy 
in the 20th century, as a mechanism to reduce contingencies and secure social order. 
Globalization, however, has reduced the capacity of the state to synchronize social 
experiences and expectations, thus creating a state of affairs in which ontological insecurity is 
more likely to occur — a state of affairs in which "the ordinary circumstances of everyday 
life constitute a continual threat" (Laing 1971, p. 171). 
The social and political consequences of ontological insecurity can be disastrous. This is 
especially so for countries that never developed the capacity to truly compartmentalize their 
national histories and thus create their own national communities of aspirations and 
memories. In some regions of the world, this means nothing less than what Robert Kaplan 
(1994, p. 73) described as the "re-primitivization of man." 
To address these issues, this chapter discusses the relationship between territorial space, 
historical time, and ontological security and examines the emergence and development of the 
sovereign state as the modern expression of this relationship. Globalization undermines this 
relationship and the capacity of the modern state to provide ontological security. 
Accordingly, this chapter explores the prospects for developing transnational social policies 
that recreate the relationship between territorial space, historical time, and ontological 
security. 
Territory, history, and ontological security 
One of the constant dimensions in the evolution of history is the tendency for human beings 
to find their identity and security in the territorial organizations of social life. In "primitive 
cultures," the relationship of territory, historical identity, and security was expressed in the 
reverence that people had for their land. In modern political societies, this is expressed, for 
example, in the territorial aspirations of nationalist movements. 
Answers to the fundamental question about the roots of the territorial dimension of social 
organization are found in at least three theoretical perspectives. A biological explanation of 
the territorial dimension of social phenomena states that the "territorial imperative" is the 
product of an animal instinct to control property and power (Ardrey 1966). In the same 
tradition, Randolph Bourne (1946, p. 100) argued that "the State is the organization of the 
herd to act offensively or defensively against another herd similarly organized." From a 
political theoretical perspective, Robert Sack (1986, p. 19) expressed the view that 
"territoriality" represents "the attempt by an individual or group to affect, influence, or 
control people, phenomena, and relationships, by delimiting and asserting control over a 
geographical area." Sack's position is an important departure from the biological explanation. 
For Sack (1986, p. 2), territoriality is not "biologically motivated, but rather ... socially and 
geographically rooted." Territoriality, in this perspective, involves the use of politics to 
organize the control of people over people and transcends individuals' basic instincts for 
survival. Marxist scholars have also explored the territorial dimension of social organizations. 
Henri Lefebvre, for example, viewed states as spaces created by violence. This violence 
(Lefebvre 1991, pp. 280–281), 
must not be viewed in isolation: it cannot be separated either from the 
accumulation of capital or from the rational and political principle of 
unification, which subordinates and totalises the various aspects of social 
practice — legislation, culture, knowledge, education — within a determinate 
space; namely the space of the ruling class's hegemony over its people and 
over the nationhood that it has arrogated. 
Both fundamental and common to the biological, political, and economic explanations is the 
relationship they establish between territory, social order, and security. What separates them 
is their different emphases on the factors determining this relationship. According to the 
biological explanation, the territorial dimension of social life is the result of human instinct; 
for Sack, the relationship between territory and social order is the result of a political 
impulse; and for Marxist researchers, this relationship is explained by the economic 
imperative of capitalism. 
The evolution of the notion of territory 
From the beginning of organized human life, territory has functioned as a container of "social 
time", understood as the passage of time collectively experienced by the members of the 
community. Territory naturally limits human experiences and therefore expectations as well. 
But by doing so, it also limits uncertainty and reduces contingencies. This even applies to 
nomadic societies who usually migrate through relatively similar terrain. 
The human tendency to use territory as the foundation for social organizations may be rooted 
in inductive thinking. At some point in our evolution, humans saw that territory limits human 
experiences. Once this is a given, it is easy to conclude that by controlling territory, one also 
controls the events taking place within it, and by controlling events, contingencies are 
reduced and security is achieved. Thus, the idea of territory as a container of time and 
experience may have originally been a mere observation, later transformed by experience into 
a fact that, today, is taken for granted. The suggestion that inductive thinking and common 
sense could be at the root of the relationship between territory, history, and security is 
supported by the theoretical development of the relationship between time and space in 
physics. Inductive reasoning and common sense were, according to Alfred North Whitehead 
(1925), the foundations of Newton's conceptualization of this relationship, especially as 
rudimentary instruments of scientific analysis and observation did not allow scientists to go 
far beyond the use of their own senses. 
The tendency to think of territorial spaces as containers of historical time was pronounced in 
agricultural societies, with "the formation of density," or the grouping of small villages into 
complete communities, which brought about "communal life and hence the need for law and 
authority to enforce it" (Gottmann 1973, p. 124). These communities developed the ability to 
manage internal conflict and to overcome contingencies by establishing rules and regulations. 
The development of these communities represents the emergence of what Sheldon Wolin 
called "political spaces," geographical areas "where the plans, ambitions, and actions of 
individuals and groups incessantly jar against each other — colliding, blocking, coalescing, 
separating" (Wolin 1960, p. 17). 
Another stage in the evolution of the relationship between history, territorial space, and 
security was that of universal imperium (Gottmann 1973, p. 124). Alexander the Great 
expanded the territorial foundation of social organizations previously contained in city-states. 
The imperial experiment of the Hellenistic age was later repeated in the Roman Empire, 
which controlled the Mediterranean and western Europe through a system of administrative 
planning, law, and economic relations. Its eventual collapse opened the doors for the 
expansion of the Christian Church and the consequent Christianization of the Roman world. 
Thereafter, the social organization of the West would be based on both a universal structure 
of religious belief and a fragmented structure of political power. The medieval Europeans 
derived a precarious sense of security from both. Feudal relations determined everyday life 
while religion gave meaning to that life and provided answers to the larger questions about 
human existence. 
Within the local territories that constituted the foundations of medieval social life, the future 
resembled the past in a world that moved through cyclical time regulated by the seasons. "In 
all Christendom," as Manchester (1993, pp. 22–23) remarked, 
there was not such a thing as a watch, a clock, or, apart from a copy of the 
Easter tables in the nearest church or monastery, anything resembling a 
calendar. Generations succeeded one another in a meaningless, timeless blur. 
The short collective memories of medieval people limited their expectations (Koselleck 
1985). Dealing with uncertainty and achieving security in this world of limited experiences 
and expectations was ultimately founded on religious faith and resignation (Le Goff 1988). 
The distant past and the distant future stood beyond the control of human intervention and 
"tended to fuse together in the darkness of mythic time" (Luhmann 1982, p. 271). Medieval 
society, as Poulantzas (1978, p. 109) observed, "does not make history, it bathes in a 
continuous and homogeneous historicity." 
In the mid-1500s, Europe faced a great crisis produced by profound social, religious, 
technological, political, and economic changes that would eventually transform the medieval 
relationship between territory, history, and security. These changes created a gap between the 
experience of medieval society and previously unimagined historical possibilities. The crisis 
was not only institutional but also psychosociological. It was a crisis of both social order and 
of human security that required a rethinking of the most basic foundations of social and 
spiritual life. At the social level, it centred "on the location of authority," and questions such 
as "what is authentic authority?" and "where does authority come from?" At the human level, 
the questions were even more fundamental: "are there solid and stable certainties?" "what is 
order and how certain is it?", "what is truth and how is it achieved?", and, ultimately, "can 
one rely on anything?" (Rabb 1975, p. 33). These questions presupposed that the distant past 
and the distant future were no longer under the control of God and the Church. This created 
both a sense of liberation from the "theological dogma and animistic superstition" of 
medieval societies and a sense of alienation from a world that no longer offered "a redeeming 
context within which could be understood the larger issues of human existence" (Tarnas 
1991, p. 326). Ontological security could now only be achieved through human and, more 
specifically, political intervention. Therefore, the belief expressed in the idea "no salvation 
outside the Church" would be replaced by "the defining maxim of modern politics: no 
security outside the state" (Dillon 1995, p. 156). In these new circumstances, the role of state 
policy would become crucial to the creation and re-creation of social order within the new 
political spaces of the modern era. 
The state and the spatial delimitation of history 
History is seen here both as a social interpretation of a community's past and as a reference 
point for anticipating the future. From this perspective, history consists of experience and 
expectation (Koselleck 1985). Increasing expectations for social order and ontological 
security expanded the scope of state policies and the state's regulatory capacity from the 17th 
to the 20th century, until the concept social policy emerged to make explicit the role played 
by the state in shaping the social conditions of its citizens. This expansion can be divided into 
two phases: the era of Hobbe's Leviathan and absolute monarchy and that of civil society 
(Barry et al. 1996). 
The first phase corresponds roughly to the era of absolutism in the 17th and 18th centuries. 
Within this context, "police science" emerged to articulate instrumental theory for the 
purpose of social engineering. The main objective of this science was the organization of 
social order. To achieve this objective, it looked into a wide range of issues, including moral 
and welfare issues, such as food and housing. It is important to note that the form of social 
order that the state tried to articulate during this period relied solely on what it considered 
feasible and desirable. No form of popular participation or consultation was used or even 
deemed necessary by the state to organize the lives of its citizens (Fraile 1994). 
The new social conditions of the first phase were launched by the crisis in the mid-1500s that 
expanded social life beyond the boundaries of the territorial units of medieval Europe. 
Increasing trade, the emergence of a bourgeois class, and the increasing mobility of labour 
weakened the medieval powers controlling social relations at that time (Anderson 1974). 
With the expansion of the scope of territories as containers of historical times, the 
construction of social order required the institutionalization of expectations (Luhmann 1990). 
This in turn required the centralization of power and the creation of a new foundation for 
authority. The historical answer to these requirements was the emergence and consolidation 
of monarchical absolutism, which recreated the territorial scope of social life by forming a 
centralized structure of political power that overran the microsocieties of the Middle Ages. 
The foundation of authority for this new structure of power was the idea of sovereignty, best 
expressed by Hobbes in 1651. Hobbes' argument in favour of the formation of a "collective 
will for the establishment of peace at home and cooperation against enemies abroad" 
demonstrated the continuing importance of territory as the physical foundation of social order 
and security. Sovereignty involved a radical reconceptualization of the medieval relationship 
between territory, history, and security, creating the foundation for the development of a 
society's capacity to generate "a strictly political history of chains of events, which replaced 
the archaic fusion of mythical and genealogical time" (Luhmann 1982, p. 333). With this new 
sense of history, philosophy would gradually replace theology, and "the omnipotent God" 
would become "the omnipotent lawgiver" (Schmitt 1985, p. 36). Moreover, with the 
emergence of the great Leviathan, ontological security would be not only politically created 
but also planned and delivered by the state in a process guided by the doctrine of raison 
d'etat, that is, by the subordination of public morality to state power, where the rational 
calculation of all possible consequences became the first political commandment (Koselleck 
1988). 
Otto Hintze (1975, p. 175) argued that in this period, 
the idea of a general citizenship began to penetrate into the political sphere, by 
virtue of the regime's absolutist nature and the unitary character of the state; to 
this idea the notion of general citizen rights was soon added. The population 
accustomed itself to fixed duties laid down by the state, to taxation and 
military service, to daily contacts with the civil servants of a centralized state, 
and, in consequence, acquired a sense of political cohesion, the rudiments of a 
common political interest. The idea of a unified political order — for which 
absolutism had created the needed external forms, became now an innermost 
concern of the population itself. A latent consciousness of nation and state 
originated, and it needed only special occasion to emerge in all its strength. 
The principle of rational calculation in the decisions and actions of the absolutist monarch 
required the development of administrative mechanisms to synchronize social experiences 
with social expectations and to create national communities with a common history. 
The role of the state, as a synchronizer of social expectations and social experiences 
underwent significant change with the Enlightenment idea of progress, and political practice 
in this era created the conditions for democratic theory and the principles of popular 
sovereignty and representative government. Social and economic progress created a gap 
between society's historical experience and its expectations. It created "an open future that 
was not constrained by the past" (Luhmann 1982, p. 281). This made social relations and 
historical identities more difficult to sustain, as the past could no longer be used as a "means 
of orientation" (Elias 1992, p. 38). This shift represented a formidable challenge to a society's 
ability to achieve security and overcome contingencies. However, the ideas of popular 
sovereignty and representative democracy expressed a new faith in human ability to control 
destiny, despite the uncertainties of the future. Democracy placed sovereignty in neither the 
king nor the state but in people. It conceived of the state as a social mechanism to act in 
accordance with the dictates of the people. Increasingly, the need for the state to maintain 
social order and the need for society to achieve security would be expressed in the form of 
state policies designed to create adequate social conditions for the people living within the 
territorial boundaries of a nation. 
Popular sovereignty and representative governments thus resolved the challenge that progress 
posed to society's needs for security. Through a combination of political fiction and reality, 
the democratic state guaranteed a response to people's needs and demands. This guarantee 
would reduce the risks faced by a society. In practice, the democratic state did respond to 
people's needs and demands, but not simply as a result of the passive reading of the people's 
will. The state, through its administrative machinery, became an active organizer of that will 
by creating and enforcing historical identities with separate notions of "the public interest." 
As R.M. MacIver (1964, p. 126) put it, 
the very fact that administration and law have determinate boundaries knits 
together those who live within them and separates them from those who are 
subject to other administration and law. The evolution of a common order 
proceeds separately and therefore diversely within each state, and so the sense 
of likeness within and difference without is fostered. 
Thus, in this period, the state actively participated in the creation of "imagined communities" 
(Anderson 1991) tied together by administrative structures. These structures made the 
development of nationalistic values possible (Nisbet 1981), and this, in turn, helped to 
synchronize society's historical experience with its expectations. 
The theory of popular sovereignty and representative government was not therefore simply 
the expression of secular faith. It was also the result of having an administrative system 
whereby faith in human beings' capacity to control history could be realized. This is why the 
principle of sovereignty, as articulated by Hobbes, was later developed "to perfect the state 
and to realize the opportunities presented by its accumulation of power" (Hume 1981, p. 20). 
Through this, it became increasingly clear that institutionalizing abstract social relations 
required the use of efficient administrative machinery. This was best expressed in Jeremy 
Bentham's concern for "the idea of rational rules as paramount standards of administrative 
behavior" (Bahmueller 1981, p. 186). The ultimate objective of these rules would be to 
contribute to "the maximization of the Benthamite's values of security, predictability, 
stability, and physical comfort" (Long 1977, p. 118). 
Thus, the establishment of the modern state as an institution was accompanied by the 
development of its capacity to regulate social relations. By operating at both domestic and 
international levels, the administrative apparatus of the state facilitated the spacial 
delimitation of history; in other words, the development of the state's administrative capacity 
to regulate social relations across territorial space made it possible to regulate social relations 
across historical time. This is because continuous regulation of social relations across 
territorial space tends to institutionalize "behaviourial expectations" (Luhmann 1990). At the 
domestic level, the administrative apparatus of the state responds to domestic demands and 
limits the range of acceptable (and consequently legal) economic, political, and social 
behaviour. At the international level, it resists external pressures — by means of war, 
diplomacy, and international law — to protect domestic markets and political self-
determination. By regulating domestic conditions and filtering external pressures, the state 
makes the conformation of national histories possible. 
The second phase in the development of the state's capacity to regulate social relations 
corresponds to what Foucault called "the discovery of society" (Barry et al. 1996, p. 9). This 
period roughly corresponds to the 19th and 20th centuries. The main characteristic of this 
period is the emergence of civil society as a network of social relations with not only a 
considerable degree of independence vis-à-vis the state but also the capacity to condition the 
power of the state. The emergence of society as a complex network of social relations with a 
dynamic of its own made the police science obsolete as a mechanism for social order. As 
Rose (1996a, p. 43) points out, "government now confronts itself with realities — market, 
civil society, citizens — that have their own internal logics and densities, their own intrinsic 
mechanisms of self-regulation." To create and maintain conditions of social order, the state 
had to consider the growing capacity of society to articulate its demands and had to rely on 
the institutions of society to respond to the demands of its citizens. According to T.S. 
Marshall (1965), citizenship rights in the United Kingdom evolved from civil rights (liberty 
of the person, freedom of speech, the right to own property, etc.) in the 18th century, to 
political rights (political participation and the right to vote) in the 19th century, to social 
rights (economic welfare and security) in the 20th century. Citizenship rights evolved 
throughout Europe, and social policy emerged as a mechanism to help create and preserve 
social order by counterbalancing the negative effects of the market on the working class, 
including unemployment and dangerous working conditions. From this perspective, the 
creation of social-insurance programs should be seen as an instrument designed by the state 
to overcome contingencies and provide a minimum of security to its people. Social insurance, 
according to Rose (1996, pp. 48–49), 
incarnates social solidarity in collectivizing the management of the individual 
and collective dangers posed by the economic riskiness of a capricious system 
of wage labour, and the corporeal riskiness of a body subject to sickness and 
injury, under the stewardship of a "social state." 
The emergence of "a social state" and of social policy resulted from the interaction of 
national societies, national economies, and national states operating within the legal and 
territorial boundaries of sovereign national territories. The evolution of citizenship rights 
from the 18th to the 20th century provided societies with the capacity to condition the 
functions and priorities of the state. In turn, the state had the capacity to redistribute the 
benefits generated by economic systems. From this perspective, a basic assumption of 
democratic theory is that the participation of the state in the formation of national histories is 
determined by the people. David Held pointed out that democratic theory assumes the 
existence of "a 'symmetrical' and 'congruent' relationship between political decision makers 
and the recipients of political decisions." According to Held (1991, p. 198), this symmetry 
and this congruence are supposed to hold at two levels: 
first, between citizen–voters and the decision-makers whom they are, in 
principle, able to hold to account; and secondly, between the "output" 
(decisions, policies, etc.) of decision-makers and their constituents — 
ultimately "the people" in a delimited territory. 
The democratic principles of popular sovereignty and representative government are realized 
through the relationship between decision-makers, along with their decisions, and the 
population affected by political decisions (Held 1991). By controlling the state apparatus, 
people in democratic societies control the processes through which the state synchronizes 
their collective historical experience with their expectations for the future. Through these 
processes, states create collective identities and national histories institutionalized in their 
organizational values, structures, and processes. Therefore, synchronizing collective 
expectations and experiences is, in a democratic society, a reflexive process, whereby social 
demands influence public policies, which, in turn, constitute part of the social structure for 
political decisions (Giddens 1991). 
In sum, social policies are the result of a set of particular circumstances in the history of the 
modern state. They are the result of the development of civil societies' capacity to condition 
the functions of national states that, in turn, can condition the functioning of the economy and 
the distributions of wealth and opportunity in society. Three historical conditions led to this 
complex relationship between society, the market, and the state: first, the consolidation of the 
principle of sovereignty, allowing national territories to contain the main determinants of 
their political evolution within legal, territorial, and political boundaries; second, the 
development of the capacity of the state to regulate and condition social relations; and third, 
the evolution of citizenship rights. 
These three historical conditions enabled European societies to create national histories, with 
national actors and institutions. A central factor in the formation of these national histories 
was the generation of social order and security through national social policies. Therefore, the 
concept of social policy expresses a national reality. A national territorial state and a national 
population should be the main points of reference used to identify both the problems in social 
policy and the means to confront them. New historical problems, such as those produced by 
capital mobility and global migration, significantly reduce the capacity for social policy to 
generate conditions of order and security. 
To illustrate and to gain a broader comparative understanding of the processes of state 
formation and social policy, the following subsection contrasts the Latin American 
experience with that of Europe. 
The Latin American experience 
The historical evolution of the political societies of Latin America differs significantly from 
that of the European state in at least three important interrelated respects. First, the legal 
principle of sovereignty that is formally attached to Latin American states by international 
law lacks the historical, social, and political significance that it had for European political 
societies. The Latin American states were never able to contain or territorially delimit their 
history. They never developed the capacity that European states achieved to contain within 
their boundaries the basic causes of their internal political, economic, and social evolution. 
Instead, their historical development has depended on external cultural, political, and 
economic factors. 
Second, the Latin American state never achieved the social regulatory capacity of the 
European state. It never developed the capacity to synchronize social memories and 
aspirations through the formulation and implementation of state policies. Inefficient 
administration of justice, poor delivery of educational and health services, incompetent and 
corrupt police organizations are only some of the manifestations of the very limited capacity 
of the Latin American states to organize social relations within their territories. 
Third, the social evolution of Latin America has not produced civil societies with the capacity 
to condition the role and function of the state. It has not produced a structure of citizenship 
rights capable of creating conditions for the kind of symmetric and congruent relationship 
between the state and society central to democratic systems. Even in today's democratic 
experiments in the region, the main challenge of prodemocratic forces is the creation and 
consolidation of independent public spaces for the articulation of social strategies to influence 
the role of the state (O'Donnell 1992). 
Social policy in Latin America is the outcome of (1) clientelist relationships between the state 
and those sectors of the population with the capacity to be recognized by an externally 
dependent and highly exclusionary state with limited capacity for social regulation; and (2) 
external influences and pressures, such as from international organizations, development 
agencies, and financial institutions (IFIs). Clientelism and external pressures have produced 
two models of social policy in Latin America: state corporatist social policies and social 
policies offered as an alternative to citizenship. In his classic analysis of corporatism, 
Schmitter (1974, pp. 102–103) defined state corporatism as a system in which "corporations" 
are "created by and kept as auxiliary and dependent organs of the state which founded its 
legitimacy and effective functioning on other bases." The idea of social policy as an 
alternative to citizenship is taken from Marshall. In his classic analysis of the evolution of 
citizenship, Marshall (1965, p. 88) argued that the Poor Law in England "treated the claims 
of the poor, not as an integral part of the rights of the citizen, but as an alternative to them." 
His analysis suggests the possibility of treating social policy as a form of state intervention 
"divorced" from citizenship. 
State corporatist social policies are more visible in the most socially advanced societies of the 
region, such as Argentina and Brazil. Social policies offered as an alternative to citizenship 
prevail in countries such as Guatemala, Mexico, Nicaragua, and Peru. State corporatist social 
policies respond to corporatist interests, rather than to broad social or class demands. As 
Malloy pointed out, pressure groups in these corporatist societies do not "bargain for general 
rights of citizens, nor even for right of classes." Rather, pressure groups in these societies 
bargain for "group-specific rights" (Malloy 1993, p. 235): 
The pattern of coverage in all cases formed a kind of power map of each 
country. The first and best coverage went to groups like civil servants and the 
military who controlled parts of the state apparatus itself; coverage of high 
quality next went to groups in strategic economic activities in export products 
such as railroads, docks, maritime, etc; these were followed by groups in 
critical urban services such as banks, electricity, transport, etc; the last to 
receive coverage, and of a lower order, were manufacturing workers ... the 
rural sector as well as the urban informal sector were excluded. 
Social policies offered as an alternative to citizenship are designed to benefit segments of the 
population that suffer systematic forms of social, political, and economic exclusion. The 
people in this category are citizens only in a formal manner. They are recognized as 
recipients of social policy by the same states that deny their rights and sustain their exclusion. 
The most visible groups in this category are the indigenous populations across the region. 
Understanding the differences in the nature of the state, citizenship rights, and social policy in 
Europe and Latin America is essential to understanding the impact of globalization on the 
nature of state–society relations in these two parts of the world. The next section addresses 
the issue of globalization and its impact on social policies. 
Globalization and the changing nature of social policy 
Globalization refers to "the intensification of worldwide social relations which link distant 
localities in such a way that local happenings are shaped by events occurring many miles 
away and vice versa" (Giddens 1990, p. 64). Although the origins of globalization can be 
traced to the emergence of the United Kingdom as the world leader in finance and trade 
during the second half of the 19th century, the first institutional expression and the 
mechanisms of the globalized economy were set in place only after the end of World War II, 
with the birth of an international monetary system at the Bretton Woods conference in July 
1944 (Mitchell 1992). On the basis of this agreement, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) were created. 
Since World War II globalization has continued to evolve, manifesting itself in areas other 
than the economy. At present, it is possible to distinguish several macroscopic trends of this 
phenomenon, including 
• The internationalization of trade, finance, and corporate organization; 
• The internationalization of the world's security system; 
• The rapid transformation of technology; 
• The spread of ecological problems; and 
• The emergence of new social movements with both a local and transnational 
consciousness (Camilleri and Falk 1992). 
These expressions of globalization reduce the capacity of the state to spatially delimit history. 
They "'lift out' social relations from local contexts of interaction" and restructure those 
relations "across indefinite spans of time–space" (Giddens 1990, p. 21). 
The internationalization of trade, finance, and corporate organization has produced a growing 
disharmony between the national scope of the political authority of the state and the 
transnational reach of the market. Thus, multinational corporations operate within a 
corporate, rather than a geographic, view of the world's space (Clarke 1985; Heilbroner 1992, 
1995). 
The disharmony between the state and the market created by this situation is reflected in the 
changing nature of social policy in both Europe and North America. The welfare state in 
these societies was founded on relatively harmonious relationships between politics and 
economics at the national level. It was the political ability of the state to redistribute the 
benefits of economic growth that made the development of social rights and of national 
networks of social services possible. Today, however, "domestic" economic and social 
relations are increasingly shaped by global-market forces, rather than by domestic ones 
(Reich 1991; Heilbroner 1992). This makes it increasingly difficult for governments to 
"domesticate" economic forces (Falk 1993, p. 636) to maintain social policies and with them, 
a sense of ontological security. 
Moreover, the transnational character of economic relations and the increasing "irrelevance 
of corporate nationality" create conditions for what Christopher Lash (1994) called "the 
revolt of the elites." According to Lash, the globalization of economic relations enables elites 
to severe their loyalty from their own national societies. They can withdraw their economic 
and political support and their contribution to their countries' attempts to sustain national 
identity and history. 
However, in addition to economic relations, technology also contributes to the globalization 
of social relations. In his article "Jihad vs. McWorld," Benjamin Barber (1992) argued that 
the information arm of international commerce's sprawling body reaches out 
and touches distinct nations and parochial cultures, and gives them a common 
face chiseled in Hollywood, on Madison Avenue, and in Silicon Valley. ... 
What is the power of the Pentagon compared with Disneyland? Can the Sixth 
Fleet keep up with CNN? 
Barber (1992, p. 58) further remarked that "McDonald's in Moscow and Coke in China will 
do more to create a global culture than military colonization ever could." 
Whereas communication technology tends to diffuse values from North to South, global 
migration "moves" values from South to North. Global migration is motivated by the search 
for better living conditions by the inhabitants of countries in the deprived regions of the 
South. Whereas television carries the values that define the national histories and identities of 
the North into the living rooms of the South, migrants carry the frustrations of their own 
history, as well as their aspirations to the North. In 1993, the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees estimated that every year "150,000–300,000 people are accepted 
for resettlement on humanitarian grounds, and more than 2 million seek asylum in a foreign 
country." According to the same source (UNHCR 1993, p. 24), "the immediate cause of flight 
is usually an imminent threat to life, liberty or security." 
Because of the transnational character of economic forces, information technology, and 
migration, they reduce the state's ability to contain the causes of its social, political, and 
economic evolution within its own boundaries. Furthermore, the administrative machinery of 
the modern state is quickly being transformed into a "spreading network" of "subtle and 
direct interconnections and interdependencies that enmesh public administrators from one 
part of the planet to another" (Luke 1992, p. 15). This has serious implications for the 
management of social policy. The transnational and international transformation of the state 
apparatus surely creates tensions and contradictions between the liberal concept of the 
modern state, with its emphasis on domestic responsiveness and accountability, particularly 
in areas of social provision, and the economic imperatives of the global market. The result is 
a crisis of authority arising from the state's increasing inability to respond to its domestic 
social needs and demands (Rosenau 1992). 
In many ways the magnitude and implications of this crisis are similar to those faced by 
medieval institutions when the main social issues were the redefinition of authority and the 
identification of its legitimate sources. As has been pointed out, democracy implies a 
congruent relationship between policymakers and the recipients of policies. Citizens are 
supposed to maintain a considerable degree of control over the administrative functions of the 
state. Through this control, people actively participate in the spatial delimitation of historical 
time. The result is a lessening of uncertainty about the future and therefore greater security. 
However, the development of the modern state's role in "engendering social conditions" 
(Luhmann 1993, p. 67) has been accompanied by a decline in the political capacity of people 
to influence the public policy-making process. This is becoming increasingly evident in 
social-sector policies, including employment and education. Therefore, a person affected by 
policy decisions "sees himself as endangered by decisions that he neither makes himself nor 
controls" (Luhmann 1993, p. 107). Globalization tends to promote a rupture in the congruent 
relationship between decision-makers and the populous that eliminates the raison d'etre of 
political participation as traditionally conceived. To win a national election today, for 
example, is not to achieve the capacity to govern vis-à-vis social needs and priorities but to 
assume the role of intermediary between increasingly powerful global forces and active but 
increasingly ineffective domestic pressures (Ventriss 1989; Simeon 1991). 
However, globalization does not create homogeneous social conditions around the world. Far 
from it. Globalization is a force to be reckoned with, but it is a force that confronts the 
resilient variety and heterogeneity of the human condition (Migdal 1988). Therefore, the 
impact of globalization on the capacity of states to spatially delimit history and generate 
conditions for security will vary according to a state's capacity to filter external pressures and 
to respond to domestic needs and demands. To understand this, the traditional notions of 
developed and developing societies remain useful because they are not simply categories for 
differentiating levels of economic advancement, but, more importantly, they represent levels 
of institutional capacity to reconcile people's social experiences with their expectations. More 
specifically, these categories represent different levels of state capacity to create conditions of 
social order and security through public policies (Johnson 1977). 
These important differences are not properly captured by the concept of social policy that is 
used ahistorically to represent state actions in both developed and developing societies, 
regardless of their different histories and different social conditions. The specificity of the 
impact of globalization on social policy in the two types of society is lost if these 
fundamentally different historical experiences are represented by a concept of social policy 
that claims universal applicability and value. 
The historical evolution of the political societies of Latin America shows weaknesses and 
deficiencies in terms of external sovereignty, social regulatory capacity, and civil society. 
Consequently, globalization can have devastating social effects in states like those in Latin 
America that are without the capacity to organize social interventions to respond to domestic 
needs and demands. 
The effects of globalization in Latin America became increasingly evident during the 
stabilization and adjustment crisis of the 1980s, particularly through the conditions and 
restrictions imposed by multilateral credit organizations on the governments of the region. 
According to Rosenthal (1990, p. 63), the crisis was prompted by 
high levels of indebtedness combined with a dramatic rise in real interest rates, 
deteriorating terms of trade, an abrupt decline in fresh sources of external 
financing, and the increasing uncertainties and instabilities of the rules that 
governed world trade and financial flows. 
These unfavourable conditions were aggravated by a loss of dynamism in the two main 
engines of growth in Latin American economies in the post-World War II period: the export 
of primary products and industrialization based on the expansion of domestic demand. The 
increasing obsolescence of these traditional economic engines is reflected in the fact that the 
total value of exports in 11 of the 19 economically most important countries of the region 
remained unchanged or declined during the 1980s. Moreover, the participation of Latin 
America in the world exports went from 7.7% in 1960 to 3.9% in 1988 (ECLAC 1990). 
These changes are not a cyclical phenomenon but result from a profound transformation of 
the international demand structure, which includes changes in consumer preferences and 
technological changes. They are, in other words, the result of a discrepancy between "the 
composition of the Latin American exports and the structure of demand, production and 
technology of the international economy" (ECLAC 1990, p. 24). 
During the 1980s, Latin American governments negotiated with the IMF and the World Bank 
to obtain new credits to restore external balance. In securing new credits, these countries 
agreed to introduce a number of economic, political, and institutional reforms along 
neoliberal lines (Sunkel and Zuleta 1990). The implementation of these reforms involved 
opening national economies to international competition, reducing the size of the state, 
reducing government services (for example, in health and education), and privatization. 
Unfortunately, the social costs of these reforms have been dramatic. 
In terms of the medium- and longer-term effects on social policy and social-security systems, 
the stabilization and adjustment crisis of Latin American societies and the introduction of 
neoliberal economic policies during the 1980s and 1990s should not be treated as a temporary 
phenomenon. They have triggered a historical transition to a new model of both social and 
economic development, in which the market determines the organization of economic and 
social affairs. The market-centred model of development tends to replace the different 
versions of the Keynesian development model that prevailed in Latin America after the 
1930s. The Keynesian model is based on a combination of international economic laissez 
faire and state interventionism (Schamis 1993). In the Keynesian model, the role of the state 
includes the responsibility for providing workers and marginal sectors of society with a 
network of social services that, at least in theory, guarantees their social rights. In fact, the 
idea of the welfare state in Latin America has found extremely diverse expressions: from the 
sophisticated, universal, Uruguayan social-security system introduced by José Batlle y 
Ordõnez between 1903 and 1915, to the highly exclusive systems of countries like Guatemala 
and Peru. Regardless of the wide range of national variations, the Keynesian model expresses 
the notion that state intervention is needed to bring about economic development, to 
safeguard the social rights of the population, and to create social order. The introduction in 
the 1980s of structural-adjustment programs and stabilization programs signaled a radical 
reconceptualization of the role of the state and state–society relations, particularly insofar as 
they pertain to social provisioning. This emerging model is part of a global trend that is 
reconfiguring state–society relations on the basis of market considerations. Needless to say, 
the sociopolitical implications of this model are profound. 
The Inter-American Development Bank (IADB) and the United Nations Development 
Programme (UNDP) have pointed out that in absolute numbers and as a percentage of the 
total population, there was more poverty in the region in the early 1990s than at the beginning 
of the 1980s (IADB and UNDP 1993). 
The Social Panorama of Latin America, 1995 reports "moderate progress" in the alleviation 
of poverty. However, these efforts have not been enough to recover the social conditions that 
prevailed at the end of the 1970s (ECLAC 1995). Moreover, the rate of economic growth for 
this decade is insufficient to absorb the growing labour force. According to ECLAC (1995, p. 
23), 
this situation was initially interpreted as a specific consequence of the early 
stages of the reform process, but it now appears to have become permanent, 
even in cases where the process is at an advanced stage and growth rates are 
high. 
Finally, ECLAC (1995, p. 27) reported that 
the economies of most Latin American countries during the 1990s have been 
characterized by an unequal distribution of the costs of adjustment and by a 
notable rigidity of income distribution during expansionary phases. 
With more than 200 million people in the region living under the poverty line (ECLAC 
1997), it is possible to argue that politics in Latin America is to a considerable extent about 
social policy (Faria and Guimaraes Castro 1990). People's participation in the promotion and 
consolidation of political institutions is guided not only by ideals of political freedom and 
democracy but also by a practical concern for survival and security. 
The intimate relationship between social policy and politics in Latin America is conditioned 
by economic policy. In Latin America, the current processes of economic and political 
development involve profound tensions and contradictions between the institutional 
establishment of democracy as an inclusive political system and of exclusive neoliberal 
economies (Calderón and Dos Santos 1991). Awareness of these tensions and contradictions 
prompted observers of Latin American affairs to argue that the introduction of liberal-market 
economic policies has produced "regressive social effects and severe political conflicts, with 
unpredictable consequences for the recently restored democracies [of the region]" (Sunkel 
and Zuleta 1990, p. 35). IADB and UNDP (1993, pp. 3–4) indicated that 
excluding large sectors of the population from the tangible and intangible 
benefits of progress is incompatible with the consolidation of increasingly 
open, pluralistic and stable democratic systems. Sustained economic exclusion 
reflects in political exclusion which undermines governance. 
More recently, the final report of the 24th Conference of the Food and Agriculture 
Organization of the United Nations, celebrated in Asuncion, Paraguay, in July 1996, warned 
governments in Latin America and the Caribbean of the grave social consequences of hunger 
and malnutrition in the region. According to this report, 13% of the population of Latin 
America and the Caribbean suffer from hunger today. At this conference, representatives of 
workers' organizations also warned participants about the dangers of large-scale social 
insurrections produced by the intensification of poverty in the region (La Prensa 1996). 
The inability of the Latin American states to respond to the social needs and demands of their 
populations has not been offset by the market. The market has the potential to empower 
people through self-employment and wage employment. However, under present and future 
conditions of many Latin American countries, this potential is unlikely to be realized. 
Projections for 2000 show the development of a widening gap between the rates of growth of 
the labour force and those of employment. This trend is a central characteristic of the 
phenomenon of "jobless growth" affecting the world today (UNDP 1993). Moreover, the 
problem of labour today is not only expressed in a quantitative discrepancy between demand 
and supply. Job security is also deteriorating. In both industrial and developing societies 
"enterprises have been reducing their reliance on a permanent job labour force, engaging 
instead a highly skilled group of workers surrounded by a periphery of temporary workers" 
(UNDP 1993, p. 37). In 1993, the Program to Promote Educational Reform in Latin America 
and the Caribbean reported that although overall economic growth in Latin America was 
producing more jobs, 8 out of 10 new jobs since 1980 were concentrated in the informal 
sector, which includes small business, self-employment, and domestic service. Needless to 
say, most of these jobs were of very poor quality. 
The inability of the state to provide people with social security, compounded with the 
inability of the market to provide people with employment and job security, creates the 
proper conditions for ontological insecurity, a situation, recall, in which "the ordinary 
circumstances of everyday life constitute a continual threat" (Laing 1971, p. 171). 
ECLAC suggests possible linkages between socioeconomic conditions and increasing 
violence and insecurity in Latin America. Based on a survey of the regional press carried out 
between January and August 1995, ECLAC (1995, p. 123) reported that in Uruguay "85% of 
the population believes that violence has increased in the last 10 years and there is little 
confidence in the police." In Honduras, 
police functions have been transferred from the military to the civil authorities, 
but the police have proved incapable, through lack of resources, of curbing the 
violence which led to 3,600 deaths in 1994 and 835 up to June 1995, 
according to police statistics. 
In Venezuela, "lynching of criminals in working-class areas demonstrates the degree of 
dissatisfaction with the policy and processes of justice." In Guatemala, 
the electoral platforms of several political parties agree on the need to combat 
crime, give more power to the police, increase their wages and provide more 
equipment, and to increase awareness of civic responsibilities and punish 
corruption in the forces of law and order. 
The proliferation of ontological insecurity can result in the delegitimation of the state and 
political institutions, whose existence can only be justified in the first place by their 
contribution to social conditions under which "the ordinary circumstances of life do not 
afford a perpetual threat to one's own existence" (Laing 1971, p. 42). Therefore, the 
delegitimation of the state and political institutions can easily result in the depoliticization of 
social conflict: that is, a condition in which the struggle for status, power, and scarce 
resources takes place outside established political processes and institutions (Coser 1956). 
The consequences of the deinstitutionalization of Latin American politics can be dramatic. 
The elimination of the state as the object of political conflict and competition can create 
conditions in many of the countries of the region for a war of all against all. This is because 
the withering away of state power does not eliminate the tensions and contradictions that 
plague Latin American societies; rather, it eliminates the possibility of using state power as 
an effective instrument for the promotion of social justice. 
Conclusion: too close for comfort — social life in the global village 
In a world of transnational societies, the causes of — and, presumably, the solutions to — the 
problems of social order and security are not confined to national territories and national 
social structures and institutions (Faist 1995; Huysmans 1995; Rodriguez 1995; Jordan 1996). 
These problems need to be reconceptualized to account for the impact of globalization on the 
capacity of the state to recreate national histories within the boundaries of national territories. 
This is especially the case for societies like those of Latin America that never developed the 
capacity to contain the main determinants of their historical evolution within territorial 
boundaries. 
The study of social policy can no longer take nation-states as sole referents; rather, it has to 
be studied from both national and transnational perspectives. Abram de Swaan wrote an 
interesting speculative article exploring the question of transnational social policies. He 
argued (de Swaan 1992, pp. 33–34) that transnational social policies per se do not exist 
today: 
What exists at present is development aid: transfers from the richer to the 
poorer states, generally aimed at promoting productive activities rather than 
supporting citizens in times of need. In fact, for many years now, the net 
capital flow has been in the opposite direction. Humanitarian — non-
governmental — organizations operate to support the hungry, the sick and the 
homeless in the poor nations with private donations collected in the richer 
countries, but these transfers do not entail legal obligations or enforceable 
claims, they constitute charity, on a global scale but marginal and incidental at 
best. A transnational welfare scheme would imply that some nations would 
contribute to payments made to the citizens of other nations in a systematic 
manner and under binding arrangements. 
Although it is true that a transnational welfare system as defined by de Swaan (1992) does 
not exist and may never be in place, it is also true that the transformation of the spatial 
foundations of international systems of modern states brought about by globalization has 
forced national and international organizations to move in the direction of transnational social 
policies. This tendency can be seen not only in Europe but also in the framework of relations 
between developed and developing countries, in which the globalization of key social 
problems has blurred the differences that used to clearly separate the theoretical and practical 
fields of development aid, humanitarian aid, and social policy. This is most clearly manifest 
in the emergence of a global social-policy agenda and in the more incipient discussion on the 
institutional requirements for its implementation. 
Fernando Filgueira (19951) identifies three conditions that have to be fulfilled for a policy 
issue to become global. First, the issue has to be analytically 
1 Filgueira, F. 1995. Los inicios de una agenda global en políticas sociales: el caso de 
América Latina. Paper prepared for the Globalization and Social Policy in Latin America 
project, International Development Research Centre, Ottawa, ON, Canada, Jul. 
identified as a treatable social problem with transnational manifestations. Second, the issue 
has to be perceived as a problem whose causes, consequences, and potential solutions 
transcend the boundaries of national states. Third, an institutional transnational capacity has 
to be articulated to confront the issue. Based on these criteria, there is very little doubt that 
some key social issues are becoming global. This is expressed, for example, in the 
conceptualization of the causes of poverty and in the design and implementation of potential 
solutions to this problem by the IFIs that are part of the so-called Washington consensus. The 
globalization of social policy is also expressed, although mainly symbolically, in the general 
agreements reached by participants in international forums such as the World Summit for 
Social Development and the Fourth World Conference on Women. 
Several potential motivating factors in the emergence of transnational social policies can be 
identified. De Swaan (1992) pointed out two: ecological factors that create global 
interdependence and give poor countries some bargaining power to improve distribution of 
wealth around the world; and global South–North migration that can have the capacity to 
motivate developed countries to promote better social conditions in the poor countries of the 
world. To these two, one can add the social requirements of the global market; that is, the 
requirements for global social order and stability required by the increasing interdependence 
of national markets, the intensification of trade, and capital mobility. 
However, the interdependence created by ecological problems, global migration, and the 
global economy are only manifestations of the fundamental problem (and challenge) posed 
by globalization. More than anything else, globalization represents a fundamental change in 
the relationship between people, territory, and ontological security that developed for 400 
years. Globalization has penetrated the walls of sovereign states, thus linking national 
histories with world history. The result of this penetration is the end of national politics as a 
domestic activity capable of determining a society's future. The consequences of this 
fundamental change can be dramatic (Richmond 1994; CGG 1995; Wallerstein 1995). Even 
the most optimistic observers of the current process of global interpenetration agree that 
globalization will probably create significant levels of insecurity around the world long 
before a new national, regional or global institutional capacity to overcome contingencies is 
developed (Kennedy 1993; Singer and Wildavsky 1993; Thurow 1996). This is why, as 
Robert Heilbroner observed, the dominant mood of humanity at the end of the 20th century is 
apprehension. According to Heilbroner (1995, p. 89), 
in four respects Today stands in contrast to Yesterday. First, the Future has 
regained some of the inscrutability it possessed during the Distant Past. 
Second, the marriage of science and technology has revealed dangerous and 
dehumanizing consequences that were only intuitively glimpsed, not yet 
experienced, by our forbears of Yesterday. Third, the new socioeconomic 
order proved to be less trustworthy than when it appeared during the late 
eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. And last, the political spirit of 
liberation and self-determination has gradually lost its inspirational innocence. 
For the wealthy societies of the world, the challenge posed by globalization has not only a 
national but also a transnational dimension, as their responses to the social problems of the 
South will not only determine the fate of people in developing countries but also the 
developed countries' identity as nations. Identities, Charles Taylor (1991, p. 48) remarked, 
depend on "our dialogical relations with others." The way societies deal with the "others" also 
defines their own identity. To put it bluntly a country cannot, for example, close the door of 
its hospitals to "illegal aliens" and continue to celebrate its democratic traditions and 
humanitarian principles. 
The comfortable territorial and mental spaces created by the modern state are falling apart. 
The unhistorical sovereign territory is being quickly replaced by multihistorical and open 
spaces. To administer the new forms of social conflict and turmoil generated by this 
emerging historical ahistorical condition, societies around the world must develop new 
capacities to generate conditions for human security. With global interpenetration, 
transnational social policies are slowly emerging as a new social reality. However, the forms 
they are taking suggest that they can only be used to protect the rich against the effects of the 
poverty created by national and transnational socioeconomic structures. Moreover, the 
transnational institutional system that is in charge of articulating these transnational-policy 
measures is immune to social pressures and social demands. 
One should not assume, however, that politics is dead and countries must resign themselves 
to the dictates of the global market. Any solution to the serious problems that globalization 
presents will inevitably require the revitalization of politics at both national and transnational 
levels (Heilbroner 1992; CGG 1995). This revitalization should not be based on a 
voluntaristic view of history, according to which governments and decision-makers can 
decide whether or not to participate in the process of global interpenetration in which modern 
societies operate today. Voluntaristic views of globalization reduce social phenomena to a 
problem of human will and political decisions. To transcend the inadequacies of this 
perspective, history should be seen as "the permanent result of a tension between objective 
possibilities and human choice" (Guerreiro-Ramos 1970, p. 32). From this perspective, the 
challenge for social scientists and policymakers is to devise ways of assessing the framework 
of limitations and possibilities within which morally significant policy decisions have to be 
made. The challenge is also to expand the scope of political and moral opportunities to 
confront the negative consequences of globalization and to realize the opportunities of the 
new millennium. 
CHAPTER 2 
SOCIAL-POLICY ISSUES AT THE END OF THE 20TH CENTURY 
Luis Ratinoff 
Many people believe that the world is experiencing a "Copernican Revolution" in social-
policy formulation. Globalization has expanded the parameters of social policy from a 
domestic to an international frame of reference and from sectoral to societal processes. 
Awareness of the society-wide implications of specific social-policy issues comes with the 
realization that global interconnections tend to limit social-policy options to a narrow range 
of new but restricted solutions. It is becoming increasingly transparent that this range is 
conditioned by the interplay of two sets of rules: those allocating general benefits among 
groups, sectors, and regions and those providing special protection and inducements to foster 
specific goals or to compensate for the negative consequences of resource-allocation 
processes. 
This chapter argues that the emerging global scenario restricts local capacities to protect and 
compensate people for social inequities and discrimination. The following sections will show 
that the new social-policy issues are not so much related to program inefficiency as to the 
systemic bias of resource-allocation processes. If these processes sustain or increase existing 
regressive conditions, improved social-program efficiency will be insufficient to turn the tide. 
Compensatory interventions only succeed if they can prevent further inequalities and if 
allocation norms are not biased by inequities and segregation. However, in developed and 
developing countries, political elites are now slowly learning that they cannot develop social 
policy in domestic isolation. Although their constituencies remain local, their actions in one 
place and in one public-policy area have forward and backward effects and multiple and 
complex linkages beyond national borders and sectoral concerns. 
Global concerns and local constraints 
Global interconnectedness has resulted in a mosaic of new domestic situations in which 
everyone is exposed to global trends. However, this vulnerability to external influences is not 
everywhere the same. The degree of consolidation of existing social-policy systems seems to 
be a factor determining the extent of the impact of global forces. Thus, for example, local 
constituencies firmly committed to social policies and to social objectives in developed 
countries often interfere both in the range of the adjustments taking place and in the overall 
fluidity of the global network of influences. Such local constituencies marginally regulate 
changes in existing systems and provide political support for a diversity of ethical concerns 
central to current social-policy changes. Thus, cultural traditions and the elite's ideologies and 
interests often become the main limiting factors once economic isolation is broken. 
Globalizing reform processes, particularly in social policy, can easily change social-policy 
objectives and institutional makeups; however, the destruction of the fabric of society implies 
human sacrifices and political prices that deter local elites from radicalizing or speeding 
reforms to globalize economic and social policies. Open opposition, negotiated settlements 
between domestically and internationally oriented political groups and interests, and 
expressions of passive resistance and frustration become formidable and sometimes hidden 
barriers to the legitimacy of elite interests. Widespread cynicism, apathy, youth alienation, 
corruption, and a surge in crime tend to contribute to a climate of social impotence in dealing 
with the human side of globalization. Authoritarian responses seem to deepen these trends, 
and piecemeal concessions are often insufficient. To preserve their legitimacy, therefore, 
local elites must build and renew social consensus. 
Other sources of opposition reduce the autonomy of globalizing elites. In advanced industrial 
countries, where constituencies count, there are also strong civic groups capable of 
mobilizing public opinion in favour of environmental concerns, human rights, and social 
issues. In many instances, global activism has increased, parallel to the consolidation of 
international markets. It is not yet known whether this is a systemic trend or a momentary 
reaction to a few extreme and undesirable consequences of global-reform processes. 
However, the rise of civic organizations seems to be a significant phenomenon in globalizing 
scenarios, especially when disengaged constituencies search for civic values outside political 
parties. 
Utopian and ideological arguments 
The proponents of the current rhetoric of economic globalization use two types of argument. 
They appeal to both modernization utopia and free-market ideology. Utopia and ideology 
define the justification of social objectives in unprotected environments. Utopianism appears 
to expand the scope and depth of equity concerns with a host of complimentary public 
policies and programs while free-market ideology reduces social policies to a residual role. 
The utopian argument emphasizes how progress in an environment of market continuity will 
have modernizing effects that spill over into social structures and political systems. This 
argument assumes that in the long run, free markets destabilize economically oppressive 
conditions. Whereas protectionist policies seem to consolidate distortions that perpetuate the 
privileged status of rent-seeking interests, open economies are thought to institutionalize 
more impersonal and efficient resource-allocation processes. However, the reduction of 
opportunities for profit has several noneconomic implications. Standard modernization theory 
suggests that the struggle for control of assets and rents is replaced by the control over 
markets through competition. Class-conflict issues that find a fertile ground in protected 
constituencies are thought to be replaced by economic-efficiency concerns and enlarged 
consumption as the more real and effective political pacifiers. Once maintaining a protected 
field of assets and opportunities is no longer the overall condition for accommodating interest 
groups, it is postulated that the achievement of economic efficiency and growth will become 
the organizing principle of social integration. 
The cornerstone of modernization utopia is the idea that improved competitiveness reduces 
the risks of an open economy and expands opportunities for material progress, regardless of 
initial inequalities. Utopian discourse emphasizes the role of a sequential evolution requiring 
an increasing supply of adequate human capital and the development of social and political 
capacities for decentralized coordination, based on trust and democratic decision-making. 
Within this framework, an open economic system is thought to become fully sustainable 
wherever the human and social capital reinforce the gains of prosperity and the expectations 
generated by enlarged consumption. 
On this utopian model, social-policy interventions are justified only under exceptional 
conditions. This is particularly the case when the human-capital stock is inadequate to sustain 
economic growth or when the depth of inequities and discrimination prevent good 
governance. Both exceptions seem to be broad enough to include most social programs. 
However, their exceptional nature also opens the way for a more restricted and ideological 
view of public responsibility. 
Although in general, public-policy goals reflect the utopian outlook, implementation 
strategies harbour, in fact, many of the ideological concerns of the proponents of market 
dominance. Universal provision that guarantees access to benefits, for example, is replaced 
by focused interventions to concentrate resources where needed so as to reduce the waste of 
undeserved subsidies. Consequently, the scope of social policies is defined in terms of over- 
or under-concentrations of resources, and their effectiveness is measured primarily in terms 
of overhead costs. 
This combination of utopianism and free-market ideology requires a great deal of tolerance 
for ambiguity. On the one hand, the priority of social goals is recognized, but as 
complementary to other goals. On the other, the "realism" of putting the engine of prosperity 
first emphasizes the ideal of a community committed to the utilitarian values of economic 
efficiency and competition. These ideological concerns call for the institutionalization of a 
uni-dimensional culture fully consonant with the complex workings of capital returns and 
optimization. They suggest the need to enforce a utilitarian value system and in the process 
dismiss any other cultural concerns. But the ethical abhorrence of human deprivation and the 
need to maintain and create solidarity express other dimensions of social interaction and 
imply different opportunity costs in the process of redesigning the fabric of a society. 
Although the utopian side of the globalization project helps to promote the notion that there 
are public social responsibilities, it does not help to determine whether these priorities are to 
have an ancillary or a residual role. 
The ideal of communities operating as unregulated fields for open competition not only 
excludes the logic of solidarity and universalistic social policies but also influences their 
implementation strategies. A commonplace in many social-policy reforms stemming from the 
process of economic adjustment to globalization is the proposal that the effectiveness of 
social programs can be improved by making them imitate the market. However, such 
proposals often disregard the specific circumstances, factors, and challenges faced by public-
policy reforms. Often, an organizing theme of such reform proposals is to blame inadequate 
public-sector policies, abusive bureaucracies, public-sector unions, and politicization. The 
underlying implication is that in competitive and prosperous environments, sanitizing the 
field through "efficient" technical interventions can achieve more with less. 
The new model of social-policy implementation emphasizes the centrality of resource 
optimization over politically defined goals. The very strategy of focusing the provision of 
benefits helps to reduce political pressure from influential groups that do not need the 
subsidies. In such a context, the reformers offer a battery of "solutions" to reinforce resource 
optimization, including decentralization, diversifying the delivery of public services, 
privatization, downsizing, and subcontracting. 
Although these approaches seem to be consistent with market ideology, the increasing use of 
civic organizations to diversify and decentralize involves a heterodox array of agents, with 
values of solidarity and sometimes political solutions as well. This presents another challenge 
requiring a great deal of tolerance for ideological ambiguities, as the effectiveness of using 
civic organizations depends on the ideals of human cooperation and the commitment to 
achieving social goals over those of resource management. The blending of issues, activism, 
and social mobilization with the bureaucratic market-oriented system of social-policy 
implementation is a Machiavellian concession to pragmatism, really incompatible with the 
ideal of a community of individuals devoted to capital-returns optimization. Efforts to 
improve the allocation of resources in the social sectors by changing command structures into 
incentive systems, for example, have had mixed results. It is likely that as a result of these 
reforms, subsidies have become more transparent, and profit-seeking interests have had less 
access to the benefits. In this context, the social sectors are more efficient, in the sense of 
lowering overhead and applying subsidies to the really needy. However, this does not mean 
that the programs are more effective; in many places, there are signs of a decline in the 
effectiveness of programs. 
Beyond delivery systems 
The growing and dynamic role of activist civic groups in social-policy formulation and 
implementation fills, in part, the policy vacuum left in the wake of resource-optimization 
strategies and their strong emphasis on the technical rebureaucratization of social services. 
Although the goal of efficiency makes sense in delivery systems and is embedded in sectoral 
issues, most civic organizations work on the sectoral fringe or very much beyond. They deal 
with problems in those uncharted territories that bureaucracies and systems do not reach, such 
as family disorganization, depressed neighbourhoods, violence, and abandoned and abused 
children. 
These issues transcend the limits of conventional social-sector policies and highlight the 
shortcomings of the resource-optimization strategies and the growing importance of 
nonsectoral challenges in public-policy debate. The relevance of this frontier is confirmed by 
the dynamic role of civic associations, social-mobilization experiences, and the incapacity of 
sectoral approaches to identify and tackle emerging substantive issues in a more 
interconnected world. Furthermore, it seems that the sector outcomes of policy delivery are 
becoming increasingly conditioned by this frontier of new social problems. Lessons are 
slowly coming together. 
Good sector performance has marginal long-term progressive effects. This, however, is the 
case only if short-term segregation is not overwhelming and can be managed. But bad 
performance and inequities tend to sustain or even increase regressive conditions. Thus, for 
example, low-quality health or education reinforce segregation and poverty, rather than 
enabling individuals to break away from them. This raises a serious issue: the social 
environment surrounding sectoral interventions cannot be neglected any longer; otherwise, 
sectoral costs will increase while the effectiveness of social-sector policies diminishes. 
It may be argued that the elites who emphasize the benefits of globalization are on the right 
track when they insist that favourable general economic conditions have the potential to 
smooth out the need for costly, piecemeal social engineering and when they emphasize the 
overall importance of a dynamic economy. But they take the wrong turn when they assume 
that uni-lateral economic parsimony is enough. The enabling environment for social-policy 
change depends on more than favourable economic prospects. Many of the conditions for 
such an environment are related to the structure of human interactions, involving economic, 
social, political, cultural, and ethical factors. 
Civic organizations often try to deal with these issues. Their contributions to the social-policy 
agenda are anchored in specific issues (for example, human rights, women's roles, 
unemployment, civic participation, violence, and personal security) and substantive problems 
(for example, children at risk, youth, family violence, shelters, training, ethnic discrimination, 
old age, and disabled persons). However, despite their strong ethical message, they tend to 
shy away from radical proposals. They tend to bring into the forefront substantive policy 
concerns and have a significant influence on public opinion and political decisions, but these 
efforts represent only the tip of the iceberg. 
The role of civil society: social entrepreneurship 
In today's context of social-policy change, civic organizations are bringing back the notion 
that social-policy effectiveness is a central parameter for assessing a policy's success. This 
pushes the often limited bureaucratic horizons of the sectoral delivery system beyond the 
range of single substantive issues and constraints. The relevance of the social environment 
surrounding the delivery systems in explaining costs and results reveals the shortcomings of 
sectoral resource allocation as the main tool to improve social-sector effectiveness. Thus, for 
example, health-system costs and results are conditioned by several external factors, such as 
lifestyles, family structure, physical and social environments, health cultures, and standards 
of life and nutrition. Selecting among alternative health-delivery priorities to allocate 
resources better may improve levels of health but only to the extent allowed by such 
environmental factors. Similarly, educational institutions perform poorly in adverse 
socioeconomic conditions. Special programs to compensate for this may be required, but they 
add to the costs, and in many cases expectations are lowered. The lesson to be learned is that 
schools and health-delivery institutions are not designed to deal with these issues, although 
they can be severely affected by them. 
Although a less ideological social agenda seems to be slowly emerging, it too brings complex 
challenges. From the perspective of policy implementation, the contribution of civic 
organizations poses new problems. On the one hand, highly formalized and regulated systems 
designed to address nonsectoral challenges do not seem to respond to the existing 
heterogeneity of circumstances, resources, and opportunities. On the other hand, the many 
single-issue strategies to achieve social goals through decentralized agents and interventions 
may be easier to implement but require abundant local capacities and initiative, the enabling 
ingredients of a strong civic society. As these are not found everywhere, issues are raised 
with increasing frequency about the effectiveness of the civic-organizations approach. There 
is also a growing awareness that decentralized interventions tend to become remedial and 
restricted and that local success stories often have limited multiplying effects. 
In practice, the civic-organizations approach could be both remedial and preventive. The 
relative significance of prevention depends to a large extent on the amount, intensity, and 
sustainability of the "disturbances" that civic associations generate in the existing systems in 
the process of influencing public opinion and decision-making. Successful disturbances, for 
example, have had profound consequences for the public ethical commitment to social well-
being and to social and human development. Most civic associations respond to the lure of 
ideological incentives and many of them become vocal in their criticism of the existing order. 
These "noises" are disturbing because they emphasize ideological concerns to set ethical 
limits to unregulated interests, such as insisting on basic rights, environmental preservation, 
equity, political fairness, and fair distribution. In a public arena increasingly devoid of values 
and long-terms goals, civic associations fill a vacuum. Although most are critical, not all are 
equally vocal. They all share the endeavour to focus public opinion on the specific issues they 
promote. Today, their disturbances are as important as the other benefits and services they 
deliver. But, unfortunately, this ideological contribution sometimes comes with the 
paralyzing effects of the challenges posed by increasing social-policy complexity. 
This less organized side of social policies often deals with strategic clusters of human 
interaction, and the success of a specific program is bound to have enabling consequences 
that improve sector performance and participation at the local level. Strategic clusters have 
such multiplying effects because they condition the outcomes of a gamut of sectors and 
interactions. Successful support programs for families, women, youth, children, and for 
neighbourhood and community reconstruction, for example, seem to have an overall enabling 
effect that improves sector performance and modifies individuals' behaviour. It is known that 
decentralized, nonbureaucratic agents achieve impressive results. The issue then is not the 
success but how sustainable these efforts are. Several instances of this appear in case studies 
in part 2 of this volume, illustrating how effective and cost-efficient decentralized 
intervention can be, but these studies also point out the difficulties in recreating these success 
stories. To identify and replicate success one needs a new type of capacity. Societies are 
slowly learning to train social managers to operate in bureaucratic environments requiring a 
great deal of coordination, resources, mobilization, and community cooperation. However, 
we are still a long way from knowing how to multiply the number of these "social 
entrepreneurs," for they are the decentralized, nonbureaucratic agents who can create or 
recreate specific social programs, including design, development, resource mobilization, 
implementation, personnel management, recruitment, motivation, and adaptation to changes 
and emerging opportunities. 
Current trends in social entrepreneurship suggest that this approach involves a complex 
combination of philanthropy and activism and the relationship between individual 
motivations and social incentives. At one level, personal commitment highlights the overall 
importance of motivation in the recruitment of social entrepreneurs. Despite the 
contemporary cultural emphasis on power and material gains, some institutions and traditions 
continue to instill altruistic values and attempt to disseminate integrative cultural and political 
themes in social-policy discourse and action. Social incentives, in turn, reinforce the ideal 
that the real world still has room for nonutilitarian convictions and enable the transformation 
of generous concerns into actions and programs. 
Social entrepreneurship is a critical issue for any decentralized social-development strategy 
based on private civic organizations. In this regard, the question is one of balance and 
resources, particularly in times of the retrenchment of public-sector programs that occurs 
with the assumption that local authorities will meet responsibilities through civic-society 
associations and initiatives. In this context, the success of charities as tools to reduce social 
inequities, for example, depends on a progressive economic and social environment. Often, 
however, such tools are not effective alternatives for the regressive systems in place, except 
for the ethical influence they have through their capacity to create disturbances. 
Social entrepreneurs and systems 
The existence of civic associations as social-delivery agencies at the local level is often 
precarious. This is because the large scale of service-delivery operations and their need for 
continuity require an adequate and steady supply of private or public funds; in practice, 
donors tend to define standards and impose nonspecific conditions. One of the outcomes of 
this is that civic groups enter into asymmetric relationships of financial dependence. 
Although this dependence may seem initially attractive to many civic organizations, when 
financing opportunities entail the expansion of their operations, at least three adverse 
consequences are difficult to avoid: constrained, self-regulated step-by-step programs become 
externally regulated by donors; less room is given for self-initiative and innovation; and more 
supervisory control becomes indispensable. One of the outcomes of this is that the 
relationship between those who grant the funds and those who provide the services tends to 
be one of implementation through subcontracting. In some cases, these arrangements may be 
more flexible than command structures and also more cost effective; however, it is reasonable 
to assume that increases in bureaucratization in the delivery systems may result in donor-
induced rigidities and higher costs. Despite this, subcontracting with civic organizations may 
be an alternative that pays back in areas and in situations beyond the capabilities of 
hierarchical social-delivery systems.1 
In the world of contemporary social-policy change, a lot has been said in favour of the 
participation of civic-society groups in social-policy implementation. However, we do not 
have enough information to know how much to expect from them. Unrealistic hopes may be 
a fertile ground for frustrations, and the truth is that no matter how successful they become, 
their interventions are designed to be limited in scope and number. 
Without doubt, a better understanding of the limitations of these new arrangements may be 
helpful. In addition to the difficulties of finding social-entrepreneurship capacities and the 
hidden effects of such alternatives as sub-contracting, the ability of these arrangements to 
deliver results with low costs is limited in scope, given the limitations in the design of the 
programs. In most cases, the maximum multiplying effects occur when new possibilities 
emerge as a consequence of the social-mobilization that civic organizations unleash. 
However, this requires a great deal of political tolerance and restraint on the donors' side. 
Civic organizations that generate social mobilization for specific issues often become 
gradually tolerated as a source of social "turbulence." The tolerance, however, depends on the 
subordination of their role to existing institutional frameworks. Civic associations can and do 
influence political opinion, but they are not political parties. The latter define their positions 
vis-à-vis specific issues from a relatively consonant ideological range of views. Civic 
associations are issue oriented, and up to now they have not tried to provide general 
economic and social cures. In fact, their very ability to influence across party lines enhances 
their power and ethical resonance. They are not radical groups with their minds set against 
the established order. Civic associations are indeed critical of the ways the established order 
performs with respect to specific issues, but they propose to improve it step by step, through 
programs, new rules, and persuasion. 
1 A new jargon has emerged in the last 10 years to distinguish the genuine nongovernmental 
organizations (NGOs) from government-induced or government-controlled NGOs 
(GONGOs) and from donor agency-induced or donor agency-controlled NGOs (DONGOs). 
Experience shows that GONGOs and DONGOs tend to duplicate NGOs in the same areas and 
sectors and are less adaptive and effective and therefore less cost effective. They experience 
some corruption as a result of the amount of the external financing they receive, often from a 
single source, and the bureaucratic influences and interests that shape their operations and 
their very survival. 
Genuine expressions of local government and political autonomy in social-service delivery 
seem to step over an ambiguous threshold. From the point of view of the global interests 
promoting policy reform, the concept of civil society seems to loose its positive connotations 
when a broad political movement emerges articulating claims such as universal-equity goals 
beyond local and specific concerns or when civic associations reject their subordinate status. 
Thus, social policies designed to transfer responsibilities to private agents and to deprived 
groups, without simultaneously opening up opportunities or fostering capacities and more 
power-sharing, are bound to face some complex challenges. The notion of empowering 
people has made some conceptual and even a few practical inroads, but up to now such 
efforts seem to fall short of achieving their goals. Nobody knows how much empowering is 
enough or how to deal with the lack of initial powers. Furthermore, we have no clear 
consensus on how much power to transfer. Similarly, restricting equity to poverty issues, as is 
often done when social organizations become involved in service delivery, creates the danger 
of a significant political backlash. Although the idea of a nonrevolutionary political backlash 
is difficult to grasp, still it may have serious consequences. 
In more protected societies, the threat of social upheaval has been the ghost that supports the 
political mechanisms in place; however, in the less protected global environment, with a 
nonpolitical but nevertheless implicit modernization agenda, macrosocial imbalances can 
generate "implosions" that undermine the effectiveness of specific countries' existing 
institutions. Some of the signs of this phenomenon are collective feelings of political 
withdrawal, youth alienation, deep cultural fractures, and increasing violence and crime. All 
of these point to the emergence of radical trends, anarchic individualism, and the weakening 
of social bonds and ethical commitments. 
 
Frictions and strategic social clusters 
One of the main challenges in the current global scenario is to achieve social order in the 
context of rising social disintegration. This is no longer just a political issue — one of 
achieving formal institutional stability. Modern implosive environments affect, in practice, 
the fabric of human social interaction. Once the politics of hope, based on achieving a more 
equitable social order, is replaced by the politics of prosperity, based on reaching a higher 
rate of economic growth, little room is left either for the public expression of social tensions 
and aspirations or for articulating these frustrations in a comprehensive political project. 
Experiences indicate that although it is unrealistic to expect major social upheaval, if nobody 
proposes workable political alternatives, one can expect a number of specific challenges that 
tend to exceed institutional capacities for sustaining law and order. 
This is an implosive social horizon. In fact, drug consumption has increased in most places, 
as have crime rates in urban centres. The phenomena of alienated youth and an adversary 
youth culture have made significant inroads in the last 20 years. Furthermore, citizens' 
perceptions of personal insecurity and political corruption seem to contribute to a political 
culture of detached and uncommitted individuals. These trends suggest that a working social 
order cannot be taken for granted. In this context, the failure of the resource-optimization 
approach, either as a restricted, residual policy or as a broader ancillary strategy, stems from 
the assumption that a working social order is given and that the task at hand is to perfect it 
through technological progress and prosperity. 
The simplicity in the design of this approach and the complexities of the issues suggest that 
persistent social issues are determining the extent to which sector efficiency can be translated 
into social-policy effectiveness. This is often described in terms of "friction" generated by the 
resistance from the field to program implementation. It is thought that the new social-policy 
challenge is to overcome the countercurrent and the turbulence. However, contemporary 
social-policy practitioners have identified a number of strategic interaction points. Many of 
these strategic interaction points reflect the impacts of modern technology on human society; 
the increasing exposure to global risks that in the last 20 years have helped to deepen those 
impacts; and the ongoing trends that seem to sustain them. The following sections discuss 
some of these strategic interaction points. 
The rediscovery of the family 
At the end of the 20th century, the strategic importance of the family in sustaining the fabric 
of society has been rediscovered. Unfortunately, this is occurring in the context of a debate 
clouded with normative overtones. The issue of the family has become an area in which 
rhetoric converges with cultural diversity. This issue illustrates the inability of modernization 
utopianism to settle other ideological divides that are polarizing societies. The current debate 
helps to focus attention on the problems for the survival of family life under harsh urban 
conditions, but disagreements over issues and solutions have paralyzed the development of a 
better coordinated strategy. 
The state of the family plays a crucial role in contemporary social-policy change. Most 
people agree, for example, that the state of the family has profound implications for social-
policy implementation. Thus, the cost effectiveness of health and educational systems seems 
to be related to family integration and stability. Something similar can be said of welfare 
policies. Although this is not the place to elaborate on these complex linkages, it is relevant to 
emphasize that policies to help families at risk are difficult to design. In most cases, family 
groups are highly adaptive, but they cannot cope with some of the effects of globalization. As 
evidence shows, a great deal of family disorganization observed today is due to the indirect 
influence of transnational factors in the socioeconomic environment. 
Not all of these can be controlled or eliminated, but the conditions for family life can be 
improved by reducing a significant number of them. Some of these obstacles are specific, 
simple to deal with, and have multiple implications for family-group stability, such as child-
care services and access to recreational facilities and subsidized housing. However, not all 
these factors are so specific or respond so well to immediate treatment. The more diffuse the 
linkages are, the more complex is the challenge, such as unemployment, the negative 
influences of depressed neighbourhoods, some inherited lifestyles, or the magnetic values of 
contemporary commercial culture. By eliminating social-protection systems and mechanisms 
and by increasing the exposure of the individual and the family to risks, for example, 
globalization is helping to enhance the strategic importance of stabilizing values and rules. 
The influence of cultural factors is still diffuse, despite the fact that families are anchored in 
explicit normative frameworks. The erosion of traditions and the emphasis placed on returns 
to capital, even in areas of social development, has weakened legal frameworks for family 
protection. The law is no longer enough to protect the family when exposure to risk is on the 
rise, and in many cases, existing norms have become inadequate. 
Today, families face problems that hinder their capacity to stay together and to produce 
services and allocate rewards. Finances for the special services that family groups provide are 
under severe strain. Experiments in substituting families for institutional alternatives have not 
been successful from the point of view of quality or cost. Supporting and strengthening 
families would be a much more cost-effective approach. The increasing participation of 
women in the labour force is a sign of the type of adjustments taking place, as well as being 
an expression of women's attempts to break away from their traditional entrapments in a 
world that undervalues the role they play in the family. The gap between the normative 
models and the realities of family life has gradually become wider. On the one hand, the 
increase in one-parent households, or "incomplete" family groups, is significant. On the other 
hand, adaptive practices are often legitimized in direct contradiction to local cultural patterns. 
Demographic trends are still a challenge 
Despite contemporary cultural debate on reproductive rights, population issues have become 
an indispensable social-policy dimension. Demographic trends determine the human 
quantities, the crucial bottlenecks, and the relationship between the age structure and the 
allocation of risks. Furthermore, the new patterns of sexual behaviour generate health and 
educational costs along the way. 
For modern residual social policies, population trends are increasingly becoming essential 
background information. It is assumed that economic prosperity will change human attitudes 
toward the meaning of life, disease, and death but, in the meanwhile, only restricted 
interventions make sense and have this effect, especially in the field of reproduction. The 
aging of the population, the new mortality and morbidity patterns, the increased length of 
schooling, the impact of a spreading culture of freedom, earlier sexual maturity, and the 
higher rate of female participation in the labour force cannot be easily dismissed as 
expressions of demographic transition, as they affect social and economic choices. A battery 
of social programs may be needed to deal with these complex issues. 
Adults come from children 
Abandoned, exploited, and abused children are becoming a widespread problem in high-
density areas in both developed and developing countries. Modern conditions are not only 
adverse to family integration and survival but also to the well-being of children. These 
problems are related, but they are not identical. The increasing number of dysfunctional 
families is probably a factor; however, from a social point of view, high birth rates among 
deprived social sectors and the high incidence of illegitimacy are also important contributing 
factors. A significant surplus of children and adults who shy away from parental 
responsibilities create opportunities for exploitation and abuse. For social-policy purposes, 
the recognition that high birth rates alone do not explain the exploitation and abuse of 
children in contemporary societies has opened the way to a reassessment of, for example, 
socialization processes and the role of legal-protection systems. 
Undernourishment has become urbanized 
Hunger and malnutrition are still present. They have become urban problems in modern 
social settings. Enough evidence shows that these problems are closely related to poverty and 
that they have sequels of terrible consequences. Child undernourishment incapacitates 
children's development for a lifetime. It hinders the development of intelligence; it reduces 
attention and learning capacities; and it reduces the vitality of individuals, as well as making 
them more prone to disease. Good ethical arguments can be cited in favour of nutrition 
programs, and from an economic perspective the long-term costs and productivity losses 
from malnutrition are significant. Although nutrition programs and policies are easy to 
design, they are difficult to implement. Many target groups tend to misuse the general-
purpose help they receive because they have other unsatisfied needs. But focused 
interventions produce limited results and must be provided in association with other social 
services and programs. The lifestyle of many of the groups affected is conditioned not only 
by poverty and deprivation but also by the lack of an adequate nutritional culture. 
Alcoholism and drugs 
Alcohol and drug abuse are also commonly found in modern societies and have 
incapacitating and dangerous consequences. Both are often associated with poverty, 
discrimination, and other inequities that generate feelings of alienation. Although some room 
is left for prevention through education, reinforced by group pressure, it is symptomatic that 
available resources are spent on rehabilitation programs and police interventions to reduce the 
supply of drugs. This occurs despite the fact that not enough is known about, for example, the 
cultural aspects and the specific circumstances of the abuse of psychoactive substances. The 
idea that these problems are not new is difficult to refute; nevertheless, the current social-
policy challenges are to reduce the scale and curtail the spread of the problem. 
For the most part, police interventions are expected to resolve the social concern about drug 
cultures and the entrapment of young people in addictions. However, in many industrial 
countries, not only is the illegal-drug market dynamic, but also the demand adapts to new 
products when the supply of others dwindles. Daily news of the drug situation reinforces the 
image of supply adaptability, but the factors that explain the demand side remain in the 
shadows. The control of the supply of drugs has produced limited results; a better 
understanding of demand is needed together with new social policies directed to dealing with 
these problems, particularly health and education policies. 
The syndrome of reduced teaching intensity and modern education 
The current social-policy focus on sectoral-allocation issues, specifically in the case of 
education, obscures the consequences of the syndrome of reduced teaching intensity (RTI), or 
the teaching efficacy of schools. Teachers know that the school climate is a powerful 
component in the process of producing an educated mind. High teaching intensity results if 
the transmission of knowledge is associated with the transmission of values and habits. 
Emotional problems seem to block the process of learning, but values and habits contribute to 
emotional stability. In other words, classroom teaching efficacy is negatively affected if the 
school values clash with those of an adverse cultural environment. Educational institutions 
tend to adjust their expectations to the possibilities and opportunities of their cultural 
environments. Thus, in deprived and violent areas, school results are below average because 
they reflect not only the insufficient motivation of families, groups, and neighbourhoods for 
education but also the lower efficacy of the adjusted classroom standards. In modern 
societies, RTI syndrome is becoming one of the most serious challenges to social equity 
because it dulls the progressive edge of educational processes. 
In the context of globalization, RTI syndrome originates in the conflict between a culture 
under pressure to modernize and introduce technology and school systems unable to respond 
to these new challenges. This discontinuity is raising costs while lowering the standards of 
the services delivered. Furthermore, the multiple attractions of modern societies, passive 
socialization through impersonal electronic media, and the processes of active emotional 
socialization through affiliation networks all seem to have advantages over the procedural 
teaching methods of school systems, but they fail as substitutes for formal education. Further, 
a less intense formal education cannot compete with these alternative ways of learning. 
This situation seems to have some perverse consequences. Teaching intensity broadens the 
children's information horizons and nurtures the skills of abstract reasoning to deal with the 
challenges of complex modern societies. However, the abundant information flows associated 
with economic globalization and transnational influences produce negative reactions and 
feelings of insecurity if individuals do not have the capacities to deal with a simultaneous 
multiplicity of disturbing signals. A creative use of heavy information loads is incompatible 
with simplification and requires a great deal of mental discipline developed through 
systematic learning. We are slowly learning that information overload is not so much a 
function of the amount of information per se but of individuals' capacity to use information in 
discursive, symbolic, and interactive ways. When this capacity is low, individuals seem to 
close their minds and select whatever information reinforces their basic beliefs. 
The social challenge posed by higher information density is to develop people's capacities to 
find the right balance of needed information and to avoid the negative consequences of 
information overload. The idea that abundant flows of information may slowly replace 
classrooms and be compatible with less intense formal education ignores the role played by 
the educated mind in structuring information; without this structure, signs, and messages 
generate mainly automatic reactions and images perpetuate passivity and imitation. To 
develop people's capacity to convert signs, messages, and images into discursive and active 
understanding requires both extending education to new social sectors and using more intense 
strategies to deepen the cultural influence of formal learning. 
The transition to adulthood 
Youth problems are signs of modern times. Rapid technological change has helped to 
increase the cultural gap between generations. More than ever before, the continuous 
obsolescence of language, values, and expectations has emptied the common ground that 
used to link young people with the adult world. This trend is reinforced by the commercial 
marketing of youth products, by postponing the age of incorporation into the labour force, 
and by the uncertain opportunities offered to young people at the end of this latency period. 
The problems are not necessarily new, but they have accumulated over time. The 
insufficiency of existing social systems to respond to young people's demands has established 
an area of public neglect that has a wide range of negative implications. The commercial 
exploitation of the images of youth has resulted in the gradual fading of the limits between 
fantasy and reality in terms of young people's expectations, and the emphasis on material 
consumption is helping to water down idealism. The lengthy educational period required by 
labour markets and the weakening of sustainable legal-protection systems for children and 
young people have institutionalized a latency period that raises expectations. The more 
uncertain the light at the end of this tunnel, the more difficult is the integration of young 
people into the mainstreams of adult life in global societies. The syndrome of youth 
alienation and young people's adoption of more radical lifestyles suggest that these problems 
are generating future costs both for society and for these young individuals. These 
developments also suggest the need for new types of social policy. 
Neighbourhood traps 
Rapid urbanization and population growth are redefining the global social scenario. The 
provision of basic services and jobs continues to lag behind demands while a process of 
social deterioration is taking place, particularly in the urban areas. Increasingly, cities and 
neighbourhoods are becoming social territories, segregated by frontiers formed by different 
levels of productivity and investment and the availability of meaningful opportunities. For 
example, significant sectors of the urban population experience the benefits of the modern 
city only through the deprived territories they inhabit. These depressed human environments 
tend to sustain existing regressive conditions and represent tremendous obstacles to the 
effective implementation of social policies. 
To develop linkages of neighbourhoods in depressed urban territories is a complex task that 
requires societies to create trust in the absence of the necessary reserves of social capital. This 
task has important institutional implications. The challenge is to decentralize responsibilities 
and powers while reestablishing the role of publicly elected authorities and central 
institutions. The development of a sense of neighbourhood requires the universal prevalence 
of law and order and provision for local needs. To have sustainable results, the economic 
bases of the neighbourhood must be rebuilt, and adequate social services must be provided. 
Simple designs, complex execution, and economic constraints 
In the current public-policy environment, it is often difficult to execute, coordinate, and 
balance ancillary social-policies while achieving the global economic goals of improving 
system efficiency, using decentralized implementation strategies, and reducing the obstacles 
to more progressive conditions. Because the decentralized approach is disorganized, its 
success requires attaining indirect multiplier effects beyond the direct policy objectives. The 
nonbureaucratic coordination involved in this approach needs to build on the mutually 
supporting synergies that social policies are supposed to generate, and their multiplying 
effects have to exceed the inequities the current structures of society create. The participation 
of people in this social-policy compact is the only factor not directly conditioned by resource 
availability. All others are resource driven. 
The globalization paradigm that lies behind the processes of economic-policy reform 
involves the assumption that the free flow of capital and technology will ultimately minimize 
the need for costly social-policy interventions. However, it is recognized that social policies 
have a role to play during the transition and that the resources and capacities invested in them 
should reflect their relevance — without, that is, jeopardizing material progress. Until now, 
utilitarian arguments have relied on utilitarian assumptions, but it is always difficult to 
consider the long-term effects of social interventions in dealing with immediate problems. 
Moreover, not everyone believes that the progress brought about by globalization is beyond 
the reach of politics and the interests of specific constituencies. It is also believed that despite 
visible global trends, social order remains grounded in local conditions. In fact, the 
globalization project contains no proposals to replace national authorities or to allow the free 
flow of people across borders to alleviate tensions resulting from structural adjustments and 
social-policy reforms. 
Politics and values indeed play a role in this transition. Beyond ideology and utopianism, the 
progress of global integration requires a great deal of sustained political negotiation to 
accommodate the imperatives of internal order and to recognize the cultural traditions that 
make communication meaningful. People are slowly realizing the importance of cultural 
traditions. The costs of law and order are bearable if people share commitments and 
identities, but chaotic conditions seem to emerge with radical disengagement from the past. 
Some contemporary political experience suggests that people without history are unable to 
supply the bases for institutional stability or for civic culture. A discrete range of similar 
feelings of time and space provides people with a common identity and frames the meanings 
that facilitate interactive communication. 
For those who think that nonutilitarian values and goals play a significant role in policy 
change, international market integration is also desirable from the viewpoint of the economy, 
and they argue that the social and cultural implications of globalization should involve 
political decisions about the distribution of the sacrifices and benefits — gains and loses. This 
line of thinking emphasizes that governments still have responsibilities to their 
constituencies, despite the complex and sometimes volatile workings of global markets. The 
exaggerated notion of an impersonal, self-regulating system is a political myth that serves to 
justify inaction and neglect. The proponents of an ethical political framework for 
globalization try to use the opportunity provided by the new policy scenario to maintain and 
develop a feasible order, applying the benefits to achieve a reasonable degree of social 
fairness, participation, cultural identity, and more effective legal protection. This requires, for 
example, formulating political projects — projects that sustain cultural diversity and the 
commitment to moral rights and obligations, open the political field to new participants, 
gradually reduce deprivation, and pursue equity through more competitive social processes. 
Social policy as a legitimation agenda 
An alternative social-policy agenda, promoted by the policy-reform process, has gradually 
emerged from the contemporary experiences of many societies suffering basic-needs 
deprivation, violence, crime, alienated constituencies, cultural turmoil, feelings of widespread 
corruption, and growing personal and job insecurity. A heterogeneous coalition of moral 
conservatives, churches, civic-society activists, union leaders, and members of the disaffected 
middle classes supports the hypothesis that these implosive symptoms come from an 
unresolved macrosocial disequilibrium that increases the costs of maintaining a feasible 
order. 
Although ancillary social policies in a global environment are mainly concerned with making 
economic prosperity a functional reality, ethical considerations do emerge in regard to 
achieving and maintaining a feasible order in the midst of the present chaos. The organizing 
themes are the legitimation of normative frameworks and procedures to provide minimum 
levels of stability and to fill the void created by the denial of the role of nonutilitarian values 
in generating social integration and development. These themes are often not components of 
a predetermined ideological set but simply make up an ad hoc list of concerns. However, they 
are more than just a loose enumeration. Behind their apparent randomness lies the 
contemporary experiences of out-of-control social trends working to undermine the fabric of 
society. A more detailed examination highlights some of the emerging concerns. 
 
Fairness 
The notion of equity cannot be reduced simply to that of charity. It is charitable to eliminate 
destitution, either through direct assistance or expanding work opportunities for the less 
productive sector of the labour force, but justice relates more to the fair allocation of rewards 
and opportunities. The modern phenomenon of increased consumption, coupled with 
increased levels of personal dissatisfaction with the existing order, is indicative of prosperity 
but also of negative expectations in relation to the distribution of rewards and opportunities in 
society. Although material well-being is a powerful pacifier that may induce conformity, 
social justice is a much more complex social stabilizer. In fact, the concept of fair social 
protection is normative, interactive, and dynamic. A profile of existing invidious economic 
disparities and the ways rewards are allocated is useful in understanding people's 
expectations of overall social fairness. 
Two structural dimensions can be used to gauge levels of equity generated by social policies: 
income distribution and vertical social mobility. Reducing poverty may simultaneously lead 
to increasing economic disparities, and this is incompatible with the expectation of 
participating in a fair social order. But high levels of income concentration suggest conditions 
that prevent or slow trickle-down processes, especially if regressive trends remain 
unchanged. Low social and economic mobility are signs that despite economic growth, 
opportunities remain concentrated and unequal. 
Experience has shown a less than perfect relationship between economic and social 
competition. Although low wages, the accumulation of resources, and the monopolization of 
opportunities may foster economic competitiveness, they close rather than open social 
systems. A simple projection shows that with more regressive prevailing economic 
conditions, higher growth rates are required over longer periods of time to achieve better 
redistribution; this is because existing discrimination becomes deeply entrenched and slows 
down the expansion of economic participation. 
Legal protection: rights and obligations 
Adequate legal protection is a critical social-policy issue. However, the more abstract the 
system of rights and obligations, the lower the chances for effective legal protection. Formal 
rules provide a regulatory framework. However, in most cases, they directly or indirectly 
assume that rights exist mainly for those who have the resources or affiliations to claim them. 
Without widespread moral commitments, a mosaic of segmented legal expectations emerge: 
for some groups, the law is an oppressive framework; for others, it is a normative framework 
to facilitate interaction; for others still, it is an instrument to win additional advantages when 
an effective normative system in society is lacking. The erosion of the moral community 
helps to consolidate a situation in which a pragmatic legal culture progressively dominates 
the moral normative structure. 
The main symptoms of a fading moral community are the declining cost effectiveness of the 
justice system and the gradual privatization of the little social protection that is still provided. 
In these cases, good arguments can be developed for implementing legal reforms and 
improving the administration of justice, but a moral community is grounded in observance of 
a system of rights and obligations rather than in imposing specific rules. And the 





Alienation is widespread in modern societies. Regulating competition among political elites 
does not seem to resolve the issues posed by today's complex societies for representative 
government. Political representatives quite often become self-serving and develop agendas 
and compromises to help them gain power. However, those agendas are insufficient to tighten 
their bonds and commitments to their constituencies. More and more, people feel that they 
are underrepresented and believe that neither their support nor their opposition to a political 
representative makes any difference to the ways decisions are made. 
The growing politics of interest representation in the age of globalization has slowly eroded 
the role of values in public life and encouraged politicians to pay less attention to the 
problems affecting people's daily lives. The increasing use of highly divisive issues to 
mobilize minorities to break down the apathy of the majority is becoming a permanent 
component of representative democracy, but it seems to reinforce these negative trends. 
Constrained by a wide range of interests, modern political representatives at all levels are no 
longer keen on values. Visions of a better community have become dysfunctional empty 
illusions useful only for the opportunistic politics of market integration. 
The power that political representatives enjoy today does not seem to expand their freedom to 
chose alternative options. They feel at ease negotiating interests but impotent to deal with 
value-loaded issues. In a world of political interests, structural reforms seem the only way 
out: a reorganization of the deadlocked space may open room for a new manoeuvre. What is 
lacking, however, is the realization that these reforms demand human sacrifices, have visible 
direct beneficiaries, and also require a considerable waiting period to achieve progressive 
results. 
The reaction of modern constituencies is understandable: the numbers of "informal" systems 
of representation are rapidly increasing. Civic organizations have become self-appointed 
representatives of forgotten political values, and grassroots associations tend to reclaim that 
portion of popular sovereignty that formal systems took from people. Empowerment has 
become a loosely defined piece of contemporary political jargon. Systems for informal 
participation are central to solving social problems today. Under the rhetoric, the extension of 
citizenship beyond the boundaries of segregation and neglect requires the gradual transfer of 
power to grassroots civic associations. 
Cultural diversity and deprivation 
Cultural deprivation is a complex syndrome of globalization. Initially, it was a problem for 
minorities and ethnic groups forced to abandon their values and traditions to become part of 
modern life. Shame and guilt were associated with the process of giving away their cultural 
identities. Anthropologists have analyzed how some of these groups and individuals became 
trapped in a void, feeling guilty for being themselves and feeling unable to become 
something else. Societies today understand very little about how cultural traditions work, 
perhaps because fantasies and emotions are involved. However, a great deal of information 
suggests that "continuity" solutions seem to produce the best results. People who keep their 
cultural identities face difficult dilemmas, but at least they tend to compromise themselves in 
more creative ways. 
Cultural deprivation is becoming widespread. The global commercial culture is taking over 
and reducing local diversity to a fringe. Cultural expressions are no longer determined by 
time and space; they are fantasies without points of reference in reality. This gives people 
under their spell a sort of liberating experience, but they are unable to bridge the gap between 
their daily lives and the electronic sounds and imagery. Also, this pervasive commercial 
culture seems to provide no signs or avenues to higher levels of culture. Culturally, it is more 
important to entertain, and the subliminal effects are more important than the message. 
The revolution in communications afforded by information and communication technologies, 
including the Internet, is opening as many new opportunities for cultural oppression as for 
cultural freedom. For those who can understand and add meaning, the Internet provides 
cultural freedom. But in many places, the symptoms of a cultural deprivation are beginning to 
emerge. The need to live according to uprooted fantasies produces a symbolic space devoid 
of meaning, together with an incapacity to create meaning. Audiences are growing, but this 
culture is either passive or reshaping the world in the image of its fantasies. Cultural 
traditions that remain on the borderline between reality and imagination are lost in this 
process, and they are no longer sustained. The issue of cultural diversity has come to the 
forefront because the countries that have been able to modernize their cultural identities seem 
to fare better, despite living in a world of high exposure to risks and uncertainties. 
Conclusion: resources optimization or goal achievement 
Without sustainable prosperity, residual social policies will fail to make sense. The more the 
effectiveness of the ancillary approach depends on the reduction of friction, the more 
complex and wasteful this type of social-policy will become. Prosperity-driven social 
solutions for a globalizing world assume that increased consumption and the expanded 
opportunities created by economic success will be enough to gradually improve social equity. 
This, however, implies a slow but systemic expansion of more rewarding opportunities. 
If the equity effect of prosperity is less than satisfactory, governments may require a more 
political and universalistic, not necessarily a more centralized, approach to social policy. 
Also, governments ought to replace resource-optimization criteria with goal-achievement 
criteria; otherwise, the political pressures might prove to be difficult to manage and policies 
may evolve toward a patchwork of unrelated programs. 
The experience of the last 20 years illustrates how the incentives design of ancillary and 
residual policies requires a complex set of special programs to achieve results. Available 
information suggests that the cost-containment motive implicit in most resources-
optimization social policies has three significant impacts. First, social-sector standards are 
kept low, for improvements in social service increase unit costs. Thus, for example, the 
aggregate cost of a larger student population tends to grow disproportionately. Second, some 
former public expenses are now transferred to families and to private groups. Third, there is 
need to provide additional public or private financing for special, nonsectoral programs. 
However, the indicators of social equity suggest very slow or no improvement. In fact, this 
type of policy approach fails to achieve progressive social goals. 
The long-term feasibility of globalization trends may increasingly depend on more effective 
social policies to better distribute the high cost of adjustments. The emerging issues dwell on 
two sides: more effectiveness and coordination in social-policy programs and also regulatory 
frameworks to facilitate market integration through processes less wasteful of human lives 
and social capital. The development of noncommand structures of social-policy coordination 
is still a challenge. "Mimicking the market" makes sense to non-altruistic interests, but 
altruism and commitment to service require examples, models, and incentive structures to 
create, spread, and adopt innovations and build-in institutional learning processes. 
Experiences with trying to metaphorically frame social programs within "market-
competitive" solutions have not shown the results expected by the institutional social 
engineers. New forms of bureaucratization and command have emerged, sometimes more 
orderly in their first stages but also more rigid. The lack of adaptability has been the doom of 
preceding command structures, and the prices that must be paid in these cases have been too 
high. Further, the diversity of needs in the age of globalization often exceeds the available 
capacities to provide for them. 
PART II 





WEST AND CENTRAL AFRICA 
SOCIAL POLICY FOR RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT 
Tade Akin Aina 
Any meaningful and relevant analysis of social policy in Africa today must start with an 
understanding of the twin processes of poverty and development. It must investigate both 
process and context in terms of the most recent experiences in countries of the region. Such 
an analysis must revisit the development process, its failures and, in particular, the recent 
epoch of persistent crisis and adjustment and recognize the significance of that crisis, not 
only for development in general, but also for policy-making. Such an analysis must include 
an understanding of "development consciousness," or the ways people perceive, think of, and 
are conscious of development as a process intended to transform their lives in a positive and 
beneficial direction and of its contribution to the improvement of material and other well-
being. 
These elements of the analysis are important because one of the major consequences of 
Africa's prolonged crisis has been, not only the delegitimization of the African state and its 
forced withdrawal from the provision of basic services and other forms of direct social 
provisioning, but also the emergence of a kind of consciousness that denies the validity and 
relevance of social policy in the development process. Quite often this denial is couched in a 
language of social-policy reform and restructuring that challenges both the basis and practice 
of conventional social policy. 
This systematic denial and reorientation are the result of the recent appropriation of the 
responsibility for economic and social-policy management of several African countries by 
international financial institutions (IFIs). This appropriation, the product of the globalization 
process and a response to the protracted economic crisis experienced by these countries, has 
been defined mainly in terms of the dominance of a neoliberal market doctrine, emphasizing 
deregulation, liberalization, and privatization (Mkandawire and Olukoshi 1995; Founou-
Tchuigoua 1996). Rather than improving the quality of life for the majority of people, this 
approach has only worsened it. Development should be seen as a process of systematic 
transformation of the conditions of existence of the majority of people in a beneficial manner 
to enhance their attainment of individual and collective well-being. More than ever before, 
Africa needs not only to reclaim development, but also to face the challenges of social 
reconstruction, that is, rebuilding social institutions and support systems eroded by years of 
neglect and the efforts of both internal and external forces to undermine them. 
This chapter argues that reclaiming development and the reconstruction of society in a 
context of transnational influences can only be tackled effectively through a systematic and 
sustained initiative. This involves putting in place sustainable economic-development 
strategies that include frameworks of coherent and relevant social policies geared at building 
and rebuilding institutions in the region and recovering peoples' collective self-confidence, 
integrity, and social integration. 
However, systematic, state-lead social provisioning was one of the earliest victims of the IFIs 
solutions to the economic crisis ravaging the nations of West and Central Africa. 
Conventional social policy was seen as wasteful and negative, contributing little or nothing to 
economic growth and national revenues, rather than as a major contribution to the 
development process. 
This chapter challenges this negative view of social policy and attempts to show that social 
policy is an intrinsic dimension of the development process, particularly during stages of 
transition and reconstruction, such as in Africa today. Any systematic review of such policies 
must be popular and participatory, involving various social sectors and beneficiaries, 
including traditionally excluded groups such as poor women, rural dwellers, the elderly, 
youth, and children. More pressing today than ever before is the need to comprehensively 
reappraise and understand the role and significance of social policy. This is particularly 
relevant, given the dominance of the economic and so-called death-of-the-social paradigm 
(Rose 1996). The shift to this paradigm is creating an important gap in the development 
process. Allowing this gap to grow may lead to ad hoc, hastily designed, and ill-considered 
actions that do more harm than good, further dividing society, undermining social integration, 
and forestalling confrontation with the issue of poverty. 
A concern with social policy and social development, however, is not a mere technocratic 
concern with "welfare" or with policy-making as a means to the "alleviation of poverty." A 
concern with social policy is at the heart of a deep preoccupation with the development 
process and its objectives of positively transforming the human condition. In other words, it 
is primarily a concern with human well-being, how it is conceived, organized, and facilitated, 
and how the burdens of achieving it are distributed over various sectors of society. This 
concern, of course, is not new and can be traced back to earlier debates on the nature of social 
inequality and how this should be tackled. These issues are still on the theoretical and policy 
agenda, as is evident from the worldwide concern of politicians and intellectuals with the 
social-policy debate (Torres 1995). 
In the countries of West and Central Africa, however, current political and cultural conditions 
impose certain challenges regarding the direction of the development process and the role of 
social policy. We need to consider alternative visions of, and paths to, social and economic 
development that integrate the satisfaction of individual basic needs with the broader goals of 
society for collective security and social sustainability. Achieving these objectives implies 
creating living conditions and organizing society and politics in ways that differ from the 
oppressive and stifling precolonial structures and the exploitative and repressive colonial and 
postcolonial systems. It further implies the need, in Africa in particular and in the world's less 
privileged societies in general, to design alternative modes of organizing the economy and 
society to guarantee economic productivity and surplus while preserving and valuing social 
equity, justice, and democracy. Such alternative development requires the relevant human-
centred social policies as key elements. Transforming the current inadequate conditions of 
human development requires the emergence of people who are not only liberated but socially 
responsible and people whose integrity, dignity, and rights are preserved and guaranteed. 
This, in turn, requires specific kinds of development and developed societies that preserve 
social and economic rights and guarantee respect for diversity and humanity, rather than 
subjection to a market determinism. 
 
Social policy in West and Central Africa 
The region 
The West and Central African region is extremely diverse in ecology, history, politics, and 
language. Culturally and geographically, it brings together disparate areas called West Africa 
and Equatorial Africa. These include the Sahel, forests, coastlands, adjacent islands, lakes 
and river basins as diverse as those of the Niger and Congo, Lake Chad, and the Great Lakes. 
Comprising about 26 independent states, the region includes not only some of the most 
populous and well-endowed states in Africa but also some of the poorest, least-developed 
countries in the world. With Chad, Mali, and Niger at its extreme north, the region stretches 
to the Republic of Congo and Zaire at its most southerly point and Burundi and Rwanda in 
the east. 
Reflecting its colonial experience of Belgian, British, French, Portuguese, and Spanish 
domination, the region embraces linguistic groups with the colonial heritage of British West 
Africa, French and Belgian Africa, and the tiny Portuguese and Spanish enclaves. In many 
ways, the region expresses most of the core characteristics of sub-Saharan Africa, particularly 
its vulnerability to change in natural conditions, its political and economic fragility, and other 
structural weaknesses. The countries of the region are particularly vulnerable politically and 
economically. Politically, the small nation-states are fragmented. The majority of these 
countries are predominantly suppliers of primary products, which makes them highly 
vulnerable economically to fluctuating prices of commodities in international markets. The 
heavy reliance on monoproducts also renders these countries highly vulnerable to fluctuations 
in weather conditions. Heavy dependence on rain-fed agriculture entails that production, 
consumption, and export earnings are at the whimsical mercy of weather conditions. Over the 
past three decades, recurrent droughts have adversely affected desertification-prone areas, 
especially in the Sudano–Saharan countries. The resulting food crises and related problems 
have adversely affected living conditions (Adepoju 1996). 
Despite the presence of countries with abundant natural resources — such as Cameroon, 
Gabon, Nigeria, and Zaire — West and Central Africa are still perhaps some of the most 
poverty-stricken regions in terms of both economic and human development. This is 
compounded by an extreme diversity and absence of cultural and even ecological coherence. 
Samir Amin grouped all of Africa into three broad regions, based on the pattern of their 
incorporation into the world capitalist system and the specific function and role of each entity 
within it (Amin 1972). Apart from one or two ambiguous elements, mainly those of Rwanda 
and Burundi, the region covered by this discussion embraces Amin's Africa of the colonial-
trade economy and his Africa of the concession-owning companies. Amin's classification 
provides an analytical handle combining geography and history and the existence and pattern 
of exploitation of natural resources providing a basis for the region's political economy. 
Amin's classification also provides an analytical foundation for understanding the nature of 
the colonial experience of different parts of the region, their development experiences, the 
extent of their underdevelopment, and the pattern of the current experience of globalization 
(Amin 1992). In sum, it provides some useful linkages between the evolution of social policy 
from colonial times to today's situation. 
Broad patterns in social policy 
Before examining the experiences of social policy in West and Central Africa, it is perhaps 
necessary to touch briefly on the definition of social policy, owing to the vague and 
ambiguous ways this concept is often used and the differences in theoretical traditions using 
this notion (Hill and Bramley 1986; Esping-Andersen 1990). 
In addition to difficulties defining social policy in Western literature, a different set of 
problems is found in the review of the African literature. Rather than defining or focusing on 
social policy, African researchers have been more concerned with the broader notion of social 
development. This, in practice, represents some recognition of the specific conditions of 
African societies as least-developed or developing countries (Jinadu 1980; Sanda 1981; Osei-
Hwedie, 1990; Chole 1991; Mohammed 1991). In other cases, the literature shows either the 
prevalence of a more professionally oriented and restricted notion of social policy, as social 
work and social welfare, or an emphasis on social services and their effectiveness (Fyle 1993; 
Semboja and Therkildsen 1995). It should be further noted, however, that except in a few 
cases (Kibuka 1990; Patel 1992; Kaseke 1994, 1995), the wider notion of social policy is 
rarely used in a way that captures the unique challenges of African human-development 
priorities and concerns. 
In the African context, social policy can be conceived as the set of systematic and deliberate 
interventions in the social life of a country to ensure the satisfaction of the basic needs and 
the well-being of the majority of its citizens. Social policy is thus an expression of socially 
desirable goals through legislation, institutions, and administrative programs and practices in 
accordance with specific development objectives. It embodies both the policies and the areas 
of basic needs for interventions in the pursuit of human well-being. Understood in this way, 
social policy is thus a broader concept than the more technical or professional notion of social 
work and social welfare. Although this concept of social policy is often used as synonymous 
with social development, the later implies a larger structural transformation of cultures, social 
structures, productive systems, and the quality of life. Social policy nevertheless makes a 
major contribution to ensuring and maintaining social and human development. 
In practice, conventional social policies are not neutral. Social policies in West and Central 
Africa are often the subject of manipulation and influence by diverse interests and riddled 
with inequalities of gender, race, class, region, and age. Certain inequalities, such as those of 
gender, for example, despite being highly negative, are rarely perceived as reproducing 
systematic social inequities in the predominantly patriarchal societies and sexist states of the 
region. Gender blindness and discrimination still constitute predominant characteristics of the 
economic and social policies formulated and implemented in the region, without any 
consideration of the unequal relations between the sexes either in the households or in terms 
of access to strategic resources, such as land and credit (Sow 1993), or in key areas of social 
life, such as education, health, employment, and politics. Gender inequality is therefore a 
persistent aspect of conventional social policy, with the result that, rather than empowering 
women, social policies contribute to reinforcing and expanding inequitable relations and 
structures (Williams 1989; Etta 1994). 
However, social policy in West and Central Africa has not been static. It has changed in 
response to historical processes in the formation of countries in the region or in wider 
international and global systems. Thus, social policy in West and Central Africa has changed 
in response to the major events in the history of the region. Broadly speaking, the region's 
relevant history can be divided into the colonial and postcolonial periods. Neither represents a 
monolithic, undifferentiated development, and within each there are distinct phases with 
specific trends in various aspects of economic and social life. These notions are used here 
more as a mode of ordering experiences and events, rather than in the sense of the larger 
cultural definition that characterizes current trends in discourse on postcoloniality. 
The colonial period 
The colonial period was very complex, with great variations across and within regions and 
societies. These variations resulted both from the ways societies were differentially 
incorporated into the global capitalist system and from the functions they fulfilled in it, either 
as labour reserves, areas of mining concession, or regions of the colonial-trade economy, 
which was based on peasant agricultural production for metropolitan markets. The cultural 
and political peculiarities of the Belgian, British, French, and Portuguese colonial powers and 
the ways they organized and managed their colonies also affected how specific states and 
political economies emerged. However, despite these differences, each was exploitative and 
had the metropolitan orientation of the colonial, "plunderer" state (Crowder 1968; Bathily 
1994; Zeleza 1994). 
Formal social policy in the region during this period emerged from these complex and often 
contradictory influences shaped by "the ideologies and structures of state provision," which 
"reflected a very narrow interpretation of social welfare" (Boyden 1990, p. 200). As a result, 
colonial social policy had certain major features. 
First, it was largely determined by the colonial mission, the economic exploitation of the 
resources of the colonies. According to Fadayomi (1991, p. 137), 
economic growth was superseded only by economic exploitation, while the 
minimal degree of social development that existed had resulted entirely from 
colonial provision of the basic social services and physical infrastructure 
necessary to facilitate the exploitation of natural resources. In other words, 
social development was merely incidental to the development of the 
metropolitan economy. 
In other words, colonial social policy took a residualist approach. As pointed out by Vivian 
(1995, p. 21), 
during the colonial era, welfare ideas and policies were essentially residualist-
holding that "social welfare institutions should come into play only when 
normal structures of supply, the family and the market, break down." ... That 
is, welfare services (including not only economic support but also other forms 
of social provisioning such as education and health services) were only to be 
provided to those who could not provide for themselves. 
At the service of the colonial mission, dominant interest groups helped to change the 
interpretation and definition of that mission. Among these groups were the colonial officials 
(military and administrative); the business and commercial interests, in certain cases white 
settlers, who were present in West and Central Africa but not as strongly as they were in East 
and Southern Africa; missionaries; and officials of volunteer agencies. A major form of 
support provided by these vested interests, particularly the missionaries and volunteer 
agencies, was that of providing education for the production of people to service both the 
colonial administration and its economy (Fadayomi 1991; Endanda 1993). 
Second, colonial social policy was restrictive both socially and spatially. In many cases 
across West and Central Africa, social services were located only in urban areas or 
neighbourhoods where colonizers were found in large numbers. As Boyden observed (1990, 
p. 180), 
the types of welfare services provided ... reflected the concerns of the rulers 
rather than the needs of the ruled. One of the explicit priorities of colonial 
governments was to provide protection for the expatriate community against a 
hostile physical environment. The Nigerian health service, for example, was 
established in the areas where expatriates lived primarily as a result of the 
great fire that consumed Lagos in 1877 and the outbreak of bubonic plague in 
1924. ... The expatriate settlers and colonial administrators were also worried 
about the threat to themselves from youth crime, and made begging and 
vagrancy and public order concerns predominant. 
Furthermore, the settlements were not only segregated but also classified according to the 
provision of social services, such as in the case of the Town Planning Act of 1917 in Nigeria 
(Mabogunje 1968; Onokerhoraye 1984; Aina 1990). An outcome of the concentration of 
social services and other forms of amenities in these colonial centres was the emergence of 
cities with origins in colonization and the growth of uneven and unequal spatial and socio-
economic development. This law classified Nigerian cities and towns into first-, second-, and 
third-class towns, on the one hand, and native towns, on the other. This classification then 
determined administrative structures and the provision of infrastructures, such as electricity 
and pipe-borne water. The social services and administration of these towns depended on this 
classification; the native towns suffered almost absolute neglect. Lagos, the colonial capital 
was the only first-class town. 
Social policy was thus selective, discriminatory, and exclusionary, geared to protecting and 
advancing colonial interests and those of the white settlers (Patel 1992). Social policy 
included the local population only if it played important roles in the colonial structure or if 
continuous exclusion could fundamentally threaten colonial interests; for example, colonial 
powers only introduced environmental health services in coastal West Africa when malaria 
was rampant in that region. 
The main social actors were the colonial officials, the agents of the foreign volunteer 
agencies, particularly the missionaries, and foreign economic interests, settlers, and various 
categories of local people. The latter included chiefs, particularly the "warrant chiefs," 
created by the British colonial administrators in the pursuit of indirect rule (Crowder 1968), 
the emerging educated elites, in some cases culturally defined as evolués and assimiladoes, 
and rich traders. In certain cases, racial groups such as mulattos and Levantine and Asian 
skilled workers and entrepreneurs were also included. These constituted the key beneficiaries 
of colonial social policy. 
The benefits from colonial social policies for these groups differed. In most cases, the major 
preoccupation was with protecting the interest of colonial officials. Before World War II, for 
example, these benefits in most parts of West and Central Africa were restricted to the 
provision of social services, such as water supply, health services, educational facilities, and 
roads. The objectives were to maintain law and order and a local low-level administrative 
cadre to exploit effectively the natural and other resources of the colonies and to create 
colonial markets for metropolitan export. In practice, this entailed minimal provision of social 
services for the majority of people. However, an excessive concern was shown for the safety, 
health, and security of the colonial officials, traders, and settlers. This preoccupation also 
included colonial town planning and the functioning of official institutions, such as prisons, 
courts, and hospitals. Social security, pension plans, etc. were not provided universally but 
meant mainly for colonial officials and war veterans. Thus, social policy in colonial West and 
Central Africa was not only restrictive and exclusionist but also tied to the physical security 
of the colonial conquerors. 
With the transition from the colonial to postcolonial administration, social policy took on 
completely different functions and objectives. It became a means of legitimizing the new 
regimes constructed by the African nationalist rulers of the weak and fragmented postcolonial 
states. 
 
The postcolonial period 
The postcolonial period in the region included two distinct overlapping phases. The first is 
the early postcolonial period, or the constructionist phase. The second is the crisis phase, 
which began in the mid-1970s and became evident and protracted in the decade of the 1980s. 
The early postcolonial period 
The early postcolonial period roughly corresponds to the first 10 years of independence for 
most countries in West and Central Africa, from the late 1950s to the mid-1970s. It coincides 
not only with the attainment of independence by most states in sub-Saharan Africa but also 
with a surge of nation-building, development projects, optimism, confidence, and some stable 
economic growth, albeit over a short period. It ended with the first global economic crisis, 
occasioned by the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries' increase in petroleum 
prices. Along with the oil crisis, which has been called the African Crisis, and its associated 
economic downturn, other phenomena began to take shape, including drought and famine 
resulting from the Sahelian ecological crises and a wave of persistent political crises. These 
political crises resulted in the virtual collapse of the state and social order in countries such as 
Burundi, Liberia, Rwanda, and Zaire. 
This constructionist phase was one of consolidation and expansion of the neocolonial-
accumulation model that characterized the development paths of many African political 
economies (Mbaya 1995). Coupled with this model was the legitimation strategy of the 
populist programs of the nationalist movements that came to power after independence 
(Mkandawire 1995). Central to the legitimation strategy was a strong social-policy initiative 
tied to an essentially constructionist ideal of economic development, that is, building 
physical, social, and human infrastructures. This was also a period of "constructing" major 
social programs in education, housing, health, urban planning, and elaborate social subsidies. 
This was matched by the construction of new physical signs of nationhood, such as airports, 
ports, military bases, five-star hotels, elite residential estates, parliament buildings and 
government offices, and the sites of the early import-substitution and export-processing 
industries. 
Except in very impoverished economies, this was a phase of some distinctive postcolonial 
affluence for the more privileged strata and classes of postcolonial African societies, which 
were gradually transformed or incorporated into new elite positions and status. This was also 
a time of some stabilization in producer prices for some countries and an economic boom for 
others, such as Côte d'Ivoire, Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria, Zambia, and to some extent Senegal, 
Sierra Leone, and Uganda. At the same time, the demand was growing to create space within 
the economy for a framework of social-policy provisions, with the call coming from 
emergent vocal groups of urban workers, bureaucrats, traders, members of the armed forces, 
and urban-based professionals. 
The early postcolonial period was thus predominantly geared to the expansion of social and 
economic structures to incorporate indigenous interests and groups barred from the colonial 
system. Addressing these demands was central to the nationalist legitimation model and 
constituted perhaps the core of an attempt to spread the fruits of independence to those 
groups with the greatest claim. According to Laakso and Olukoshi. writing on social policy in 
the nationalist project of the postcolonial regimes (1996, p. 15), 
the post-colonial economic boom experienced in the early post-independence 
years facilitated the steady expansion of social services and bureaucracies in a 
manner that enabled governments to accommodate the emerging elites-
political, religious, economic, bureaucratic, and social of various ethnic groups 
and cater for the basic welfare and social needs of the populace as part of the 
post-colonial "social contract." 
However, the accumulation and legitimation models ran into trouble, as they soon reached 
the real limits of their capacity to incorporate more and more new elements both socially and 
economically, given finite resources and rapid population growth. From the late 1960s to the 
early 1970s, the core elements of the nationalist project began to disintegrate politically. The 
struggle for legitimation and incorporation gave way to increasing authoritarianism and 
monolithism. The emergence and consolidation of one-party states came to be a common 
feature, as well as military regimes, run increasingly through clientelistic and personal-rule 
mechanisms. Simultaneously, an increasingly unfavourable global context began to appear 
(Laakso and Olukoshi 1996, pp. 16-17): 
Deep-seated economic problems in the context of a recessionary international 
economic environment meant that the post-colonial "social contract" and the 
various alliances and networks built around it to create relative political 
stability became increasingly unsustainable. As the economic crisis worsened 
in various African countries, so too did the capacity of the state to provide 
welfare services to the populace and patronage to the political and economic 
elite diminish. 
With the decline of popular democratic politics and the collapse of the economies, social 
policy became equally eroded and downplayed. Social services and social infrastructures 
either decayed from sheer neglect or, where they existed in rudimentary forms, were 
appropriated by local barons and misused for political patronage. 
The crisis phase 
To date, the crisis phase in the postcolonial period has not produced signs of resolution or 
relief. It has become more complex with the so-called economic-reform programs, which 
produced some changes in political and economic regimes in the region and redefined 
patterns of social relations between economic and social groups and ethnic and gender 
relations. Changes during this period have reorganized the colonial and early postcolonial 
social and class structures, creating new sets of winners and losers and leaving the vast 
majority of the population in the latter. In the political sphere, this phase opened up 
opportunities for political liberalization and for democratization in some countries, such as 
Benin and Mali, but it has not relieved the crisis in other chronically war-torn countries, such 
as Burundi, Rwanda, and Zaire. 
As the accumulation and the legitimation models of many African political economies ran 
into trouble, several of these nations entered, in the 1970s, a phase of long drawn out 
economic decline. In some countries of West and Central Africa — such as Chad, Mali, and 
Niger — this was accompanied by drought, famine, and other severe ecological crises. In 
others, the crisis was compounded by political repression and monolithism, instability, wars, 
and conflicts. However, the debt crisis and the economic-recovery programs became a 
predominant feature of countries across the region. In a short period, economic decline and 
the debt crisis became the most critical problems. They were the outcomes of the combined 
effects of the initial colonial structure of African economies, the failure of the postcolonial 
regimes to correct these effects, and the pressures of economic globalization. 
The collapse of commodity-export prices, which occurred in short cycles between 1960 and 
1980, became more persistent, prolonged, and critical, leading to an export collapse in the 
1980s (Culpeper 1987). Without going into detail, it suffices to say that this collapse was 
accompanied by declining agricultural productivity, increasing imports of food and other 
products, increasing debts, and a growing balance of payments deficit. Investments, 
particularly foreign investments, declined; unemployment began to rise; and poverty 
increased. Thus, whereas projections for the percentages of people living under the poverty 
line for the rest of the world show a decrease between 1985 and 2000, those for Africa show 
a consistent, if slight increase, from 47.6% in 1985 and 47.8% in 1990 to 49.7% in 2000 
(Oxfam 1993). 
The major IFIs, namely, the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, designed a set 
of policies and strategies to respond to this crisis. These policies, if not directly designed by 
them, were implemented with their assistance and oriented by their philosophy and 
perception of correct economic strategy. These transnational responses to national problems, 
often aimed at "stabilizing" or "adjusting" economies, were formulated in market-reformist 
terms and conceived as palliatives for economies strangled or distorted by excessive state 
intervention and regulation, price distortions, oversubsidization of urban sectors, and heavy 
tendencies to state control and state monopolies. 
The reforms, known as economic-stabilization programs, economic-adjustment policies or 
packages, economic-reform programs, or structural-adjustment programs (SAPs), involved a 
number of key features: 
• Withdrawal of subsidies on essential products, such as foodstuffs, energy sources such 
as petroleum, and other productive inputs, such as fertilizers; 
• Deregulation of agricultural prices and the elimination of marketing boards and other 
such intermediaries; 
• Devaluation of the local currency; 
• Reduction of public-sector employment and elimination or removal of subsidies for 
public-sector employees; 
• Privatization or commercialization of parastatal and public enterprises; 
• Commercialization of social services and infrastructures — such as education, health, 
water supply, and housing — by introducing higher user prices and cost-recovery 
measures; 
• Increase in the use of indirect-taxation mechanisms and austerity packages, such as 
wage freezes, to augment public revenue; and 
• Liberalization of labour laws to ensure a more market-driven economy. 
That countries implement all or significant aspects of these measures was often a condition 
laid down by the IFIs for these countries' continuing to receive financial assistance. Between 
1980 and 1989, 36 sub-Saharan African countries initiated 241 SAPs, many with multiple 
components (Oxfam 1993). This approach involves deregulation, withdrawal of subsidies, 
retrenchment of public-service employees, and commercialization of social services, which 
have all had profound impacts on employment and social provisioning. The economic crisis 
and the adjustment policies had far-reaching impacts on all aspects of life in most parts of 
Africa. Economic and social structures were transformed; polities and administrative systems, 
restructured; and individual and collective status, lifestyles, and psychology, affected in many 
ways, including a prolonged state of shock and multiadaptive compensatory behaviour (Aina 
1989). 
Structural-adjustment policies greatly affected social policies, the provision of social services, 
and the overall well-being of the population. Given the main elements of the reform package, 
social policy and social services were directly affected through either privatization, 
commercialization, or complete government withdrawal and neglect. It has been well 
documented that the impact of structural adjustment on social services severely affected 
health, education, water supply, and environmental sanitation. Most findings show that these 
either deteriorated out of neglect or became inaccessible to the majority of the people who 
used them during the early postcolonial period (Adepoju 1993; Bakker 1994; Gibbon 1995; 
Mkandawire and Olukoshi 1995). 
Under these circumstances and with the extensive problems faced by ordinary people and 
communities in most West and Central African countries, they had little option but to resort 
to autonomous and creative means to satisfy their basic needs. Although they continued to 
suffer intense deprivations, they took steps to provide for themselves those services the state 
neglected or had no capacity to provide. In some ways, for these sectors of the population, the 
SAPs created new avenues for the delivery of social services, although at standards lower 
than those governments can provide; nevertheless, they have fulfilled real needs. Describing 
this experience mainly for the urban areas in Africa, Aina (1997b, p. 425) pointed out many 
facets of the impacts of SAPs and of popular responses to them in African urban centres: 
These ... include traffic congestion, floods, bad roads, blocked drains, 
overflowing and open sewers, erratic electricity and water supply, failing 
telephone systems, and mounting vermin-infested rubbish heaps. While the 
health and environmental hazards multiplied, health facilities, starved of 
essential resources and supplies and/or suffering from prolonged industrial 
action by dissatisfied personnel, failed to cope ... . The basis of law and order 
was also increasingly eroded as economic pressures mounted while ill-
motivated and underpaid security agents either could not cope or were too 
vulnerable in terms of their material needs ... . To offer themselves some 
protection in their homes and settlements, communities organized vigilante 
groups and community watches ... . These often administered instant justice by 
lynching suspected criminals. Although undesirable, this represents an 
expression of "self-help" organizing in response to difficult conditions. 
This self-help element became an important aspect of social-service delivery and social 
policy in the "SAP era." It contained diverse features, including not only those of collective-
community services but also those of commercialization and private initiatives. On the basis 
of the latter, the proponents of liberalization and privatization argued that this was only part 
of an ongoing trend. As Aina (1997b, p. 425) further noted, 
"self-help" in urban areas moved gradually from the "community 
development" efforts of the colonial and early post-colonial periods, which 
were often externally stimulated and directed by bureaucrats, to self-help 
(more as an autonomous, self-protective response based on real needs and 
pressures) in the provision of services such as waste disposal, drain-clearing 
and crime fighting. Where self-help (i.e. service provision not geared towards 
profit) was not well-developed, or could not take off, small commercial 
enterprises emerged in waste disposal, education, dispensing medicine, etc. 
These included efforts such as petty waste disposal units with wheel barrows 
and baskets, water-vending from buckets carried on heads and shoulders, and 
"lessons" teachers instructing groups of children in backyards or front sheds. 
Wherever the state failed or was absent and the formal private sector would 
not go or imposed user charges that were too high, the urban poor organized to 
fill the gap either through collective non-profit responses or through small 
enterprises that charged affordable fees. 
It is important to stress, however, that although the SAPs have promoted some forms of self-
reliance and autonomous action, they have eroded many of the social-policy and human-
development gains of the 1960s and 1970s in areas such as primary education, adult literacy, 
infant and maternal mortality, child nutrition, and the eradication of communicable diseases. 
With the deterioration and the lack of maintenance and renewal of the social infrastructures 
first established in the 1960s and 1970s, SAP public-spending cuts and a combination of bad 
management and neglect have reversed the gains of those decades. Agencies and groups 
concerned with the social outcomes of SAPs have forcefully highlighted this reality (Gibbon 
and Olukoski 1996). Effective momentum for this was created by the Adjustment with a 
Human Face books of the United Nations Children's Emergency Fund (Cornia et al. 1987). 
These brought the social-policy dimension back to the discussion of the design and 
implementation of the SAPs and created the basis for an adjustment era of social-policy 
efforts. 
Adjustment era in social policy 
The transnational character of social policies requires looking at both their pervasiveness 
across the region and the new social-policy agenda that reflects such a phenomena. Social 
policies in the adjustment era have three major features in terms of both their agents and their 
implementation. 
First, there is a new type of local, small-scale provider of social services. These differ from 
the conventional indigenous sources of social provisioning based on the social-solidarity 
systems of families, lineages, and kinship (Aina 1997a). These providers are often private 
initiatives operating along the lines of the informal sector, mainly for a fee. They involve a 
wide range of service provision, such as waste-disposal, selling water, education, and road-
building, among others. What is interesting is that they are rudimentary, locally based 
products of individual initiatives and efforts. 
A second feature of adjustment-era social policies is the expansion of the role of the 
community and volunteer actors in service provision, covering a wide range of institutional 
forms and social services. Their role includes provision of both voluntary and compulsory 
services, such as road-building, drainage clearing, environmental sanitation, social-defence 
neighbourhood watches, and vigilante groups. The institutionalization of these services takes 
different forms. In some cases, they are temporary arrangements set up in response to 
immediate community needs or threats, such as an increase in theft, and are dissolved after 
these needs are fulfilled. In other cases, such as in metropolitan Lagos, Nigeria, they have 
been transformed into more durable structures, such as neighbourhood associations or even 
cooperatives formed to make bulk purchases of commodities, such as building materials to 
upgrade homes, scarce foodstuffs, and other such items. 
The volunteer sector has also witnessed the growth of both local and international 
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), often initiated, encouraged, and funded by both 
private foundations and other multilateral and bilateral donors (Aina 1993). These new agents 
have come to play a major role not only in redefining social-policy priorities and concerns 
but also in formalizing the more universal application of institutional and management 
approaches in their implementation, including accounting systems and modes of financial 
reporting, management, governance structures, and even ideological and value systems for 
"NGO service culture, lifestyle and language" (Aina 1993, p. 140). In other words, in 
addition to carrying out what Fowler (Fowler 1992, 1995) described as the 
internationalization of welfare, NGOs are also internationalizing institutional structures, 
approaches, and ideologies. 
A third feature — perhaps the most significant, because it has implied an extensive 
investment in resources and has in some cases involved formidable carriers and agents — is 
the emergence of social policies with an approach known as "social dimensions of 
adjustment" (SDA). This is a very important characteristic of current social policy and its 
transnational dimension, not only because the main agents are often IFIs, such as the World 
Bank, and the governments of countries in the region, but also because they are beginning to 
lay the basis for a postcrisis social-policy agenda in Africa. 
This is particularly important because efforts to design and implement new neoliberal social 
policies are being harmonized and replicated across countries, affecting the lives of millions 
of people. These new social policies are designed and implemented not only with little or no 
debate in the countries affected but also with little or no real participation of the recipients in 
the identification of their needs. Despite this lack of regard for basic democratic and 
participatory principles, some of these projects are presented at the microlevel as 
participatory interventions. In practice, however, they are often designed by foreign 
specialists and usually managed and evaluated using indicators and benchmarks the 
participants have never been consulted about. They are usually therefore alienating, top-down 
interventions. 
Two of the main elements of SDA policies and interventions are the social-action programs 
(SACPs) and the social funds (SFs). The SACPs operate with limited poverty-alleviation 
strategies and are often quite narrow in terms of their conception, implementation, and cost-
effective attainment of their objectives (Hutchful 1994; Gayi 1995; Mhone 1995; Vivian 
1995). In a World Bank document, Marc et al. (1995, p. 1) argued that 
in Africa, social action programs and social funds have taken different forms 
than in other regions. Social action programs and social funds are both 
considered social safety nets but in fact often have a broader mandate. 
These medium-term, multisector projects are designed to intervene mainly to create 
employment and deliver basic social services. These interventions often involve multicountry 
projects, in some cases with programs applied in at least 14 countries in West and Central 
Africa and the initiative of the World Bank (Marc et al. 1995). In terms of objectives, 
according to Marc et al. 1995, p. 2), these SDA interventions 
are designed to achieve a variety of socio-economic, institutional and political 
objectives, including alleviating the effects of prolonged economic 
dysfunction, protecting those hurt by adjustment, providing support so that the 
poor may benefit in the longer term, setting up institutional mechanisms to 
reach the needy, and increasing political support for the adjustment program. 
As lofty as these objectives are, some analysts of these efforts remain less than impressed by 
their impact or effectiveness on any of these counts (Hutchful 1994; Vivian 1995). 
Comparative examinations of the projects stress the following points. They tend to be short to 
medium term; they focus mainly on public works and infrastructure-rehabilitation and 
employment-generation programs; they concentrate on building specific skills, particularly 
those at inferior, artisanal levels; they tend to rely on private-sector inputs, namely, through 
small-scale contractors and entrepreneurs, microenterprises, and the informal sector; and they 
favour the creation of alternative structures for social-service provision, either through the 
recruitment of personnel, boards, or other similar arrangements. Also, the projects are often 
demand driven, whereas clients are often self-selecting; the projects attempt to promote 
specific institutional, management, and operational approaches based on a belief in efficiency 
and the superiority of private enterprise; and these projects are often donor funded and funded 
from external sources. 
These are the most salient characteristics of the SDA service-provision, public-works, and 
employment-generating efforts under way. In addition, these policies and programs have also 
been shown to be inherently limited in aspects such as male bias, long-term sustainability, 
scope (as they have difficulties reaching the poorest of the poor), and impact (as they tend to 
affect only a small proportion of the population). Their emphasis on political visibility has 
also been said to distort their conception and implementation, as well as hindering any 
serious effort to evaluate their impacts (Vivian 1995). 
Based on experience in the past years, it is obvious that SDA efforts constitute a significant 
and important strategy for social provisioning in Africa. In many ways, SDA policies and 
programs represent a growing process of transnationalization of social policy; in the region, 
they are similar only to the policy-harmonization efforts of the colonial powers. However, 
these policies have greater range and reach than the colonial efforts. With the involvement of 
national governments, SDA social-policy efforts embody attempts to impose long-term 
social-provisioning strategies on their countries, in terms of not only the specific features of 
the social projects and programs but also the radical social-sector restructuring they impose. 
This in itself is a complex and often contradictory endeavour. As Vivian (1995, p. 19) argued, 
This type of social sector reform proposal constitutes an attempt to link the 
neo-liberal, market-based model of social provisioning to "alternative" 
approaches of participation and empowerment in a kind of "neo-liberal 
populism." This is an interesting concept. It implies that safety nets are not 
merely short-term palliatives ... but should rather be seen as part, of a process 
of long-term social restructuring. 
These policies are then promoted using smoke screens (Mhone 1995) or "smoke and mirrors" 
(Hutchful 1994) and conceptual manipulations that hijack and appropriate popular and 
progressive notions — such as participation, empowerment, community, and equity — and 
then repackage them as central to the transformation of societies and economies. By adopting 
popular and progressive notions, these initiatives are made more acceptable, and questions 
related to how the new policies contribute to the reconstruction of West and Central African 
economies and societies and to authentic human development are never directly addressed. 
This is why Vivian's (1995, p. 23) call becomes imperative: 
Social sector reform models must be assessed in terms of their overall social 
efficiency and effectiveness as well as their impact on social development. 
Social policies have long-term effects on social divisions and social structures, 
and if safety nets become institutionalized as an alternative model of social 
service provisioning, a long-term question is raised. What will be the legacy of 
the neo-liberal approach to social service provisioning? Will it promote or 
retard progress toward social development and positive forms of social 
integration? 
These are the type of questions that must be addressed to link transnational or even national 
social policies to the development process. Only by doing so can social policy for the 
countries of West and Central Africa become a means to support not only development but 
also the reconstruction needed to recover from the recent social, political, and economic 
crises and, of course, the SAPs. 
 
Conclusions: postcrisis social policy in West and Central Africa 
As West and Central African societies struggle to emerge from the crises of the last two and a 
half decades, they face certain important issues. The very first is the challenge of social 
reconstruction. This must come from a clear and deliberate recognition of the disruptions and 
destruction of recent times. Virtually all sectors of social and economic life need programs or 
processes of reconstruction, including the economies, the social and political structures, and 
even cultural life. The past era of crisis and disruption has evidently not been the most 
conducive to launching a process of reconstruction of social structures and systems or 
moving ahead their positive transformation. In fact, such an era has been more a period of 
destabilization and destruction, which now requires rehabilitation and transformation. 
Clearly, today, we need to rethink and rebuild the economic models for governing the 
countries of the region and to do so independently of the dictates or tutelage of either colonial 
powers or the managers of IFIs. Perhaps the greatest lesson from the crisis era is the 
recognition of the need to reconstruct and to learn from the mistakes of three or four decades 
of postcolonial economic development, which both Africans and foreigners have recognized 
to be a failure. 
Another major demand for reconstruction is with respect to the political structures of African 
states. This is closely tied to the required changes in economic structure. The current wave of 
pluralism, multiparty democratization, and the struggle for a wide range of human and social 
rights provides a window of opportunity. But the debate about the meaning of democracy, 
participation, communities, representation, and decentralization needs to be revisited. There 
is a need to open up meaningful discussion on what these mean to different groups and how 
these might be integrated into new frameworks built to promote social justice and collective 
and individual well-being. 
An important step in this process will be to rethink the nature and role of the state in Africa. 
This may imply moving away from the false state–market dichotomy so pervasive in the 
current development discourse. Another necessary step will be to identify the prospects in 
Africa for the emergence of "developmental democratic" states that simultaneously overcome 
the twin problems of economic development and democratic legitimation. States that are built 
on development and democracy and that build development and democracy. 
With the construction of such a state must come a new and more constructive role for social 
policy. The eras of using social policies as instruments for exclusion or merely as means to 
political legitimacy are gone. We need to rethink and to integrate human development-
oriented social-policy provisions with the totality of both nation-building and economic 
development. With development constructed as a more authentic human-centred undertaking 
in which various sectors and social groups participate and play an important role, the need for 
political legitimation will be reduced. So will be the need for policies as a means to sheer 
domination. In this way, the role and function of social policy in the development process is 
transformed from one that is instrumentalist to one embedded in the very process of creating 
a better society, constantly minimizing social and economic alienation, injustice, and 
inequity. 
A transnational social-policy agenda can be both a positive and a negative force for human 
development and for collective well-being, depending on the contents and objectives of 
transnational social policies. If the objectives of transnational social policies do not have the 
well-being of people as their main concern, then they can become caught up in technocratic 
managerial systems aimed to increase the rationalization of distributional processes, rather 
than serious attempts to improve the human condition. 
Transnational social policies can have positive outcomes, if they are designed and 
implemented in a framework of global concern to resolve the negative aspects of the 
contemporary human condition. This can be achieved through concerted efforts to address 
issues such as poverty and the lack of access for large numbers of people to opportunities and 
services needed to enable them to better their social and economic condition. This is the real 
challenge for any new social-policy regime and orientation in the context of current 
managerial, technocratic thinking and practice in addressing basic needs. By meeting this 
challenge, transnational social policies can contribute to a genuine process of social 




COMMUNITY-DRIVEN SOCIAL POLICIES 
Kwaku Osei-Hwedie and Arnon Bar-on 
In most African countries south of the Sahara, successive governments have, under diverse 
political-economic frameworks, set their development objectives based on ideological 
definitions of their national problems. In this context, the definition and the process of change 
of social policy in Africa have been dominated, led, and at times held to ransom by ideology. 
Social policies are the collective efforts of a nation's people to address their basic welfare 
needs, related to health, education, employment, occupational training, housing, income 
security, and personal social services at the local or national levels. For the analysis of social 
policies in Africa, three distinctive periods may be identified. These are the colonial period, 
the first decades of independence, and the more recent era of macroeconomic structural 
adjustment. In the colonial period, the European powers took advantage of the military and 
technological weaknesses of Africa to exploit the mineral and agricultural wealth of the 
continent. In the process, they subjected all economic, social, and political activities to their 
interests. Thus, as a result of the lack of political control by Africans and the systematic 
expatriation of wealth, countries in the region became producers of an economic value that 
was lost to their people. As a result, countries in Africa became structurally dependent and so 
underdeveloped. 
Underlying these changes in Africa's economy was the assumption that Africans were in a 
most elementary state of civilization, far below that of Europeans in the evolutionary ladder. 
This assumption led to two seemingly contradictory conclusions, formalized in the infamous 
ideology of apartheid. The first and dominant conclusion, was that only a certain level of 
African development was required to benefit the supposedly more advanced European 
capitalist system. Accordingly, the colonial regimes devoted only the resources needed to 
provide the minimum infrastructure and social services to accomplish this end. Thus, formal 
education, for example, was only introduced to make Africans efficient, reliable, and 
dedicated workers. Schooling, health, and related social services were restricted, therefore, to 
those segments of the population deemed potentially beneficial to the European capitalists. 
The second conclusion, opposed to the first, is that colonialism came about because of the 
Africans' need to advance beyond their state of development at that time and become 
"civilized." Thus, for example, religious education was established to improve the moral and 
social character of Africans. As the human-development objective was by far secondary to 
the other, capitalist objective, it was not included in any form of social policy but left entirely 
to the voluntary efforts of religious organizations, and the lack of an indigenous base made 
their services extremely rudimentary and ad hoc. The consequence was that African nations 
inherited from their colonial masters a social-service infrastructure that was close to nil and 
inherently residual. 
At independence, nationalist governments sought to change both the conditions created under 
colonialism and the thinking behind them. This was a period of rising expectations that, 
coupled with nationalist sentiments, called for a parting with the past and a search for a new 
development ideology. Socialism — or more specifically, African socialism — thus became a 
vehicle to completely eradicate the colonial economy and its related structures. 
African socialism emphasized the equality of all people and advocated equality of access to 
resources, services, and opportunities. Development efforts were thus geared toward 
structural transformation. Backed by rapid economic growth and the nationalization of a 
foreign-dominated private sector that provided buoyant government revenues, massive 
investments were made in infrastructure, from road construction to the new import-
substitution enterprises given over to the parastatal sector. 
The nationalization of private and foreign enterprises was wide in scope and included a 
proactive approach to social welfare within the socialist outlook on social development. 
Governments embarked on a manic spree of building schools, clinics, and other social and 
physical amenities, all under stringent state control. In keeping with the past, however, 
personal social services and social security remained underdeveloped. This was in part a 
legacy of a tradition that still regarded the family as the primary vehicle for personal security 
and in part due to the belief that under a socialist system, personal needs would be a 
reflection of individualism and a thing of the past. 
In the mid-1970s, however, all these development efforts came to a stop. Across the 
continent, African economies started to experience deep, pervasive, and continuing economic 
crises, with zero or insignificant growth and high inflation. This led to rising foreign and 
domestic debts, increased unemployment, shortages of consumer goods, and deteriorating 
social infrastructures. Most governments' first response to these developments was to 
introduce price controls and subsidies for many popular consumer items and inputs for 
production, including fertilizers and seeds. However, these measures proved ineffective. As 
the situation deteriorated even further, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) intervened, 
introducing a new period in the history of African social policy: the era of structural 
adjustment. 
The essence of the IMF's approach to structural adjustment is the neo-liberal notion that the 
state must divest itself of direct participation in the economy and the provision of social 
services to make way for free-market exchange. Unfortunately however, the mechanisms 
introduced to reach this end, such as tightening the money supply and reducing public 
expenditure, compounded the already precarious economic status of most consumers. In a 
short period of time, it became increasingly clear that alternatives were needed to fill the gap 
left by the state. In the case of the satisfaction of basic needs, other bodies would have to step 
in, thus paving the road again for the volunteer sector to become the major provider of social 
services. 
This chapter reviews the development path followed in social policies in Africa and its effects 
on social welfare. Three distinctive historical–ideological periods and their associated 
political-economic orientations are discussed as factors shaping the nature and scope of social 
provision. The analysis underlines how community-based social provision in the precolonial 
era gave way to voluntary and nongovernmental activities; how nationalist governments 
subsequently supplanted these modes of provision; and how in the wake of the structural-
adjustment programs (SAPs), the trend has shifted again to community provision of social 
services. The chapter argues that such community-driven social policies are at best 
rudimentary, as the power of communities to exercise self-determination is largely 
constricted by the state and the organizations it has sanctioned to promote self-determination. 
It should be pointed out that underlying many of these transformations have been substantial 
interregional, transnational influences stemming, in part, from a shared colonial experience 
under British rule, which brought most East and Southern African countries into close 
association with the Commonwealth of Nations. More recently, such ties have been further 
strengthened by the expansion of the Southern African Development Community, whose 
activities (much more like those of the European Economic Community) are increasingly 
influencing developments in its member countries' economies. 
The colonial legacy 
Before the advent of colonialism, most sub-Saharan African societies were ethnic 
nationalities, organized around kith and kin, with authority exercised through a system of 
chieftaincy, clan elders, and heads of households. Given the mainly autarchic way of life of 
most people, this was generally adequate to meet most welfare requirements — from housing 
and the storage of food to personal support in times of bereavement — based on accepted 
reciprocity and equitable personal intimacies (Brooks and Nyireade 1987). 
Colonialism changed the African landscape and permanently dented this social-support 
mechanism. A variety of reasons can be given to explain this phenomenon, not least of which 
are the promotion of money as the primary medium for exchange of goods and services and 
the introduction of a clear distinction between the homestead and the place of work. These 
developments lessened the need for reciprocity in attaining personal and family welfare 
(Ouma 1995). For example, when governments were trying to ensure an adequate supply of 
labour for European enterprises, they introduced taxation schemes. This made it necessary for 
Africans to seek employment to earn the cash they needed to pay taxes. Additionally, the 
removal of the hub of political power from the local population undermined the authority of 
the kinship system, which, in turn, reduced its ability to protect its socially vulnerable 
members. 
Perhaps most importantly, the colonialists devalued the Africans, their organization, and their 
skills. This was the outcome of an ideology that promoted the colonial powers' own social, 
cultural, and economic supremacy. One of the most critical consequences of colonialism, 
crucial to explaining current social-policy patterns in Africa, was that all welfare activities 
were directed to meeting the interests of the nonindigenous population and these alone 
(MacPherson 1982). This approach was vigorously promoted and protected. It was also 
clearly articulated, for example, by Sir Godfrey Huggines, the Prime Minister of Southern 
Rhodesia: "I shall do all I can to develop the native if I am allowed to protect my own race in 
our own areas and, if I am not, I will not do anything" (SSW 1996, p. 20). 
One of the practical implications of this ideology was that the welfare of Africans became 
subordinate to that of the colonialists and interpreted strictly in utilitarian terms. In health, for 
example, governments established hospitals and clinics for the general population primarily 
because the European enterprises needed healthy workers and the owners of these enterprises 
feared the spread of communicable diseases. Consequently, these services were rudimentary 
and inferior to those available to white people. The availability of services largely followed 
the pattern of European settlements, which meant that they were mainly urban based, despite 
the fact that most of the population was rural. In Zambia, for example, most health services 
were concentrated in the copper-mining belt and along the railroad line from where most 
African labour was recruited and worked. 
This policy applied equally to education, as aptly demonstrated by events in Zimbabwe (then 
Southern Rhodesia). Between 1972 and 1976, only 4 years before independence, the ratio of 
government expenditure on education for black children and for white children was 1 : 12, or 
40 Zimbabwe dollars (ZWD) per black child in comparison with 475 ZWD per white child 
(in 1998, 25.85 ZWD = 1 United States dollar [USD]). In contrast to black children, all white 
children were guaranteed full primary and secondary schooling. Also, black families were 
required to pay for their children's education, whereas their white counterparts were not. 
Consequently, of the 5 471 white children who started school in 1968, a total of 5 181 
completed form IV, with a 5% dropout rate, attributed mainly to migration. In contrast, out of 
every 1 000 black children in the same year, 250 never went to school, 340 had only 
incomplete primary education, and only 78 got to secondary school, of whom 45 reached 
form IV (SSW 1996). 
Another example of this type of double standard is found in personal social services in 
Zimbabwe in the 1930s. The authorities were faced with growing rates of juvenile 
delinquency, prostitution, drunkenness, and the break up of families. However, the 
government restricted its concern over these phenomena only to their occurrence among the 
white settlers. When similar problems arose in the indigenous population, they were left to 
the police. When the newly established welfare departments did take an interest in the 
problems of black people, they attempted to solve these problems by moving the elderly and 
destitute from the towns and cities to the rural areas. Apart from the desire to keep the urban 
areas "clean," the reason for this policy was the assumption that black people's needs were 
"simple" and could be easily met by extended families and other mechanisms of the peasant 
economy. For this reason, too, old-age allowances were granted to whites only. 
In sum, under colonial rule, Europeans received the highest priority, followed by those 
Africans immediately linked with the European economy. The problems of the rest of the 
African population were considered only if resources allowed or if they could be left to the 
humanitarian and missionary work of volunteers. Thus, in 1970, the church ran more than 
60% of all rural health services in Zimbabwe; on the eve of independence, in 1980, 
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) owned 107 of the country's 177 secondary schools 
(SSW 1996). This, in turn, gave governments justification to remain aloof from such social 
services. However, the church and other volunteer organizations, relying mostly on charitable 
funding, were usually only able to offer the most basic of services, which were thus also of 
low quality. In health, for example, most Africans continued to rely on traditional medicine 
for a substantive part of their health care. However, the contribution of traditional medicine 
was unacknowledged and neglected, keeping it underdeveloped by contemporary standards 
of medicine. 
Gaining independence 
Sub-Saharan Africa's independence and the ascension to power of nationalist governments 
raised a variety of expectations of socioeconomic change to foster greater equality and 
ultimately development. The newly formed political parties were instrumental in accelerating 
such changes as they tried to amass support to their cause. First among their promises was the 
guarantee of free education and health services for all, the improvement of housing, and the 
provision of other services, such as electricity, running water, and roads. Also important was 
the promise of popular participation in identifying needs and developing programs to address 
them. This was meant to allow people to taste political and economic powers that colonialism 
had denied them. 
The prospects for satisfying such yearnings were also optimistic. Although it was recognized 
that all African countries suffered considerable economic backwardness, it was assumed that 
this was caused by decades of foreign rule resulting in insufficient investment, dependence on 
single metropolitan markets, and lack of education. When Africans gained control of their 
own destinies, the expectation was that they could build industries, develop cities and 
infrastructures, attract foreign investment and aid, and prove their development potential. The 
boom in world trade during the 1960s, with the growing demand for primary commodities, 
which were Africa's main line of exports, contributed to strengthening this optimism. 
Additionally, at that time, the continent was self-sufficient in food. In fact, it was a net food 
exporter. 
At independence, as during the colonial period, ideology was again one of the major factors 
in the evolution of events. Partly as a reaction to previous forms of government but also 
because it was widely regarded at the time as an effective means to enhance the welfare of 
people en masse, socialism was adopted by most African governments. Socialist philosophies 
dominated the region from the end of the 1960s to the early 1990s. This was understood at 
that time to mean that government control of all natural resources and the major means of 
production and their use would be for the benefit of the nation as a whole. This led, first, to 
the adoption of social-sector policies as the primary instruments to create the new social 
order. Second, it led to the assumption that this would ensure that the necessary state 
resources were available to execute its policies and that the state would have sufficient 
control to manage society for its benefit. In the words of President Nkrumah (1967, pp. 52–
53), socialism would allow governments to establish 
a society in which men and women will have no anxiety about work, food and 
shelter, where poverty and illiteracy no longer exist, and where diseases is 
brought under control; where our education facilities provide our children with 
the best possible opportunities for learning. 
In hindsight, this may sound naive. However, to understand the postcolonial legacy that has 
shaped African social policy to date, one needs to appreciate the ambience of the time, the 
political atmosphere, and the euphoria of having independence after years of repression. 
Socialist African governments took a structural view of social problems and took a proactive, 
rather than a reactive, approach to social-sector policies. In most cases, social-welfare 
programs differed from those in the West, which were characterized by a central policy 
concern with income transfers. In Africa, where most economies are dominated by 
subsistence-level agriculture, a very small sector of the population had income to be 
transferred to others, and even fewer could contribute to building national social-insurance 
systems. Consequently, what social-security system existed was restricted mainly to the civil 
service and a few other employment-based sectors of the economy, such as manual labour. 
Instead, the three most important areas of investment were education, health (including water 
supply), and price subsidies and controls. The importance of the latter is clear, given the 
proportion of income spent by the poor on basic commodities (Muzaale 1988). Put in another 
way, the emphasis was on social development, rather than on residualism, and consequently 
social assistance and other personal-welfare services remained largely underdeveloped. 
With these principles and the necessary resources from the products of nationalization, 
governments went into a frenzy of compensating for past policies. This is illustrated by 
changes in the education sector. In Zambia, 880 000 new school places were created between 
1964 and 1984 (Tembo 1995). In Zimbabwe, where free education was introduced overnight, 
the government established 5 500 primary and secondary schools in 6 years, a 220% increase 
over the preindependence era. Halfway through this period, school enrolment increased to 2.5 
million, of which 420 000 were in secondary school; by contrast, the total enrolment was 800 
000 in 1980, of which only 72 300 were in secondary school (SSW 1996). In the health 
sector, governments embarked on massive infrastructure building, with the aim (as in 
Zimbabwe) of ensuring that no one need travel more than 10 km to the nearest clinic. In 
Zambia, the total number of hospitals and health centres grew from 354 in 1964 to 1 006 in 
1988, an increase of more than 160% (Tembo 1995). All health-care services were offered 
free of charge, at least to the poor, or at a standard, nominal price. 
With these and other investments, especially in industry and water supply, Africa's first 
decade of political independence showed marked improvements in the situation of most of 
the population. In Zambia, for example, total public expenditures grew at an average annual 
rate of 19.3% between 1964 and 1970 and contributed to a more than 50% rise in new waged 
employment by 1973, doubling real earnings (Daniel 1985). This, plus a growth in social 
services, culminated in an overall enhancement of the welfare of the population. So well did 
most countries do on all universal social and economic performance indicators that it 
appeared unnecessary at the time to question the source of this progress or the prospects of its 
sustainability. 
A crises in the making 
Looking back from the perspective of the 1990s, one sees these developments as almost 
unbelievable. Compare what is taking place in Africa today with parallel developments 
elsewhere, such as in the former Soviet Union, and with the economic recovery of some 
South American countries, and "it is difficult to believe," as the former President of Nigeria, 
General Olusegun Obasanjo, remarked "that we inhabit the same historical time" (Marcum 
1988/89, p. 177). Recent reports on the state of the African continent are extraordinarily 
gloomy. They describe Africa as "moribund," "peripheral to the rest of the world," and "a 
human and environmental disaster area." In the view of the World Bank, whereas virtually 
every other region in the world is likely to experience an uplift in the quality of life by 2000, 
the situation in Africa will only get worse (Farnsworth 1990). 
The obvious question is, what went wrong? Several factors may explain what happened. 
Financing the rapid expansion of the social infrastructure was facilitated by growth in the 
economy, often aided by continuing assistance from former colonial powers. This was 
invaluable to the success of governments in reviving the collective spirit of Africans, 
especially in rural areas, for it translated into the popularity of volunteering to help build 
clinics, schools, toilets, and wells. In Botswana, for example, albeit at that time one of the 
poorest countries in the world, colonial aid paid for the payroll of the entire civil service for 
11 years after independence. Together with grants from the United Kingdom, this made up 
almost half of all government revenues (Morton and Ramsay 1987). However, this proved to 
be only a short-term measure. 
Even as late as the early 1970s, when the global economy began to show signs of recession, 
Africa's social-development efforts continued to be strong. This was partly due to the 
introduction of international financial-compensatory measures that helped to weaken the 
impact of the first oil crisis in 1973. Another factor was the ability of many countries to 
attract bilateral assistance as their human-centred development models fitted well the basic-
needs interest of donor agencies. In Tanzania, for example, the amount of foreign aid rose 
from 1% of gross domestic product (GDP) in 1961 to 16% of GDP in 1986. Between 1973 
and 1982, foreign aid from Scandinavian sources alone funded the construction of 400 
dispensaries, rural health centres, and health-education and nutrition projects (Tungaraza 
1990). As a result, expenditure on health rose by close to 200% in the 1970s; and in 
education, by 180%. This trend was also apparent in social security, which rose by 120% 
(Tungaraza 1990). Although total investments exceeded governments' own resources in most 
countries, the flow of foreign aid was a determinant factor in financing their expanding social 
infrastructure. All this, however, was still insufficient. 
In general developmental terms, it could be argued that following independence most African 
countries made significant strides in uplifting the well-being of their populations. However, 
the situation of many people remained extremely harsh. In part, this was because in most 
African countries human-development indicators were very low to begin with. For example, 
in 1960, life expectancy at birth was 40 years, whereas it was 69 years in the industrial 
countries; the mortality rate for children under 5 years old was seven times as high; and adult 
literacy reached only 17% of that in the North, with university training almost nonexistent 
(UNDP 1992). In part, it was also because progress occurred over a relatively short period; as 
the situation improved, people's expectations rose proportionally. 
However, overshadowing all other considerations that fueled the need for accelerated overall 
development was the mushrooming of the population. Improved medical care and the partial 
containment of diseases such as polio and malaria drastically cut infant mortality, thus 
contributing to rapid population growth. Africa's population was already increasing at an 
average annual rate of 2.6% in the 1960s. In the next decade, this increased to 2.9%, and by 
the late 1980s, it had risen to more than 3%. This implies a doubling in population every 22 
years (Goliber 1989). 
In theory, this growing population could have met its basic needs with an equal or a larger 
increase in productivity. This happened only to an extent during the 1960s. Farm output rose 
by around 3% a year, keeping pace with the rate of population growth. Since 1970, however, 
agricultural production grew at only half this rate. Part of this decline was and continues to be 
largely beyond the control of African countries — droughts, often made worse by 
overgrazing and by the rapid deforestation needed to provide fuel and shelter for a growing 
population, have been a factor. In part, however, the agricultural decline resulted directly 
from specific government policies. Governments seeking to transform their countries from 
primary-commodity producers into industrial manufacturers pursued import-substitution 
policies that led to the development of their own steel, cement, and paper industries. In this 
context, considerable efforts were directed to protecting these industries through heavy tariffs 
and subsidies, rather than targeting foreign markets and stimulating the economy by export 
growth. As a result, in a short time, these export products became less attractive abroad. 
Although establishing the heavy industries was relatively easy, African countries lacked the 
capacity to establish a high-tech sector. The result of this was a continuing heavy dependence 
on imports. To cover the resulting trade deficits, farmers were encouraged to grow tea, 
coffee, and cocoa for export, rather than food for domestic consumption. Ultimately, most 
countries ended up not only with a neglected agricultural base as a result of high investment 
in industrialization but also with an agricultural sector further curtailed by price controls that 
repressed the income received by farmers for the items they did grow. 
Many other factors also made governments adopt strategies of internal-deficit financing, 
which ultimately affected the capacity of governments to respond to demands in the social 
sectors. In Uganda, for example, a drive to localize the economy led to massive capital flight 
abroad and a drain in the trained labour force with the expulsion of Asian entrepreneurs. 
Simultaneously, the country was engulfed in a web of political instability and in wars with 
neighbouring countries. At this time, African governments poured money not only into basic 
industrial infrastructure but also into large bureaucracies, oversized armies, and prestige 
enterprises, such as fancy parliament buildings and national airlines, paying for them by 
printing money and raising loans from abroad. In Zambia, for example, it was estimated that 
by 1980, total public expenditure had outstripped the gross national product by more than 
50%, and government and other parastatal enterprises accounted for close to 80% of the 
country's total formal employment. But only a quarter of the income was collected through 
taxes. 
These and other difficulties, both national (such as escalating civil wars) and international 
(such as the dramatic drop in the price of primary commodities), increased Africa's 
indebtedness in new ways. Earlier postcolonial borrowing had been driven primarily by the 
desire for rapid development: money was poured into industry, health, education, airports, 
roads, and water and electrification schemes. But the new borrowing was to pay for imported 
food, armaments, and a soaring civil service (often inept, because of a legacy of insufficient 
training, and more often than not chronically corrupt). Indebtedness grew at an accelerated 
pace. Defaults on loans rapidly produced a drying-up of capital from Western banks, which 
were never keen to invest in Africa in the first place; national economies came almost to a 
halt. 
The social and human costs of this were devastating. The newly constructed schools, clinics, 
and hospitals could no longer be maintained. For the same reason, transportation, water 
delivery, and electricity supplies also staggered or, more often, degenerated. Concurrently — 
and, in the long-term perspective, more importantly — large numbers of trained personnel 
left for greener pastures, undermining the delivery of existing services and the development 
of new initiatives. 
Adjustment and change 
Without an alternative framework for economic reform, the governments of African countries 
were under increased pressure to undertake sweeping reforms. On the one hand, chronic 
negative balance of payments triggered a shift in emphasis from industrial substitution to 
export-led industrialization. Because the state had until then played the major role in the 
economy, it became obvious that its functions would have to drastically change. On the other 
hand, it became evident that because large internal deficits and strong inflationary pressures 
accompanied the external deficits, reforms would have to include drastic reductions in the 
public sector and its expenditures. 
This diagnosis was widely accepted. It might have led to the implementation of a range of 
corrective measures (Mkandawire 1989); however, in practice a neoliberal view of economic 
and social development became dominant, enabling international financial institutions (IFIs) 
to take control of the reforms, particularly the IMF and the World Bank. Thus, under the label 
of "structural adjustment," IFIs imposed the condition on their support that governments 
implement harsh austerity policies, first to reorient production toward exports and, second, to 
implement a general program of state withdrawal from active involvement in the social and 
economic sectors. By the late 1980s and early 1990s, SAPs were in place in more than 30 
countries in sub-Saharan Africa. 
Structural adjustment in Africa rested on two economic objectives: changes in the 
foundations of the economy and the achievement of an equilibrium in external and internal 
monetary balances. Therefore, as stated by Reinikka-Soininen (1990, p. 11), the SAPs 
involved 
a comprehensive set of economic measures designed to achieve macro-
economic goals, such as improvement in the balance of payments, a more 
efficient use of the productive potential, an increase in the long-term rate of 
economic growth, and low inflation. 
One of the strongly held assumptions underlying SAPs was that only efficiency in resource 
allocation and economic equilibrium can cause long-term growth. This meant that SAP 
measures were usually geared toward price mechanisms designed to induce substitutions in 
consumption and production. Thus, SAP recommendations were aimed at 
• Removing or reducing price distortions and subsidies; 
• Increasing depressed producer prices; 
• Increasing domestic interest rates to promote saving and the efficiency of financial 
institutions; 
• Promoting quick-yielding productive sectors; 
• Restraining wages; 
• Opening trade and capital markets to competition; and 
• Managing external debts (Commonwealth Secretariat 1989). 
In short, the primary aim of structural adjustment was to allow increased intervention of 
market forces in the control of the economy, thus reversing the ideological basis of 
government for most African countries before the SAPs. 
The role and processes of SAPs as a means to reviving African economies have attracted 
considerable attention (Sahn 1994; World Bank 1994). In practice, however, several 
problems are associated with assessing the social impact of SAPs, especially when it comes 
to the weaker sectors in society. In part, this is due to undisaggregated statistics and a lack of 
substantive, reliable information and comprehensive household surveys (Demery and Squire 
1996). In part, it is also due to problems related to the interpretation of available data. It has 
been difficult, for example, to clearly separate the effects of SAPs from the those of 
concurrent events (Commonwealth Secretariat 1989). This has become a problem particularly 
since the early 1990s, when many SAPs began to move beyond the strict realm of economic 
reform and tried to reorganize other aspects of society, including even gender relations and 
the democratization of political processes by facilitating multiparty elections and increased 
freedom of the press. One of the implications of the overall lack of social data is that most 
discussions of SAPs in Africa have had to rely on theory or the indirect evidence of modeling 
exercises (Bourguignon et al. 1991), on pan-African generalizations that incorrectly treat the 
continent as a homogeneous whole, or more commonly on largely anecdotal evidence 
(Watkins 1995). The following section discusses some of the social impacts of the SAPs. 
The social impacts 
Because one of the primary aims of structural adjustment has been to liberate the economy 
from social and political influences, a major emphasis of SAPs to date has been on 
privatization. To this end, governments have implemented several interrelated measures. 
First, governments devalued exchange rates artificially overvalued to boost exports. Second, 
governments removed most price controls on basic commodities like the staple maize meal. 
In addition to reducing public deficits, this was also meant to stimulate the agricultural sector 
by increasing the price farmers receive for their products and thereby putting a halt to a 
serious social side effect: the rural–urban migration that was reaching untenable proportions. 
In Zambia, for example, in the first 16 years of independence, close to half the population 
migrated to urban areas. By 1980, the "rail provinces" — the Lusaka, Central, Copperbelt, 
and Southern provinces — alone already contained more than 55% of the nation's population, 
up from 20% in 1964 (Burdette 1988). Third, governments divested themselves of the 
business enterprises under their control, reduced the size of their civil services, and diverted 
substantial funds from social services, generally regarded by the new neoliberal-thinking 
economists as unproductive. 
Although the effectiveness of these measures over time remains subject to debate (Demery 
and Squire 1996; Hope 1997), it is generally acknowledged that over the short term they have 
brought a traumatic experience to much of the population. At the macroeconomic level, GDP 
per capita in sub-Saharan Africa as a whole declined in real terms between 1988 and 1992 by 
1.0% a year, whereas per capita consumption, already at a minimum, fell in 23 out of 41 
countries. It is, however, at the micro, that is to say more personal, level that SAPs have had 
their most direct social impact. In Zambia, for example, the divestiture by the government of 
its publicly owned businesses, ranging from mines and dairies to dry cleaners, left 85% of the 
population unemployed. By the end of 1996, out of a total of 9 million people, only 400 000 
had formal employment. Further, although many workers were willing to take retrenchment 
packages, their employers' cash flows were too meagre to pay them (Lamont 1996). Finally, 
even the mean years of schooling, in which governments invested the most, had fallen 
(UNDP 1992). 
Another strategy of the SAP for cost-recovery was to introduce user fees in key social-sector 
services, such as education, health, and water supply; in areas in which such measures were 
already in place, the approach was to dramatically increase user fees and to collect them more 
stringently. In the education sector, for example, many students have been forced to drop out 
of school because of their inability to pay higher schools fees. Owing to cultural factors, the 
most direct effects of these measures have been felt by girls. Users fees in education also 
contribute to increased urban–rural disparities, as the urban schools' constituencies are better 
placed to pay higher fees and more able to pay higher teachers' salaries, thus depleting rural 
schools of qualified teachers. Adeybayo Adedeji, former Executive Secretary of the 
Economic Commission for Africa, noted that "if things continue like this, Africa will have 
more illiterate people as a proportion of the population than at independence" 
(Commonwealth Secretariat 1989, pp. 27–28). The health sector has been equally affected. 
User fees in health were already a common practice, except for the poorest sector of the 
population. However, devaluation and budget cuts led to increases in the cost of drugs, which 
in turn led to a drastic reduction in the availability of drugs at clinics and hospitals. In 
Zambia, the real value of the drug budget in 1986 was a quarter of what it was in 1983 
(Commonwealth Secretariat 1989). As in education, cutbacks in health have also had a 
greater impact on women, as they are the custodians of family health, especially of children. 
Although most of these measures and their aftermath have been common to many other 
developing countries, they caught African governments unprepared. Their civil societies had 
virtually no social safety nets to contain their adverse effects. In part, this was due to the 
governments' belief that the negative effects of these reforms would be short lived and so 
could be weathered if not by all, then by most of the population. Moreover, compared with 
other regions where neoliberal economic policies have been introduced, the African region 
had traditionally had institutionally underdeveloped personal and residual social services. 
This was due to a combination of factors. These included the colonial legacy that downplayed 
individuals' needs beyond the most basic — historically it had been assumed these could be 
met by the peasant economy; the legacy of a socialist outlook that places collective before 
individual needs; and the African kinship system that places responsibility for personal 
welfare on the extended family. In this regard, the profile of social policies in Africa under 
SAPs takes on a different dimension from those in other regions. 
In addition, because the primary concern of some governments was social and not personal 
development, they even dismantled some of the few personal safeguards that were already in 
place or severely curtailed them as their economies deteriorated and resources became more 
limited. In Zimbabwe, the government decided as early as in 1980 to repeal its Old Age 
Pension Act (which at the time catered to whites only), instead of extending its coverage to 
the entire population. Although its importance was clearly recognized, this Act was deemed 
unfundable. Another cost-saving strategy was to keep the level of nominal income below 
which medical care was provided free of charge unchanged for 10 years, despite the country's 
roaring inflation. 
Consequently, the measures in place in most countries to cushion the social impact of SAPs 
were very meagre. In some cases, the only safety net was food rations for the destitute and 
minimal cash-for-work or food-for-work programs intended to provide their recipients with 
just enough to sustain their physical health. In Botswana, the food package originally meant 
for a single person was provided to feed the entire family. The same applies to the cash-for-
work program ("drought relief"), in which participation was also restricted. In Swaziland, 
public assistance was so small that recipients were paid only once every 3 months because 
the amounts on their social-assistance cheques would be otherwise less than their 
transportation costs for collecting them (Khumalo 1992). 
Under these conditions, most governments have been forced to revise their entire set of social 
policies. From using their limited resources to promote social welfare across society, they 
have had to begin using them residually as a corrective tool to manage the social 
malfunctioning of the market economy — to compensate for or, more precisely, to cope with 
"economic diswelfare." Moreover, governments have had to do this literally overnight and in 
the light of the dictates of the SAPs, which demanded as little public investment as possible. 
All this took place at a time when the sick in hospitals already had to rely on relatives for a 
change of bedding; schools were operating without books or desks; and people were going 
back to using unsafe water sources as taps ran dry (Mabote 1996). In Zimbabwe, less than 5% 
of those employed in the formal sector qualified for free health care, compared with 46% in 
1982 (Sanders 1992). 
The "new" ideology of residualism — in effect, a return to colonialism — translated into 
three key phenomena in terms of social development: the active retargeting of the neediest 
among the needy, more by default than intent; the restressing or reemergence of self-help or 
local autonomy under the disguise of decentralization, local participation, and partnership; 
and the reintroduction of private welfare, undertaken mainly by NGOs. 
Targeting the neediest of the needy 
Many African governments, cognizant that some of the direct social-reform measures and the 
trigger-off impacts of SAPs would aggravate an already difficult situation and aware of the 
probable political effects, introduced some cushioning mechanisms aimed to help the most 
vulnerable groups: the Programme of Action to Mitigate the Social Costs of Adjustment in 
Ghana; the Programme for Alleviation of Poverty and Social Cost of Adjustment in Uganda; 
the Social Action Programme in Zambia; and the Social Dimensions Fund in Zimbabwe. All 
these programs were drawn up alongside the SAP economic measures, but more often than 
not they were introduced belatedly. 
Very early in the process, some of these programs began to encounter serious obstacles. 
Arriving at a definition of vulnerable groups, for example, was not an easy task. Different 
programs adopted different, often conflicting, strategies. Thus, in Zimbabwe, which had one 
of the broadest public-assistance programs in Africa, one approach was to tighten the 
eligibility criteria so that help would be available only to the most needy. This led to the 
enactment of the Social Welfare Assistance Act of 1988, which restricted public assistance to 
the elderly, the chronically ill, the disabled, and the dependants of indigent people. Before the 
implementation of this Act, all persons had been able to receive assistance provided they 
proved that they were destitute and had no other significant source of assistance. At the same 
time it promulgated this Act, the government extended the provision of health care free of 
charge across the board by significantly raising the income threshold for fees to be paid, from 
150 ZWD to 400 ZWD, although this sum took no account of family size (SSW 1996). In 
recognition of rural–urban disparities, the government exempted all families in rural areas, 
whatever their income, from the newly introduced schools fees, and in the urban centres poor 
families were expected to apply to the Social Dimensions Fund for help. In contrast, in 
Zambia, which used a system of food subsidies, only urban-based heads of households 
earning less than a specified amount per year were eligible for coupons they could exchange 
for heavily subsidized corn meal. The system did not apply to rural communities, except in 
provincial towns of predominantly urban provinces, as it was assumed that rural dwellers 
were self-sufficient in food production. 
However, even when these measures were implemented, they often proved to be insufficient. 
Many people, especially workers on commercial farms, who were fairly isolated, remained 
unaware of the availability of these services. In most cases, even if they were informed, they 
could do little to use the services because the program offices were located in major cities, 
out of reach of much of the population. Also, assistance programs usually dealt with only 
newly added service costs, not with those already in place. Thus, for example, in all African 
countries, families contended not only with school fees but also with other associated 
expenditures, such as a school-building levy and the costs of children's school uniforms, 
which many families could ill-afford and which the funds failed to cover. 
Even more detrimental, however, was the fact that governments allocated insufficient funds 
for these programs. As a result, the programs were often unable to cover even some basic 
contingencies for which people were eligible for assistance. As often occurred, governments 
found it easier to sustain some particular arrangements rather than others. In Ghana, for 
instance, most assistance funds were earmarked to enable retrenched workers to venture into 
new occupations. In Senegal, the funds were used to set up small businesses (UNDP 1991). 
In both cases, little was left for other groups. 
The lengthy delay in processing benefits has become even worse because of underfunding. 
This problem has been further compounded by an increasingly frustrated staff unable to carry 
out its duties. To implement most of the new policies effectively, the officers responsible 
have had to investigate the claimants. However, one of the major difficulties is inadequate 
transportation. This is due in part to the small number of vehicles available, the low 
allocations to cover mileage costs, and the poor maintenance of vehicles, some of which were 
donated directly from abroad and are expensive to repair, as parts have to be imported. 
Consequently, officers often just wait for clients in their offices. For their part, clients are 
often unable to cover transportation costs to reach the offices, or when they are able to, they 
receive little attention because the officers, often not being much better off than their clients, 
are busy attending to their own affairs. As a health worker remarked, "before [the SAP], 
nurses discussed medicine, now all they talk about is how to 'deal'. Instead of giving health 
education to a patient, you find a nurse busy asking a patient where this or that can be 
procured" (SSW 1996, p. 62). 
Decentralization, participation, and partnership 
To revitalize the economy and bridge financial gaps in the social sectors, central governments 
decentralized management and administration, including social services. Most governments 
embraced this measure with great enthusiasm. At independence, African countries inherited 
highly efficient administrative structures and forms of governance. For example, fewer than 
100 officials ran all of Botswana, a country the size of France, albeit with a minuscule 
population (Morton and Ramsay 1987). Situations like this were possible, first, because of the 
limited aims of colonial regimes (that is, keeping law and order, facilitating economic 
exploitation, and, at times, introducing small-scale improvement projects, all of which 
required few supportive services) and, second, because of the civil services' fusion of political 
and administrative authority. This allowed local authorities to be personal representatives of 
the heads of governments in their respective places of operation, leading to extreme 
centralization down to the lowest levels. 
Independence found much of this structure wanting. To establish development policies, new 
governments needed, first, to build the institutional capacity to provide services requiring, 
among other things, a much larger civil service. Second, because the members of this service 
had to be dissociated from the previous administration, governments wanted to localize 
public servants and divest them of their all-embracing powers. Third, they wished to give the 
people an effective voice in running their affairs. 
The most common mechanisms introduced in several countries to address these three issues, 
almost immediately after independence, set out to revive the village as the basic unit of 
administration in the rural areas and to establish town councils in the urban areas. Villages 
and town councils were made, at least on paper, the effective development units, linked to the 
main urban centres by a string of similar development institutions at district and provincial 
levels. One of the most sophisticated of these models was introduced in Tanzania. After 
1972, elected village councils were given the authority to make bylaws, raise revenues to 
finance local development, and carry out activities that they had previously had little 
involvement in, such as road works and water-supply projects (Mutahaba 1989). More often, 
however, as in Botswana, Zambia, and Zimbabwe, the lower levels of the structure had less 
effective authority. 
With only slight variations, under this model, the first stage in policy formulation was to 
bring problems to the attention of one of the village-level committees, popularly elected at 
the Kgotla or its equivalent village-based mechanism.1 Issues would then be taken up by the 
Village Development Committee (VDC). The VDC was also elected at the Kgotla and 
divided into committees dealing with substantive areas, such as education, health, and 
agriculture, that were expected to formulate proposals for village-wide development. The 
VDC was also expected to provide the link between the village and 
1 In Botswana, for example, the Kgotla is the central decision-making agency of a village and 
serves as the village's administrative and judicial centre. It is presided over by the local chief, 
and all adult community members are expected to attend to discuss public affairs. 
central and local government structures (Silitshena 1989). For example, the VDC identified 
the needy in the village, brought them to the attention of social workers, and arranged for 
them to receive public assistance. 
Following this village-based approach to policy formulation, the VDCs' recommendations 
would move up through the administrative structure to district and, ultimately, national 
levels. From the Ward Development Committees, composed of the VDC chairpersons, 
suggestions were to be forwarded to the District Development Committee to be subjected to 
technical analysis. Depending on the outcome of these deliberations, the recommendations 
were to be sent to the Provincial Development Committee for further technical and budgetary 
analysis, and if approved, they were then to be recommended to Cabinet and to Parliament 
for adoption. This last step was usually to be taken by the relevant ministry charged with 
ranking the policy proposals from all the country's districts and provinces. When a 
community's plans were to be carried out, or the government wanted to consult its 
constituency, the same path was to be followed but in reverse. 
In theory, this process of policy formulation was neat and clear, but in reality it remained a 
statement of intent, not a program of action (Chikulo 1985). This was due to a combination of 
both local- and central-government constraints. Local governments were weak, first, because 
of an absence of any tradition of local government beyond traditional forms of governance 
that had been undermined by colonial rule and, second, because of a lack in all but a few 
localities of an economic base to support local governments. With many new responsibilities, 
local governments ran into functional overload. 
Other factors added to the complexity of the situation. One set of factors was related to the 
drive to localize personnel. These were associated with a decline, first, in performance, as a 
result of the induction of a large number of functionaries ill-prepared to take up their new 
positions and, second, in supervision, which was entrusted to newly elected councillors, who 
had none of the experience and competence needed to exercise this type of responsibility. 
Consequently, to get things moving in the new, decentralized environment, many functions 
formally devolved to the village and district levels reverted over the short-term to "proper" 
officials, who were found mainly in the central government. The situation was further 
aggravated by the fact that development projects and budgets formulated at the village level 
were often very unrealistic, much akin to a child's Christmas shopping list. For example, a 
small settlement of 500 residents might decide that it must establish a secondary school. In 
the middle of a dryland, already suffering from lack of water, a community wanted to begin a 
vegetable-growing project. The estimated costs of such projects were often severely trimmed 
as they moved up the ladder. By the time they reached the final decision-making level, they 
bore little resemblance to the original proposals (Hyden 1980). Even when projects were 
approved, it often took so long to discuss them that by the time they were adopted they were 
already outdated and ripe for review or their "good implementation" had attracted the centre's 
displeasure, as it was not prepared to see alternative power structures emerge. With time, the 
lower-level organizations, especially the villages, became demoralized and stopped taking 
their role seriously. This disaffection was compounded by the practice of using the villages, 
under the guise of their participating in self-help projects, more as instruments for the 
extraction of labour than as organs to influence decisions — a practice that Salole (1991) 
aptly called "the taxation of the beneficiaries." 
Overall, the centralization process itself proved resilient to change. Three reasons can be 
given to explain this. First, centralization was originally seen as a key means to consolidate 
the process of nation building. This was to respond, in part, to the legacy left by the European 
carving up of Africa. When boundaries were drawn without regard to differing ethnic groups 
or even to earlier conquests of neighbouring lands by successful tribes, few governments 
attracted the loyalty of their citizens, except perhaps for kin of the group in power (Kennedy 
1993). Second, centralization was a means to make the public service accountable to the 
dominant, often sole, political party, described in typical doublespeak by former President of 
Zambia, His Excellency K. Kaunda, as a policy of "decentralization in centralism": "a 
measure whereby through the Party and Government machinery, we will decentralize most of 
our Party and Government activities while retaining effective control of the Party and 
Government machinery at the center in the interest of unity" (Mutahaba 1989, p. 98). Third, 
the centralized form of governance largely fit the determined role and paternalistic nature of 
political leadership in African societies, in which people regard their leaders as the guardians 
of their personal and social well-being and regard their public servants as the extension 
workers of those leaders. This explains, for example, the frequent reference to African 
presidents as the "father of the nation." When taken literally, this notion often leads to a 
system of central patronage in which, at least theoretically, all civil servants are appointed 
personally by the president and accountable to this person alone (Mutahaba 1989). Thus, as 
the years passed, Africa saw the progressive diluting of the autonomy enjoyed by local 
governments. Its replacement by a hierarchy "allowed only as much discretionary power as 
was necessary to implement central policy directive[s]" (Chikulo 1985, p. 351), which, in 
effect, made much of government and service administration revert to the prefectural system 
of the past. 
Today, SAP reforms are once again turning this situation around. Neoliberal policies assume 
that, by analogy with the free-market dynamic, effective public decision-making can only be 
made either directly by people's individual preferences or by individuals through the 
preferences of their communities. When these assumptions are reinforced by pressure from 
Western donors to make African governments more democratic, the outcome is the lessening, 
if not the ending, of central-government planning and control. However, the governments 
themselves have become concerned because, despite the progressive coverage of essential 
social services and many development programs, the trickle-down effect of economic 
activities, especially to rural areas, has been disappointing, and most of the rural population 
still lives in poverty. This can be partly attributed to difficulties in expanding and diversifying 
rural economies; however, increasingly, in line with some of the underlying assumptions of 
structural adjustment, the fault is found to lie with the technocrats who conceive and 
implement development programs. Technocrats are thought to find it easier to disperse 
money than to build institutional capacity at grassroots levels; thus, they not only contribute 
to, but also encourage, dependence. In Botswana, for example, under one of many programs 
to stimulate agricultural production among smallholders, farmers were paid to plow, destump, 
and plant their land in rows, which is to say, they were paid to do the work they would have 
done normally. Agricultural demonstrators, consequently, were turned into administrators, 
measuring the land plowed each season, and farmer committees became gatherings to receive 
handouts (Morna 1989). Likewise, the National Policy on Destitution in 1980 stipulated that 
eligible destitute persons receive monthly rations but made no provision for their 
rehabilitation or return to productive life. To change this situation, found throughout much of 
the rural economy, the new approach has been to encourage communities to take greater 
responsibility for their own development and to allow governments to concentrate on their 
overall strategic and facilitating roles. 
This renewed focus on the community as a development base poses several major challenges. 
First, for this strategy to be a significant departure from the past, development responsibility 
and control have to shift substantially from central and provincial to district and community 
levels. This would also require a significant change in development activities. Both types of 
changes would require the substantial reorientation of the civil service, which, in practice, is 
used to administering, rather than facilitating, development operations. With such a 
reorientation, there is also the risk that governments will again invest mainly in capacity-
building for their own personnel through new in-house retraining. An associated factor 
mitigating against decentralization is the importance attributed to social networks in Africa. 
This often leads people in positions of lesser authority to expect "leadership," in the sense 
that it is often considered politically prudent for the government, not the community, to solve 
local problems and to be seen to be doing so. 
Second, to achieve any degree of success, community-based programs inevitably require 
significant financial inputs. In this respect, however, the room to manoeuvre has become 
severely curtailed. The poverty of their constituencies limits independent sources of income 
for local councils, especially in the rural areas. Also, as one aim of the entire exercise is to 
balance the public budget, the spending of central governments, too, is very restricted. Thus, 
as a recent document on the topic states, "it is expected that the budget line [for community-
based programs] could be set at a level that would provide community members with 
sufficient motivation to participate, while remaining relatively modest in terms of national 
budgets" (GOB 1995, p. 3). In practice, this is tantamount to saying that no further funds for 
these programs are available. 
Finally, hurdles have to be overcome at the local level. Two decades after grassroots 
participation in policy formulation was largely abandoned, village organizations, like their 
bureaucratic counterparts, have come to perceive development mainly in terms of service-
infrastructure provision and less in terms of improved livelihoods. For example, in a recent 
village-planning exercise in four villages in Botswana, almost all the plans developed by the 
village organizations referred to government-provided services. Only on a few occasions, and 
even then, only after considerable prompting from development workers, did local 
organizations come up with anything that they could do for themselves (Prinsen et al. 1996) 
Also, village-level organizations are often not truly participatory and are therefore inadequate 
for consultation. Attendance at village meetings, for example, has declined considerably, as 
has people's willingness to participate in voluntary activities. Not uncommonly, the elderly, 
usually men, dominate most village affairs, despite their lack of proficiency in government 
procedures. This situation raises serious concerns about any move toward community-
development strategies, particularly in the area of basic needs, without first focusing on 
substantial capacity-building to equip villages with the participatory and management skills 
required to formulate, run, and monitor their development programs. 
The reintroduction of private welfare: development, capacity-building, 
and partnership 
Economic and social vacuums seldom stay as such. In Africa, declining employment led 
rapidly to the growth of the informal sector, already widespread because of wages being 
literally at starvation levels. In the social sphere, the virtual collapse of the welfare state 
stimulated the role of private enterprises in providing key social services and encouraged the 
reintroduction of the volunteer sector, now under the banner of NGOs. Thus, a third outcome 
of the reforms affecting social policy has been the involvement of NGOs. 
In the years immediately following independence, most African governments tried to face the 
demands for social-policy development alone. The volunteer sector, mainly church-led 
organizations that dominated the provision of social services, were either banned or 
marginalized, being upstaged many times over by the public sector. In other cases, the 
volunteer sector's mode of operation, working directly at the grassroots level, was deemed 
subversive in the socialist outlook of the times, with the result that some of these volunteer 
organizations were closed (Mwansa 1995). 
With their treasuries depleted and participation, self-help, and partnership given priority, 
governments allowed the reemergence of NGOs. Priority was given to those NGOs dealing 
strictly with humanitarian (residual) assistance and those that might contribute to community 
development, for example, through capacity-building. Often, however, the operations of these 
organizations remained under suspicion. In Uganda, for example, the government vets all 
NGOs. Indigenous organizations are subjected to additional rules to ensure a tighter control 
than is the case with nonindigenous NGOs. Some of the major attractions of NGOs for 
African governments are that most of their funding comes from nongovernmental sources and 
that among their professed aims is the promotion of local ownership and popular participation 
through development programs. Although there is undoubtedly evidence of local ownership 
and popular participation, to many these characteristics of NGOs are a double-edged sword. 
Recent experiences of the role of NGOs in social policy point to various areas of concern. In 
theory, NGOs and the multilateral and bilateral organizations that fund and advise them help 
governments formulate social policies, contribute resources toward transforming these 
policies into action, and operate, during their implementation, within the parameters set by 
governments. But, it is not uncommon for NGOs to come with their own preconceived 
definitions of problems, in many cases dictated by their own interests. One result of this is 
that although local decision-makers are usually involved in the policy process, their 
participation is often reduced to identifying problems in accordance with the NGO's or the 
funder's priorities. Mwansa (1995, pp. 72–73) noted that "the state then merely acts as a 
passive recipient ... . Driven by poverty and want, ... [it] cannot afford to challenge the NGO 
lest the assistance is taken to another country." 
A typical example of this dilemma occurred recently in Zambia. Following lengthy 
consultations, a local authority compiled a list of the residents' most urgent needs. Unable to 
meet these needs, it hoped that an NGO participating in preparing the list would help. 
However, the NGO had its own agenda, which did not include addressing any of the most 
pressing needs identified by the community (Mwansa 1995). Although this in itself posed 
little problem, given that the magnitude of the community's needs made any help welcome, it 
shows how the NGO's response aimed at needs that were low in the residents' priorities. This 
example also shows that even under a different approach, there is an entrenchment of old 
practices that bypass local ownership in planning and implementing community actions and 
ignore the importance of local capacity-building. 
A second concern, closely connected to the first, is that many of the NGOs' agendas are under 
foreign domination, thus undermining their effectiveness in social policy and program 
implementation. In many cases, the agendas of NGOs, as well intentioned as they may be, are 
not locally grounded: they inadequately reflect the outlook, attitudes, and cultures of their 
intended beneficiaries. A current example is the Women in Development approach. The focus 
of this approach is to increase women's productive efficiency with the hope that this will have 
multiplier effects in other spheres, such as their ability to take care of their children. Although 
few critical studies have been done in this area, preliminary evidence suggests that instead of 
improving women's quality of life, programs conceived within this framework end up 
increasing women's already heavy workload. As a result, these programs become 
unsustainable because many of their recipients abandon them early in their implementation 
(Manyire and Asingwiire 1996). 
A third concern is that much of the work of the NGO movement is undermined by its own 
structure, in particular its financing, labour, and mode of accountability. Financially, almost 
all NGOs, including the indigenous organizations, rely heavily on external funding. Although 
the argument can be made that such help may be unavoidable during a program's infancy, it 
seriously challenges the sustainability of the NGO's efforts once this external support ends or 
is withdrawn. In 1993, for example, four NGOs were established in Botswana to address the 
problem of the increasing number of street children. Within 3 years, with their seed money 
exhausted, all but one folded; the remaining one cut its operations to the bone. Another 
example occurred in South Africa: after apartheid ended, many international organizations 
and donors funding social programs began to channel their assistance to this country, severely 
curtailing their operations or even ending them elsewhere. 
In terms of their labour structure, NGOs often lack sufficient local labour to run their 
programs. In many cases this is compensated for by donors bringing in their own experts. 
However, the lack of local expertise poses particular problems. Many of the foreign experts 
are not only unfamiliar with local customs but also unaware of the problems this creates. 
Thus, for example, if using foreign experts proves to be sustainable, it provides even less 
incentive to train local workers. Even when local expertise is available, the numbers are 
usually so small that NGOs tend to simply redeploy it, rather than contributing to its 
expansion. NGOs are often able to pay better wages, so many draw experienced workers 
away from the public service, leaving it depleted. Thus, in effect, the NGO is substituting for, 
rather than complementing, services already provided. 
In terms of accountability, NGOs, in a large part because of their structure, are more 
accountable to donors than to the communities they are meant to serve and to support. This 
often means that they are expected to demonstrate effectiveness in concrete, measurable 
outcomes. One of the consequences of this expectation is that NGOs are often driven to adopt 
practices that essentially contradict their very mission. An example is found among large 
multinational NGOs engaged in housing. True to the mandate of working with beneficiaries, 
families receiving assistance must contribute in kind to their future dwelling. However, as 
building a house takes a certain amount of skill, family participation is limited to moulding 
bricks. In the interest of efficiency, the construction is left to professionals. The final result is 
that the NGOs end up doing the work for people, rather than building their capacity to do it 
themselves or teaching them the skills to enable them to be self-sufficient. 
Some of the constraints facing NGOs might simply be a result of NGOs' being in their early 
stages of development. There are indications, for example, that funding agencies are 
attempting to improve the social-policy performance of NGOs. The World Bank, recognizing 
the magnitude of the negative effects of structural adjustment in the social sectors and the 
much slower-than-expected pace at which economic recovery is occurring, is putting a 
premium on grass-roots participation, insisting that all its projects incorporate participatory 
techniques. What is more important to recognize, however, is that no matter what their 
weaknesses have been, NGOs provide essential basic-needs services that in their absence 
would be unavailable, especially for the most vulnerable members of society. 
Conclusions 
The changes taking place in social policy in Africa show not only the complexity of the field 
but also the magnitude of the work still to be done. A multitude of problems besets social 
policy in Africa. Basic social services remain fragmented and at times confused in their 
objectives. Many primary needs in health care, education, social security, housing, 
employment, and water and sanitation continue to go unmet. What services are provided have 
neither the scope nor the depth to cover the array of demands of most of the population. Yet, 
despite these weaknesses and the fact that governments continue to shift responsibilities to 
individuals, families, and communities, most people still look to the state to meet their 
welfare needs. 
The internal capacity of governments to meet social-welfare expectations can be disputed, if 
only because of the size and depth of the needs. But the methods governments have used to 
accomplish this task have always been informed by ideology, as underlined by the current 
political-economic framework and by transnational development agendas. Social provision in 
Africa from the colonial period to the present has been predicated on, and dictated by, the 
predominant ideology, which has also determined the role of the major actors in the process. 
Generally, the core institution in social provision in Africa has been and continues to be the 
family, through its informal systems and networks. But changes in the social systems, the 
demands of modernization, and rising social expectations call for an increasing role for a 
formal system of social provision to supplement the contribution of individuals and families. 
This has been the case since the 1960s, when most African states achieved independence. 
Within a decade or two of independence, efforts to compensate for past neglect catapulted 
upward most people's standards of living in all spheres of life. However, the socialist 
ideology accompanying this process failed to establish an efficient and productive economy 
able to deliver consumer goods and social services at a higher level of economic 
development. This, in turn, led to the failure of early development efforts. Attempts at 
reforming the economy were unsuccessful. The former socialist regimes are now trying to 
make the transition to the market economy, hoping that this change will serve their people 
better. In this respect, the wheel has come full circle. As the economy becomes an 
autonomous sector, so social policies emerge as a distinct sphere of action for correcting the 
negative effects of the market economy. Like the economy, social policies are entering the 
purview of a distinct set of institutions, with their own principles and practices (Mishra 
1995). 
When neoliberal economic strategies were introduced in the West, unlike in Africa, there 
were well-established social infrastructures in place to cushion the effects of the new 
economic practices on the poor. Severe as the expenditure cuts and cost-recovery measures 
are, children still go to school and few, if any, die of hunger. As big as the numbers of those 
affected, for example, the numbers of the homeless, they are still manageable, both in 
absolute and in political terms. This is not the case in Africa. Even worse, every social 
indicator shows that the situation is bound to deteriorate further. 
But this is not the only unique feature of African social policy. Traditionally, social policy 
has been a concern strictly of the state or a matter for the nongovernmental activities that a 
country's citizens design for their individual and collective protection. Today, however, in 
most African countries, IFIs, multinational agencies such as the various organs of the United 
Nations, and donors and foreign-aid NGOs are as influential in determining social policy as 
local politicians and communities. In fact, they are demanding, and more often than not they 
are receiving, desks in the ministries responsible for their areas of operation; representatives 
of these organizations have, in effect, taken over social-policy formulation, in many cases 
reducing local politicians' participation to that of attending parliamentary debates. 
One of the major problems with this situation is that all these organizations are pulling in 
different directions, as dictated by their respective ideologies (Deacon 1995). The IMF, for 
example, with its strong emphasis on private welfare, is promoting the targeting of the 
neediest. If one abided by conspiracy theories or attributed to the IMF more cunning than it 
deserves, one could argue that the IMF's policies are actually meant to change African society 
from its foundations. Most of its policies seem geared to replacing cooperation of the kinship 
system with competitive individualism and encouraging large differences in social status, as a 
reflection of the fact that dominating behaviour increases with the competition for resources. 
Other organizations, like the International Labour Organization (ILO) and many NGOs, 
promulgate more democratic social policies. The ILO, for instance, is increasingly 
instrumental in introducing Africa to social-insurance schemes that emphasize a considerable 
degree of vertical distribution delivered through a tax-benefit system. However, as these 
schemes are based on the ability to make financial contributions, and thus on employment, it 
is doubtful that those who need their protection the most, the poor, will ultimately benefit. 
Zimbabwe, for example, introduced a pension plan in 1994 that is to be implemented in three 
stages. It is a contributory program to which employees pay 3% of their salaries up to a 
ceiling that their employers match. Phase 1 covers all private-sector employees. However, 
this is a minuscule part of the labour force. Although extending coverage to civil servants in 
phase 2 will be easy, this will not be so for phase 3, planned to cover communal farmers and 
informal-sector workers, as their incomes are low and irregular. 
Ironically, the common thread in all these efforts is the call for families and communities to 
be more extensively involved in meeting their own social and economic needs, both in 
symbolic and in practical terms. This also coincides with political reforms resulting from 
structural adjustments that demand more efforts at democratization and its associated stress 
on empowerment and decentralization. However, unless communities are given practical 
skills and greater discretion and control over resources, it is difficult to imagine how, or 
indeed why, they should increase their participation and take on the difficult task of 
establishing structures and mechanisms to carry out grassroots social-policy projects. 
With sufficient efforts from outsiders, assembling groups of people and working with them to 
formulate ideas for community development activities is often possible. But to date, 
experience has shown that this process fails on at least two counts. First, and most often, the 
majority of the ideas generated at the grassroots level relate to extension of the provision of 
outside services, such as education, health, and government-sponsored employment-
substitution programs. Far rarer are realistic income-generating schemes with outputs that go 
beyond ensuring mere physical survival for participants. Second, all these initiatives lapse 
quickly unless community members have a strong incentive to continue their participation 
when the outsiders are gone. In principle, it can be argued that this incentive could be 
enhanced if communities are given effective authority to carry out their ideas, such as by 
decentralizing budget allocations. Yet, this approach is treated with caution, as it is argued 
that (1) it will still take time to strengthen the administrative capacity and accountability of 
community organizations; and (2) most of the noncommunity inputs required for 
development can be obtained more easily and at a lower cost through government-
procurement channels (Schemetzer et al. 1992). Consequently, as providing for people is 
easier and politically more effective than developing their capacities, development remains 
the domain of technocrats, be they in government or in NGOs. 
If African experience with reforming social policies shows one thing, it is that although 
policy matters, in practice it is not the only thing that matters. Poverty cannot be eradicated 
by policies merely with that intention. Policy options are constrained by the economic 
conditions and social and cultural structures that shape development opportunities. When an 
economy collapses (which weakens government), the vacuum is immediately filled — in this 





THE DECENTRALIZATION OF SOCIAL POLICY 
Trinidad S. Osteria 
At the end of World War II, Southeast Asia was a region with pressing development 
problems as a result, in part, of high levels of poverty and rapid population growth. However, 
half a century later, the economy has grown at an unexpected and unprecedented rate. Rapid 
economic growth has paved the way to improved standards of living and reduced poverty. 
Although history, geography, population, natural resources, and global economic, political, 
and social agendas for reform have influenced the growth of most countries in the region, a 
determining factor has been the shift in national economic policies. Increased 
industrialization has become the foundation of development in the last two decades of the 
20th century. 
The countries of Southeast Asia (Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, 
Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Viet Nam) are all at various stages in the transition 
from agriculture and labour-intensive manufacturing to higher technology and skill-intensive 
production in conjunction, with further development of the service sector. They have 
generally adopted open trading systems, maintained low rates of inflation, and followed 
prudent fiscal and monetary policies. Large inflows of foreign direct investment helped these 
countries to increase industrial capacity and adopt new technologies (Dowling and Castillo 
1996). The critical economic policies that led to the formulation of poverty-alleviation and 
social-development measures were fiscal and monetary probity, open trade, human-resource 
development, and infrastructure investments that reflected economic and social priorities 
(Hughes 1994). 
This chapter examines the most recent economic developments in Southeast Asia, the 
effectiveness of macroeconomic management, and the current social-policy response to the 
globalization and regionalization of the economy, with particular emphasis on 
decentralization policies. Against a background of continued strong growth in regional trade, 
the key role of social policy is assessed in recognition of the critical social problems 
associated with economic growth. The constituent countries' experience of economic growth 
is analyzed in terms of social impacts and current policy-reform initiatives. Finally, by 
looking at the lessons learned, this chapter reviews decentralization as a modality for social 
development. 
Economic growth, social policies, and transnational influences 
In many countries in Southeast Asia, standards of living doubled between the 1960s and the 
1990s. Population growth was significantly curtailed. However, continued economic growth 
placed pressure on labour markets, extended productive capacity, and threatened the 
conditions needed for price stability. Hence, controlling inflation without slowing down 
growth has been among the prime concerns of public policy in many of these economies. 
With a rapidly globalizing international environment, Southeast Asia has faced intense 
competition in external markets, underscoring the need for skills and technology to support 
continued industrialization. The transitional economies of Cambodia, Laos, and Myanmar 
and, to a lesser extent, Viet Nam, faced the challenge of continuous structural adjustment 
from a centrally planned to a market-driven economy, requiring the capacity to implement 
foreign-assisted projects and new production and distribution systems (Dowling and Castillo 
1996). Both local industry and multinational enterprises were crucial to promoting the growth 
of new industries. Multinational enterprises have been particularly important in sectors such 
as electronics and chemicals from which new products and technologies have emerged. The 
rapid growth of both foreign and domestic investment in export-oriented, labour-intensive 
manufacturing has been a major feature of growth in Southeast Asia (Booth 1995). 
Multinational corporations (MNCs) relocate production to developing countries to take 
advantage of the rapidly growing domestic markets and cheaper labour there, to cut 
production costs, and to expand market shares worldwide. 
As in other regions, governments in Southeast Asia have been key actors in growth and 
development. Empirical evidence shows that the poorest countries within the region are those 
that have suffered from internal strife. Democratization of governance has progressively 
claimed more support, and possibilities for growth have been widely acknowledged. The 
principal policies used to ensure equitable outcomes for growth and its sustainability have 
been aimed to create employment and education. 
However, many imperfections evolve with this type of economic growth, for policies 
required for rapid growth are generally resisted by privileged groups in society. High-income 
earners, for example, may successfully avoid taxation, throwing the burden of development 
on the poor and reducing the amount of public saving available to invest in infrastructure 
(Hughes 1994). Taxation has been viewed as a means to fund the operation of political-, 
economic-, and social-sector services. Countries in the region increasingly use indirect value-
added taxes that impact on consumption rather than savings. The growth of employment was 
marked by the creation of opportunities for female workers in both the formal and the 
informal sectors of the economy. They played an important role in labour-intensive industries 
that are mainly export oriented. Together with access to education, employment opportunities 
transformed the role of women in the family and society in the region (Hughes 1994). 
Expansion and improvement of educational coverage, quality, and access are among the main 
social challenges for the region. As the economy grows and financial resources become more 
readily available, the demand for education and training increases. Health is promoted by 
economic growth as a means to improve the well-being and productivity of the population, 
and social welfare provides a safety net for the disadvantaged, marginal, and disabled. 
However, the Human Development Report 1996 (UNDP 1996) indicated that reinforcing the 
relationship between equity and growth has more far-reaching policy implications than 
simply changing sectoral policies. It affects policy-making through, for example, job 
opportunities; access to land, physical infrastructure, and credit; social expenditure; gender 
equality; good governance; and the creation of an active civil society to play a vital advocacy 
role, mobilize public opinion, and shape human-development priorities. In 1995, the region 
adopted the threefold goals of poverty alleviation, employment expansion, and social 
integration as its social-development theme. Where a standard of growth has been achieved, 
the further task is to ensure equitable distribution of these gains and to strengthen social 
cohesion. To this end, the region's governments were encouraged to decentralize and devolve 
authority in the delivery of social services. These governments continue to pursue 
cooperation with nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), the private sector, and the people. 
Structural-adjustment programs will have to be designed in a realistic manner to reflect the 
inevitable lag in the effectiveness of supply-side responses (UNESCAP 1995). 
The social-development landscape 
In 1997, the total population of Southeast Asia reached about 497.3 million. The population 
and development indicators in Table 1 show a region where fertility trends declined and the 
annual rate of population growth averaged 1.6% (UNESCAP 1991a). This profile reflects a 
number of factors. Over a short period, steady advances were made in public health, 
including increased access to health care for pregnant women, improved nutrition levels, 
reduced infant mortality, and increased child survival. Progress in infrastructure and social 
services in most countries led to the large-scale provision of potable water and basic 
education (improving literacy rates) and the dissemination of reliable and affordable methods 
of contraception (WHO 1989). At present, the region's urban residents account for some 37% 
of the total population. However, it is projected that by 2000, almost half of the population in 
the region will be living in urban areas. This process of development represents a historic 
transformation from the traditional economic base, which was predominantly rural and 
agricultural. 
Table 1. Population and development indicators, Southeast Asia, 1997. 




























Southeast Asia 497 261 1.6 24.2 7.5 2.9 — 43   










Indonesia 201 435 1.4 22.4 7.9 2.6 45 47 Ananta and 
Nurvidya 
Arifin (1991)
Laos 5 192 3.1 44.3 13.7 6.7 51 — UNDESIPA 
(1996) 
Malaysia 20 977 2.1 25.6 4.8 3.3 29 31 UNDESIPA 
(1996) 
Myanmar 46 755 1.8 27.4 9.9 3.3 36 — UNDESIPA 
(1996) 
Philippines 70 631 2.0 28.7 5.8 3.7 41 25 UNDESIPA 
(1996) 
Singapore 3 429 1.5 16.0 5.0 1.8 8 — SDS (1996); 
UNDESIPA 
(1996) 
Thailand 60 602 1.0 17.8 7.4 2.0 60 64 NESDB 
(1995) 
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Age class (%) 
Source   Male Female Infant Maternald 0–14 60+ 65+  
Southeast 
Asia 
64 67    44 423 99 33 7 5  
 




Cambodia 52 55 103 900   94 42 5 3 Ananta and 
Nurvidya Arifin 
(1991); SDS (1996); 
UNDESIPA (1996) 
 
Indonesia 63 66    51 650 100 32 7 5 United Nations 
(1996b)  
Laos 52 55    87 650   98 45 5 3 UNDESIPA (1996) 
Malaysia 70 74    11   80 102 37 6 4 UNDESIPA (1996) 
Myanmar 58 62    79 580   99 35 7 4 UNDESIPA (1996) 
Philippines 66 70    36 280 101 38 5 3 UNDESIPA (1996) 
Singapore 75 79     5   10 102 22 10  7 IPSR (1996); 
UNDESIPA (1996)  
Thailand 67 72    31 200 100 27 8 5 Duy (1994); United 
Nations (1996b)  
Viet Nam 66 69    38 160   97 36 7 5 Duy (1994) 
  
  

















Indexf Male Female Male Female 
Southeast 
Asia 
— — — — 37 3.7 — 652.2   













Indonesia 116 112 48 39 37 4.1 0.641 253.7 United 
Nations 
(1996b)
Laos 123  92 31 19 23 5.7 0.400 9.3 UNDESIPA 
(1996)
Malaysia  93  93 56 61 55 3.4 0.826 29.8 UNDESIPA 
(1996) 
Myanmar 107 104 23 23 27 3.6 0.451 64.3 UNDESIPA 
(1996) 
Philippines 111 — 81 — 56 3.7 0.665 99.9 UNDESIPA 
(1996)








Viet Nam 111 — 35 — 21 3.4 0.523 104.2 Duy (1994)
Source: UNESCAP (1997, chart). Contraceptive prevalence rate: United Nations (1996a, table A.6); gross 
enrolment ratio: UNESCO (1995, table 3.2); Human Development Index: UNDP (1996); infant mortality: WHO 
and UNICEF (1996); urban population (except recent data): United Nations (1994). 
a Exponential growth rate. The rate takes into account international migration and thus may not equal the rate of 
natural increase. 
b Prevalence rate for modern methods among married women of reproductive age; most recent data available. 
c 1995. 
d 1990. 
e 1993. Gross enrolment ratio = number of students enrolled at specified level per 100 persons in applicable age 
group (e.g., ages 6–12 for primary school). 
f A higher value indicates a higher level of human development. 
g 1996. 
The implications of these demographic changes for fundamental social-policy issues are wide 
and far reaching. The urbanization process, for example, has proceeded at a particularly rapid 
pace, adding a number of new cities with populations of 1 million or more by 1995. Large 
agglomerations face the broad range of new social problems that often accompany urban 
sprawl. The close association between urban centres and industry, as well as the spread of 
industrial-support services, has resulted in a steady inflow of workers into metropolitan areas, 
primarily at the low end of the wage scale (UNESCAP 1992a). In fact, most rural-to-urban 
migrants become part of the informal sector of the economy, resulting in the transfer of rural 
poverty to urban settings. The poverty of migrants in the midst of urban affluence, the 
loosening of family ties, the promotion of materialist values by the media, the alienation that 
comes with increasing urbanization, and the inability of industry to meet the job expectations 
of a growing population lead to a sense of anomie, futility, and dissatisfaction, often 
manifested in crime (UNESCAP 1991b). 
The social implications of economic growth 
The first half of the 1990s witnessed a surge in economic growth per annum in many 
countries of Southeast Asia, ranging from 1.7% in the Philippines to 10% in Singapore in 
1990. Economic growth in the region was spearheaded by Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, 
and Viet Nam. Inflation decelerated slightly, as most countries were able to contain the 
upward pressure on prices in the face of tight labour markets and capacity constraints. Laos, 
Myanmar, and Viet Nam, however, remained burdened with double-digit inflation. Exports 
grew rapidly but the current account deficit of the region increased to 20.5 billion United 
States dollars (USD) in 1995 — an increase from 8.1 billion USD in 1994. On the strength of 
their economic performance, some countries in the region have made optimistic growth 
projections for the 21st century. The Malaysian government's Vision 2020, for example, 
envisages its economy catching up with Western levels by the first quarter of the 21st 
century. The targets set by the Indonesian government for economic and social development 
from 1994 to 2019 forecast that economic growth per annum will accelerate from 6.2% in the 
Sixth Five-Year Development Plan period (1994–99) to 8.7% in 2014–19 (Booth 1995). 
This economic surge is reflected in the remarkable pace of growth of the gross domestic 
product (GDP) of most of these countries. Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, and Viet Nam, for 
example, recorded economic growth rates of more than 9% between 1994 and 1995, and in 
1995, Indonesia registered an annual growth rate of GDP of more than 7%. The economic 
recovery in the Philippines, which started in 1993, was sustained in the subsequent 2 years at 
5% (see Table 2). This progress was also accompanied by improved saving and investment 
rates but also by increased infrastructure requirements and shortages in skilled human 
resources, all of which translated into higher costs driven by income growth (UNESCAP 
1996). 
In Cambodia, the reform process broadened and accelerated in 1989 with the restoration of 
private-property ownership and liberalization of foreign trade. After 20 years of war and 
dislocation, the country's human resources were depleted, requiring substantive 
improvements in education and health services. The country had major macroeconomic 
imbalances, including high fiscal deficits and inflation. The privatization of state enterprises 
has been undertaken, and foreign and local private investment has been encouraged. The 
transition has progressed quite rapidly, although the country still suffers from the legacy of 
war and internal strife. Table 3 presents a comparative overview of the region. 
Indonesia has shown strong overall growth as a result of rapid growth in both the industrial 
and the service sectors. Agricultural output improved, and rice production benefited from 
changes in the price-incentive structure. Performance in the industrial sector also improved. 
Strong private investment — 36% of GDP in 1995 — supported by substantial inflows of 
foreign direct capital accounted for the increase in gross domestic investment. Development 
expenditures increased slightly in real terms, with the major part of outlays directed to roads, 
education, and subsidies for regional development (Dowling and Castillo 1996). 
In Thailand, rapid growth has brought about large changes in the structure and dynamics of 
the economy. The World Bank has argued that Thailand has grown by following structural-
adjustment policies, by attracting direct foreign investment, and by creating a favourable 
environment for exports without intervening directly in the capital market (Phongpaichit 
1996). Throughout the 1980s, the urban population grew by about 4 million people, with the 
pool of rural labour acting as a source of urban labour supply. However, two problems were 
encountered: growing upward pressure on wage rates and the mismatch of skills and 
education to market requirements. 
Table 2. Economic indicators, Southeast Asia, 1994 and 1995. 
  
Growth rate, real GDP 
(% per annum) 
Changes in consumer 
prices (% per annum) 
Balance of payments on 
current account 
(millions USD) 
  1994 1995 1994 1995           1994 1995
Southeast Asia   8.0 8.1   6.8   6.7 –8 132 –20 492
Cambodia   4.0 7.0 26.1   9.8 –107 –164
Indonesia   7.5 7.6   9.6   9.0 –2 800 –8 000
Laos   8.0 7.1   6.7 18.4 –202 –247
Malaysia   9.2 9.5   3.7   3.5 –4 147 –7 600
Myanmar   6.8 7.7 24.1 22.7 –275 –294
Philippines   4.3 5.2   9.0   8.1 –2 800 –3 000
Singapore 10.2 9.1   3.8   3.2 11 951 13 000
Thailand   8.7 8.6   4.6   5.8 –8 419 –12 458
Viet Nam   8.8 9.5 14.4 12.7 –966 –1 729
Source: ADB (1996, pp. 23–24). 
Note: GDP, gross domestic product; USD, United States dollars. 
  
Table 3. Selected socioeconomic indicators, Southeast Asia, 1994. 










(USD) Agriculture Industry Service
Cambodia     2 360      240   4.0   0.0   7.5 7.5
Indonesia 167 630      880   7.5   0.5 11.2 6.9
Laos     1 500      320   8.0   8.3 10.7 5.6
Malaysia   68 670   3 520   9.2 –1.0 12.4 9.9
Myanmar       —      —   6.8   6.1   8.9 6.8
Philippines   63 310     960  4.3  2.6   5.8 4.3
Singapore   65 840 23 360 10.2   5.6 13.4 8.4
Thailand 129 860   2 210   8.7   5.5   9.9 8.5
Viet Nam   13 780      190   8.8   3.9 14.0 10.0
Source: ADB (1996, pp. 18–19). 
Note: GDP. gross domestic product; GNP, gross national product; USD, United States dollars. 
Under these circumstances, the Thai government's response was twofold. First, it imposed a 
minimum wage adjusted upward annually on the basis of inflation and passed a new Social 
Security Act in 1989, creating a basic system of labour welfare by increasing the minimum 
wage. These initiatives generated an increase in informal employment. Recruitment on a 
subcontract basis meant paying less than the minimum wage; children and illegal-migrant 
labourers were drawn from neighbouring countries, China, Laos, and Myanmar. Second, the 
Thai government undertook a number of measures to combat shortfalls in skills and 
education. It increased the number of extension courses for skills training, implemented a 
crash program to extend secondary schooling, put in place a cheap-loan scheme to encourage 
private investors to build more schools, and provided student loans. To improve higher 
education, the government channeled more money into the education budget. The 
privatization of university education led to the establishment in 1994 of 26 private 
universities and technical colleges with more than 125 000 students (Dowling and Castillo 
1996). In addition, in the late 1980s, the Thai government privatized road construction, land 
transportation, and communications, with mixed results. 
Viet Nam's economic reform and performance have received high commendations from the 
major multilateral lending institutions. Viet Nam's GDP growth rate in 1995 was 9.5%, with 
industry and construction constituting 30.3% of the total. Trade flows also increased 
markedly in 1995, with exports rising by about 30%. As more export-oriented and import-
substituting foreign-investment projects enter production, this will have a positive impact on 
Vietnamese trade (Freeman 1996). 
The recovery of the Philippine economy, which started in 1993, was further strengthened in 
1995. Political stability, macroeconomic management, and structural reforms encouraged 
private-sector confidence and eased infrastructure constraints. The main source of growth 
was the industrial sector, which expanded by more than 8% (Dowling and Castillo 1996). 
However, the more quickly expanding sectors — real estate, transport, and communications 
— have limited potential to create massive and sustained employment. In this context, an 
important challenge has been to ensure that subsequent growth generates enough employment 
to alleviate poverty on a broader scale. At present, the only governmental redistributive 
program is agrarian reform, and this program also has adverse effects on agricultural 
investments and productivity (De Dios 1995). 
The economic pattern of the region (see Table 4) has high associated social costs. The 
increasing pressure of population and industrialization led to extensive deterioration of the 
environment. The lack of effective industrial-regulatory measures contributed to occupational 
risks, disabilities, and deaths among workers and residents in the vicinity of the industrial 
estates most affected by industrialization. 
Other associated costs have included the effects on the traditional family. Although the 
traditional family remains the norm in Southeast Asia, it has come under increasing pressure 
from changing social and economic realities. As a result, policymakers face the new and 
difficult challenges of maintaining social stability and enhancing social programs in the 
context of economic expansion. Among the important concerns policymakers face are the 
erosion of family ties resulting from geographic mobility, a growing preference for having a 
smaller family, more individualistic tendencies among youth, the growing needs of an aging 
population, and new roles for female caregivers as they enter the labour force. At the same 
time, Southeast Asia has made impressive advances in life expectancy and other health 
indicators, owing to governments' emphasis on primary health care and to international 
development assistance (see Table 5). 
For example, most countries in the region have considered universal primary education and 
literacy important social-development goals. Many governments are also increasing their 
commitments to secondary, vocational, and nonformal education to achieve the goals of 
Education for All. By 2000 the Education for All approach aims to reduce levels of illiteracy 
in the region to 50% of those prevailing in 1990, with emphasis on female literacy. The target 
is to ensure that at least 80% of primary-school-age children complete primary education. To 
respond to economic restructuring and technological changes, governments in the region are 
also significantly expanding education that targets youth and adults. Such prioritization 
reflects these governments' recognition that a diversified and trained labour force is required 
to operate in a competitive, technologically sophisticated, and global economic environment 
(UNESCAP 1992a). 
Table 4. Gross domestic saving, capital formation, and resource gap, Southeast Asia, 
1995. 
  % of GDP 
  Gross domestic saving Capital formation Resource gap 
Cambodia   8.3 21.5 13.2   
Indonesia 35.8 37.8 2.0 
Malaysia 37.2 40.6 3.4 
Myanmar 12.2 13.0 0.8 
Philippines 14.7 22.3 7.7 
Singapore 52.0 33.2 –18.8    
Thailand 36.5 43.1 6.6 
Viet Nam 19.0 27.1 8.2 
Source: ADB (1996, pp. 18–19). 
Note: GDP, gross domestic product. 
  
Table 5. Selected trade and assistance indicators, Southeast Asia, 1994 and 1995. 
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Cambodia 336.8   490 –5.4   69.0 
Indonesia 1 642.1   40 054    –1.7 2 109.0    
Laos  217.7   300 –5.8   60.1 
Malaysia   68.2 58 756    –8.8 4 348.0    
Myanmar 161.6   771 –0.9    — 
Philippines 1 057.5    13 304    –2.5 1 861.0    
Singapore   16.9 96 826    13.3 3 411.0    
Thailand 578.2 45 261    –8.0 147.0 
Viet Nam 897.1 3 600   — 1 048 
Source: ADB (1996, p. 47). 
Note: GNP, gross national product; USD, United States dollars. 
The Southeast Asian experience of rapid economic development raises important questions 
relevant to understanding social policy from a transnational perspective: Has there been 
congruence between economic-resource allocation and social expenditure? How can the 
social and economic sectors be effectively integrated into the overall development planning 
of these countries? Could a new development paradigm be formulated that more directly 
identifies the socioeconomic transformation processes, issues, problems, and concerns of the 
region? 
Trends and patterns of social expenditure 
Until the late 1990s, Southeast Asia could be described as the most successful developing 
region in terms of growth and employment. However, the economic scenario points to a wide 
spectrum of development situations. At one end, the chief Asian "tiger", Singapore, is 
transforming itself with remarkable growth into an industrial economy. At the other end, the 
transitional economies, Cambodia, Laos, and Myanmar, still face acute problems of poverty, 
despite recent GDP increases. Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand form a second tier of newly 
industrialized economies. These governments recognize that economic growth is by itself 
insufficient to realize the required qualitative social changes. Deliberate policy interventions 
are required to ensure that economic development proceeds fairly and equitably and helps to 
raise people's quality of life. Sectoral economic policies enable countries to derive the 
maximum gains from trade, adopt new technologies, alleviate poverty, and promote social 
integration. However, as shown in Table 6, the burden of external debt and debt servicing is 
severe on these countries, making them draw resources from much needed social programs. 
The Asian Pacific Ministerial Conference in 1995 enunciated that (UNESCAP 1995, pp. 31–
32) 
Macro economic stability should not be pursued at the cost of the needs and 
interests of the poor and vulnerable sections of the population as this may well 
compromise social stability. Structural adjustment programs must correspond 
to the economic and social conditions of individual countries and should be 
designed realistically to reflect the inevitable time lags in the effectiveness of 
supply side responses. Decisions concerning adjustment should include a full 
examination of alternative ways of securing macroeconomic stability, 
structural change and improved efficiency from the perspective of social 
equity. 
























Cambodia   83.5 375.9   0.4 100.0 1 943.4 2.0
Indonesia   57.4 195.8 30.0   36.4 96 499.6 14 791.9
Laos 135.6 803.1   7.7   99.8 2 080.1 20.0
Malaysia   36.9  37.7   7.7   92.8 24 766.6 5 042.3
Myanmar     — 578.0 15.4   92.8 6 502.0 173.0
Philippines   59.3 160.6 18.5   34.6 39 301.6 4 534.1
Singapore   11.9    6.0   —     — 7 688.0 —
Thailand   43.1 103.1 15.6   21.6 60 990.4 9 237.2
Viet Nam 161.3 510.7   6.1   92.3 25 115.4 300.1
Source: ADB (1996, p. 47). 
Note: GNP, gross national product; USD, United States dollars. 
  
Table 7. Key social indicators, Southeast Asia, 1994 and 1995. 
      Gross enrolment ratio, 1994 (%)b 
  Adult literacy rate, 
1995 (%)a Primary school Secondary school 
  Female Male Female Male Female Male 
Cambodia 22 48  46  48 — — 
Indonesia 78 90 112 116 39 48 
Laos 44 69  92 123 19 31 
Malaysia 78 89  93  93 61 56 
Myanmar 78 89 104 107 23 23 
Philippines 94 95 111 113 75 71 
Singapore 86 96 107 109 71 69 
Thailand 92 96  97  98 37 38 
Viet Nam 91 97  99 105 40 43 
Source: ADB (1996, pp. 43–44). 
a Refers to population aged 15+. 
b Gross enrolment ratio = number of students enrolled at specified level per 100 persons in applicable age 
group (e.g., ages 6–12 for primary school). 
In the broad context, however, social indicators reveal that although literacy rates have 
remained high in the region, they have not done so in Cambodia or Laos, where gender 
disparities also still exist, as females lag behind in literacy and educational attainment (Table 
7). In the health sector, the physician– population ratios remain basically low across the 
board, and variations in childhood malnutrition and in access to sanitation facilities can be 
also observed (Table 8). 
Given this general profile, adequate social-policy formulation will require considerable 
investment in education and health. Current ratios of government expenditure in the Human 
Development Report 1996 (UNDP 1996) included two elements. First, it included the public-
expenditure ratio defined as the percentage of national income that goes into public 
expenditure. In 1994, this ranged from 9.3% in Myanmar to 26.2% in Viet Nam (Table 9). 
This ratio is contingent on the ability of the governments to collect taxes and other revenues. 
As a proportion of GDP, taxes ranged from 3.8% in Myanmar to 20.2% in Malaysia. Second, 
the report included the social-allocation ratio, which is the percentage of public expenditure 
earmarked for the social sectors. In the case of education, for example, this ranged from 9.4% 
in Indonesia to 19.6% in Thailand (in the countries of the region, people basically pay for 
their own tertiary education). 
 



























Urban Rural Urban Rural 
Cambodia 9 727a 50 2 021 20.0b 65 33 81 8 
Indonesia 7 028a 61 2 752 38.7 68 43 64 36 
Laos 4 446a 63 2 259 40.0 54 33 97 8 
Malaysia 2 302a 60 2 888 23.3 96 66 ND ND 
Myanmar 3 565c 64 2 598 31.2 37 ND 39 35 
Philippines 9 689d 52 2 257 29.6 85 79 79 62 
Singapore  722d 82 3 000 14.4 100  — 99 — 
Thailand 4 425e 54 2 432 13.0 87 72 80 72 
Viet Nam 2 491d 52 2 250 44.9 39 21 34 14 
Source: ADB (1996, pp. 45–46). 






Across the region, governments realize that sustained and successful efforts in resource 
mobilization rely on the participation of civil society, such as private business, philanthropic 
people and institutions, and NGOs. Effective intervention for equity and poverty reduction 
requires some exclusively allocated funds, meaning that the nonpoor should benefit little 
from these funds. In most countries in the region, a higher premium is placed on price 
stability. Governments curb widening deficits through spending cuts in social services. Large 
debt-service bills for domestic borrowing may themselves preempt social services and fuel 
inflationary expectations. Poor tax administration, the small formal sector, and tax evasion 
weaken resource mobilization. Trade liberalization in the region will imply a reduction in 
taxes collected from import tariffs. At the World Summit for Social Development, a concrete 
new proposal for the mobilization of financial resources was the 20 : 20 compact, by which 
both the recipient and donor governments would commit at least 20% of their total respective 
national aid budgets to basic social services (UNESCAP 1996). 
Globalization and social-policy reform 
The 1990s marked an accelerating trend toward closer integration of the world economy. 
Major advances in microelectronics, information exchange, communication technologies, and 
trade liberalization have been conducive to this integration process. In addition, international 
conventions, such as the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, served to strengthen these 
influences. 
The countries of the Southeast Asia region have been markedly affected by the globalization 
process. Intraregional trade has been growing rapidly, and MNCs operate in most of these 
countries. Japanese firms, for example, have relocated their production in Southeast Asia, 
assisted by the appreciation of the yen and by rising wages at home. These trends have 
serious impacts on the region's employment and labour situation. At one level, competition is 
increased for exports and foreign investment. At another level, the emphasis is growing on 
investments in human resources as a means of maintaining 
























Cambodia  6.0 16.5   6.7 0.4 1.0 — — 
Indonesia 14.6 16.0 –0.2 0.7 0.8 9.4 1.6 
Laos   9.4 24.4 — 1.3 10.3  — 0.3 
Malaysia 20.2 25.0   0.3 —   5.2 16.9   0.2 
Myanmar  3.8   9.3   2.9 — — — — 
Philippines 16.0 13.7 –0.9 0.5 3.1 10.5   0.3 
Singapore —      —   — — — — 1.3 
Thailand 17.2 16.1 –2.7 1.1 4.4 19.6   — 
Viet Nam  19.7 26.2   1.5 — — — — 
Source: ADB (1996, pp. 33–34). 
Note: GDP, gross domestic product. 
  
 
Table 10. Southeast Asian countries to which 





Singapore     18.16 
Indonesia 1 148.89 
Philippines    758.39 
Thailand    350.15 
Laos     40.43 
Cambodia     61.34 
Brunei       4.52 
Source; JMF (1994). 
Note: On a net-disbursement basis. USD, United 
States dollars. 
competitiveness in the global market. The underlying fear is that globalization will lead to job 
losses in some areas as capital moves freely between countries (UNESCAP 1995). As the 
leading exporter of capital and merchandise and the principal donor of overseas development 
assistance (ODA; Table 10), Japan, through trade, investment, and technology transfer, has 
played a crucial role in promoting international economic interdependence in the Association 
of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), founded by Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, 
Singapore, and Thailand and later joined by Brunei and Viet Nam. Japanese ODA provided 
to ASEAN amounted to 35% of the bilateral ODA to developing countries in 1992. In the 
Japan–ASEAN Tripartite Cooperation Project, for example, Japanese and ASEAN technical 
personnel work together to assist in the resettlement of Cambodian expatriates. Japan also 
gives priority to helping ASEAN countries deal with environmental degradation and related 
problems (Tan 1994). Indonesia remains a major recipient of Japanese development 
assistance. The total volume of Japanese trade almost tripled in the region between 1987 and 
1994 (Table 11). 
 
Table 11. Trend of Japan's direct investment in ASEAN, 1987–94. 
  1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994
ASEAN 
Projects (n) 523 825 970 898 687 508 487 437
Value (millions 
USD) 
1 524 2 713 4 684 4 082 3 696 3 867 3 042 4 957
Brunei 
Projects (n) — — — — — — — —
Value (millions 
USD) 
— — — — — — — 15
Indonesia 
Projects (n) 67 84 140 155 148 122 115 116
Value (millions 
USD) 
545 586 631 1 105 1 193 1 676 813 1 759
Malaysia 
Projects (n) 64 108 159 169 136 111 92 51
Value (millions 
USD) 
163 387 673 725 880 704 800 742
Philippines 
Projects (n) 18 54 87 58 42 45 56 75
Value (millions 
USD) 
72 134 202 258 203 160 207 668
Singapore 
Projects (n) 182 197 181 139 103 100 97 69
Value (millions 
USD) 
494 747 1 902 840 613 670 644 1 054
Thailand 
Projects (n) 192 382 403 377 258 130 127 126
Value (millions 
USD) 
250 859 1 276 1 154 807 657 578 719
World 



































Source: JMF (1994). 
Note: ASEAN, Association of Southeast Asian Nations. USD, United States dollars. 
Southeast Asian countries have instituted numerous measures at the sub-regional level to 
address economic issues. In 1967, for example, ASEAN was established to promote regional 
economic cooperation and security (Baker 1995). The Asian Free Trade Area identifies 
products scheduled for tariff reductions — such as oils, chemicals, fertilizer, rubber products, 
and electronics — with side effects on the trade capabilities of various partner nations, 
Overall, however, the trade potential of these countries, despite geographic proximity, has 
remained relatively untapped because of political sensitivities calling for a reorientation of 
trade and investments in a more unified and larger regional market. Thus, the establishment 
of Asia–Pacific Economic Cooperation was part of the response to the expressed need for 
region-wide economic structures in the Asia–Pacific region. Building a sense of regional 
community was deemed to be highly relevant to coping with the realities of interdependence 
and to bringing collective leadership to these new global economies. 
The trend toward nondiscriminating multilateral economic systems is catalyzed by two 
factors. First, governments are increasingly willing to accept massive structural changes to 
maintain the efficiency of their economies, as demonstrated by sweeping, unilateral reforms 
to open their markets to international investment and competition. Second, these economies 
tend to achieve integration across political boundaries, creating larger zones of integrated 
production for global markets (Drysdale and Elek 1995). Globalization brings a complex set 
of external influences that affect the whole range of public policy-making. However, the 
vastness and heterogeneity of the region have raised fears that the economically weaker 
nations would be dominated by more economically competitive ones (UNESCAP 1995). 
The social impact of globalization 
The pattern of macroeconomic adjustment in the region raises a number of concerns. First, 
structural-adjustment measures, even when they are successful in increasing exports, saving, 
investment, and economic efficiency, risk neglecting the human factor and sidetracking the 
social goals that countries expect to achieve. Second, macroeconomic policies may deepen 
the disadvantage of the most vulnerable groups, which often suffer a disproportionate share 
of the negative effects of economic restructuring, including unemployment, wage losses, 
higher taxes, and reduced social spending (Table 9). Third, if social-development strategies 
are not integrated within the overall development framework, they undermine rather than 
stimulate the desired levels of progress (UNESCAP 1991b). 
Within this context, the impact of the mass media on the popular culture has been 
instrumental in changing values in the societies of the region. The new values promoted by 
globalization involve consumerism, individualism, and materialism, especially among a 
growing middle class alienated from the poorer groups. The process of cultural globalization 
draws from the influence of factors as diverse as television, movies, newspapers, magazines, 
and music; capital products, technology, and information crossing national boundaries; mass 
international tourism; and the advertising industry. 
Regional social policy and planning 
Despite the generally progressive economic climate in Southeast Asia, the assessment of the 
regional social-development situation indicates that social development has not kept pace 
with economic growth, as shown in Tables 2 and 7. This lack of congruence has been 
attributed primarily to the absence of a clear and common vision among national 
policymakers about the specific social-development objectives they should pursue and also to 
a lack of appreciation of the specific policy measures (UNESCAP 1991b). Some 
policymakers, for example, have conveniently assumed that the benefits of economic 
progress, though emanating from the top of the economic hierarchy, will automatically 
diffuse to the lower levels, eventually benefiting all members of society. Income inequalities 
are thought to be subsequently narrowed because all social groups ultimately benefit from 
economic development through employment opportunities and higher wages. However, 
empirical analysis has failed to validate these theories in Southeast Asian. 
In fact, the pressures on the state to take prime responsibility for the provision of social 
services have increased. The traditional social-welfare safety nets provided by the family and 
the community have deteriorated as a result of increasing urbanization, industrialization, and 
corresponding migration patterns. At the same time, other social institutions, particularly 
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and the private-business sector, are increasingly co-
opted to supplement the role of the state. Until recently, government interventions consisted 
primarily of formal programs in education, health, social welfare, and income security. 
Meanwhile, NGOs emphasized the delivery of "hands-on" social services at the grassroots 
level. However, past responses to social issues in the area of basic needs have often been 
piecemeal, providing, at best, partial or temporary remedies. In recent years, more proactive 
approaches have been taken. Also, social-development goals and targets in national 
development plans are being considered in local planning, and statistical facilities are being 
strengthened to permit the collection, analysis, and dissemination of data for social-policy 
formulation and monitoring. This is reflected, for example, in the Medium-Term Philippine 
Development Plan, in Thailand's National Economic and Social Development Five-Year 
Plan, in Indonesia's Repelita VI, and in the indicative plans of other countries, such as Viet 
Nam (UNESCAP 1992b). 
National action programs encompass several functions. These include the intragovernmental 
and intersectoral coordination of social-development policy, planning, and programing; 
targeting of specific social groups, such as the disadvantaged and other vulnerable sectors; 
training of personnel to deliver social services; monitoring and evaluation of programs; and 
allocation of resources. Where substantial social-development impact has been achieved, 
further tasks include universalization of social gains and strengthening of social cohesion. 
Eradicating poverty, for example, requires focusing attention on the needs of social groups 
whose specific disadvantages or vulnerabilities impede their participation in the development 
process. Concerns about creating employment are not only about improving working 
conditions and redistributing the benefits equitably but also about raising labour productivity 
in the presence of rapid technological change and international competitiveness of industry. 
Across the board, however, the broader social-development objective is the quest for social 
integration as an equating factor, with poverty eradication and employment generation 
serving as the necessary preconditions (UNESCAP 1994). 
Governments vary in their approach to poverty alleviation. Indonesia's Presidential 
Instruction Program on Poverty Alleviation galvanizes the efforts of all government agencies, 
communities, and enterprises for socioeconomic development in less-developed villages 
through integration, mutual cooperation, self-reliance, and decentralization. The ultimate goal 
is to create and enhance productive employment, financial assistance to poor families, and 
community solidarity. Under the Social Protection umbrella, the goals of Indonesia's Sixth 
Five-Year Development Plan (1994–99) include social development of isolated communities; 
assistance to the poor and the elderly; rehabilitation of the disabled, juvenile delinquents, and 
victims of drug abuse; and enhancement of community participation in development 
activities. 
In the Philippines, the Social Reform Agenda focuses and synchronizes programs for targeted 
families and communities. The aim is to meet the people's basic needs through agrarian 
reform, institution-building, and effective participation in governance. Under the project for 
the Comprehensive Integrated Delivery of Social Services, communities are encouraged to 
identify their "minimum" basic needs and to formulate their own community-development 
plans. The Government Service Insurance System and the Social Security System have 
increased the benefits of state employees and have broadened the definition of the private-
sector employee to include the self-employed. To counteract the adverse effects of structural 
adjustment, some of the welfare measures include food assistance, housing, financial support, 
training, and employment. 
In Viet Nam, the national program on poverty alleviation focuses on economic development 
through self-reliance, primarily in rural mountainous areas and among minority groups. In 
Thailand, programs to create rural employment aim to assist farmers during the lean 
(nonharvest) seasons through the implementation of water-supply projects, infrastructure 
development, and a comprehensive social-insurance scheme initiated in 1990. The first stage 
in the implementation of this scheme (1991–96) provided financial support in cases of 
sickness, maternity, work-related disability, and death. The second stage, from 1998 on, will 
introduce old-age pension and family benefits. Unemployment-insurance benefits are also 
envisaged for the future (UNESCAP 1996). 
Most governments formulate long- and short-term social-development strategies, and the 
various government ministries implement specific sectoral programs. But the most recent 
development is to decentralize initiatives, transferring the planning and implementation of 
social programs to local governments. Various approaches to institution-building in areas of 
social development have been initiated. In such efforts, the significance of people's 
participation and the involvement of local-government units (LGUs) in social-development 
planning and implementation has been increasingly recognized. Greater attention has been 
paid to enhancing the role of NGOs, the private sector, and civil society in the planning and 
delivery of social services. 
Decentralization: an approach to social-policy reform 
Experience with social-policy development in the region shows that in terms of feasibility 
and, in most cases, impact, the state has been at the centre of the policy and planning process. 
State planning bodies have traditionally taken responsibility for translating policy goals into 
implementable programs, with resources largely supplied by government and directives 
issued by relevant government agencies. At the same time, ideals often identified with social 
progress have been considered attainable only if objectives of national unity, political 
feasibility, security, economic growth, self-reliance, and human-resource development are 
achieved. In this context, the social-development activities of governments have ranged from 
planning at the macrolevel to providing basic services — such as health, education, and 
welfare — through designated ministries. Social policies have thus been traditionally 
determined at the highest administrative levels of government because of the perceived 
political sensitivity of many of their social goals, including empowerment of the poor and 
popular participation. 
In addition to financial constraints and the need for cost-reduction measures in the provision 
of social services, one of the key issues raised by critics of these national social-development 
efforts is whether centralized and uniform social programs are adequate to deal with 
problems often rooted in local realities, lack of participation by stakeholders, and political 
manipulation of traditional social relationships. Policies formulated at the central-government 
level tend to result in uniform programs for very diverse settings. They thus often fail to 
consider local participation in the implementation process, tend to express elitist and 
hierarchical values, and are unsuited to address existing social problems at the local level. 
Thus, social-development plans are often designed after specific targets, to be achieved using 
provincial and local governments resources, have been identified. The implementation of 
social-development programs in health, education, and welfare is becoming the responsibility 
of local governments and local structures that deliver services to each sector. 
However, this approach raises a new set of issues. The differing socioeconomic contexts of 
geographic regions within a country, for example, require area-specific policy instruments 
and institutional arrangements. The devolution of responsibilities in social policy-making, 
planning, and administration to lower government units is pertinent only if the mechanisms to 
attain the established social goals are appropriate and relevant to the local circumstances 
(UNESCAP 1992b). Because local governance in social-sector policies is viewed as a 
political and social process emanating from the citizenry, the challenge is to build pluralistic 
civil-society institutions capable of fostering active and responsible citizen participation in 
policy formulation and implementation. 
Presently, enough evidence indicates that the objectives of social development in the region 
can only be achieved within a policy context that promotes local governance and the 
maximum involvement of the constituencies and beneficiaries. This implies that political and 
social conditions need to support the development of self-governing mechanisms with 
sufficient latitude for local initiatives. In practice, although many governments have espoused 
decentralization as a national policy, central governments still have a lot more control over 
policy formulation and program implementation than nongovernmental partners and people's 
organizations do. Recognizing this, the Manila Declaration on the Agenda for Action on 
Social Development in the ESCAP Region (UNESCAP 1995, pp. 13–14) recommended that 
the governments encourage and implement decentralization and devolution of 
responsibility and authority, including fiscal authority, in the planning and 
delivery of social services. Relevant institutions will be empowered to assume 
increasing responsibility and authority for social development. The 
governments will pursue constructive cooperation with non-governmental 
organizations ... private enterprise, and the people to ensure that social 
development policies and programs are directed to meet the aims and 
aspirations of all social groups. Through such cooperation and strengthening 
the means of effective popular participation, governments can be brought 
closer to the people, improving performance and ensuring that people's 
concerns are taken into full consideration in policy-making, planning, 
programming, implementation, and evaluation. 
The decentralization of social policies thus responds to a number of concerns. First, it 
recognizes the importance of local initiatives in promoting social development within the 
overall development framework of a country. Second, it acknowledges the inadequacy of 
centralized approaches to social development. Third, it results in a proliferation of approaches 
to the development of social policies and programs that take into account a wider range of 
local-level considerations. Fourth, it reflects a growing recognition of the importance of local 
initiatives, self-reliance, and participation. Fifth, it recognizes the need to ensure that social-
policy reforms are planned and implemented in the local context so as to respond more 
directly to real needs (MacPherson 1989). The decentralization of social policies ultimately 
responds to the view that local governance increases political leaders' critical awareness of 
their responsibilities, fosters community initiative and commitment, and reduces dependence 
on central government. 
In practice, however, despite the frequent claims about "development from below" and 
"bottom-up" planning and decision-making, experiences indicate a definite need for a 
substantive theory of local governance. Until now, studies and programs have focused on the 
legal-institutional aspects of decentralized organizations, with little analysis of the power 
structures and little understanding of the dynamics within and among institutions (Ruland 
1990). What was conceived as decentralization in the Southeast Asian region in the 1980s 
was in reality deconcentration. As such, it involved the distribution of administrative 
responsibilities within the central government and the transfer of responsibilities from central 
ministries to the field staff. This, however, failed to include the responsibility to formulate 
policies or make policy decisions. 
The literature on local government in Southeast Asia has focused on five major models of 
governance: legal and institutional, normative, circular causative, penetrative, and 
comparative (Ruland 1990). The legal-institutional model basically views a local 
government's performance in terms of the powers and functions of local authorities, including 
local autonomy, financing, personnel management, and procedures. Drawing from Western 
experience of political development, local governance within this perspective was deemed a 
precondition of economic development. However, adherence to a purely legal-istic view of 
self-government has a convenient way of sidestepping the political pitfalls arising from 
increasing discrepancies between the neatly designed legal provisions to decentralize, on the 
one hand, and encroachment on civic rights, on the other (Ruland 1990). In practice, 
relatively little consideration is given to local decision-making processes and procedures, 
associated leadership support, central–local interactions, or resource allocation mechanisms, 
although this approach was taken in the late 1970s In the Philippines, for example, the 
Marcos' regime showcased the creation of neighbourhood communities (barangays) as a 
form of grassroots democracy. In Malaysia, the restructuring of local government and the 
enactment of the Local Government Act were moves to rationalize the lowest tier of 
government and improve its efficiency. In Thailand, the Bangkok Metropolitan 
Administration strongly depended on national authorities in program implementation, despite 
its being a decentralized geographic structure (Patom 1978). 
The normative model of local governance focuses on the promotion of democracy, popular 
participation, local autonomy, and transparency in decision-making. An example of this 
approach has been the creation of autonomous social movements, such as those for the 
empowerment of landless peasants, the urban poor, and labourers. The circular-causative 
model explains the lack of local autonomy and the existence of weak local institutions as 
consequences of underdevelopment. In this regard, Riggs (1995) proposed the concept of 
institutional and growth poles. In his view, a strong development-oriented central government 
can stimulate local administrative structures and promote economic development by 
concentrating resources in strategic-growth regions. This concept has been adopted in more 
industrialized countries in the region, such as Japan, Korea, and Singapore. 
The penetrative model emphasizes the influences of supralocal forces and vertical political 
interactions on local governance. The community is seen as the focal point of political and 
bureaucratic influences from national and local authorities that translate into decisions 
according to the relative influence of each group. Community-power analysis focuses on the 
role of the elites in local politics and the importance of attitudes, values, and resources for 
local decision-making. 
Using the comparative model to understanding local governance, Osteria has attempted to 
examine the variety of decentralization approaches adopted by four countries: Indonesia, 
Philippines, Thailand, and Viet Nam (Osteria 1996). This study noted that social policies in 
these countries have initiated people-centred approaches to social development to achieve the 
goals of the alleviation of poverty, employment expansion, and social integration. The fact 
that the social-policy strategies developed in these countries were closely linked to those 
targets reflects the recognition that these objectives could not be achieved through central-
government initiatives alone. Osteria's study showed that basic reforms are required in both 
the political and the administrative structures to shift the locus of decision-making in social-
policy reforms from the central ministries to the local governments. It also showed that 
decentralization has been implemented in different ways by different governments in the 
region. 
Social-policy decentralization has been broadly defined as the transfer of planning, decision-
making, and administrative authority from the central government to LGUs or NGOs. In 
Thailand, for example, after the Fourth National Development Plan (1977–81), the Thai 
government put in place policies to decentralize basic economic services, to increase rural 
production; and social-development planning to extend these services to most people. 
Linkages were also developed between national and provincial plans. Urban-development 
strategies decentralized the growth from the Bangkok Metropolitan Area to other urban 
centres. The system of education was modified to move more autonomy in education policy-
making from the central to the regional and local levels. Public-health management in 
planning, implementation, budget allocation, decision-making, and personnel decisions 
devolved to provincial administrations. The Thai government further stipulated that 
operational plans at the provincial and community levels take into account local conditions 
and policies for national development (Leoprapai 1996). Subsequent national plans reiterated 
this focus in the social-development field. In practice, however, the policy pronouncements 
still need to be transformed into local initiatives. 
The 1986 Philippine Constitution stated that decentralization policy is a substantiation of a 
democratization philosophy. The Constitution mandated Congress to enact a local-
government code to institute a system of decentralization affecting the powers, 
responsibilities, and duties of LGUs in the allocation of resources. Powers of taxation were 
also granted to address the financial concerns created by decentralization of the social sector 
at all levels (Osteria 1996). 
Indonesia's First National Five-Year Plan (Repelita I, 1969–73) stated that regional planning 
was the sole responsibility of sectoral ministries. The central-government ministries were 
expected to plan, implement, and monitor their projects through their representative officers 
at the provincial and municipal levels. Based on the recognition that such an approach leads 
to unequal development, subsequent five-year plans shifted the development objectives to 
equity and welfare distribution through increased participation of the regions (Van den Ham 
1989). Although an administrative framework for decentralization was in place, much debate 
arose about the extent to which responsibilities and decision-making were to be devolved to 
the regencies. A two-tier system has complicated the structure because alongside the 
autonomous local-government structures are the local branches of the central government that 
carry out various functions and activities in the field (Malo 1996). 
Viet Nam demonstrated its adherence to decentralization tenets in its 7th Party Congress 
pronouncements and in general provisions of the People's Councils and People's Committees, 
which underscored the need for "broadening the scope of responsibility and power at the 
local levels" (Bui 1996, pp. 152–153). As the state's local organ of power, the People's 
Councils are responsible for implementing the terms of the Constitution. As such, they issue 
resolutions related to educational development, culture and cultural preservation, children's 
welfare, and maternal and child health. They formulate policies and guidelines to create 
employment, improve working conditions, and raise living standards. The decentralization 
mandate (Viet Nam 1992) is explicitly stated as follows: 
to continue to reform the state through a clear structure where power is 
distributed to the local levels and to redefine the functions and tasks of the 
provincial, district, and commune levels to specify the organization at each 
level. 
Decentralization has been effectively implemented, as reflected in activities to alleviate 
poverty and the activities of local health units. However, with the introduction of further 
economic reforms, concern is raised about the system's ability to respond adequately to 
emerging social needs (Bui 1996). 
NGOs and decentralization schemes 
Under decentralized social-sector schemes, NGOs have become partners of local 
administrators in forging administrative, policy, and institutional reforms, such as policies 
and programs dealing with poverty alleviation and social integration. In this role, NGOs often 
build on the participation of traditional safety nets, such as kinship ties, the family, and the 
community. 
The people-centred development thrust in social-policy reform underscores the active 
participation of all citizens, in concert with the government, in attaining social-development 
goals and targets. Traditionally, the NGOs have had functions in local social development: 
implementation of self-help initiatives, delivery of basic social services, funding, and 
technical and other support services. Many NGOs in the Asian region started primarily as 
welfare and charitable agencies that provided relief services to alleviate the conditions of 
disadvantaged and marginalized populations. However, over the years, they have taken on 
more diversified and expanded roles, empowering people's organizations and serving as 
agents of development for the poor and underdeveloped communities (UNESCAP 1995). 
More recently, NGOs have become involved in policy advocacy, paying more attention to the 
systemic and structural elements perpetuating social inequities. In this regard, NGOs 
complement the tasks of local governments by building people's capacities to participate 
meaningfully in community development, by providing basic services, by increasing 
employment opportunities, and by assisting grassroots organizations. 
However, underlying tensions between local leaders and NGOs have resulted from 
differences in perceptions, strategies, and motivations related to the provision of specific 
services, which in some cases leads NGOs to refuse to cooperate with local governments 
(UNESCAP 1995). Local-government leaders, in turn, often view NGOs with caution, seeing 
them as having the potential to threaten their power and authority and expose them to public 
accountability. Despite the proliferation of NGOs over the past decades, their long-term and 
large-scale impacts have generally been questioned. The reasons for this are complex and 
evolve from a host of factors, including weak organizational structure; strategies that are 
perceived as being inappropriate; and the restriction of their activities by existing government 
attitudes and policies. In some countries such as Viet Nam, though, the state creates or assists 
NGOs, and they are virtually indistinguishable from the state apparatus. Thus, for example, 
the government helps trade unions, women's unions, and youth unions by providing funds 
and logistical support, and these organizations work in coordination with the People's 
Committees in social programs (Bui 1996). 
In other countries, licencing and accreditation of NGOs by government have been viewed 
with concern. The fear is that the licencing standards "could turn into another mechanism of 
state control on behalf of entrenched attitudes and vested interests opposed to social reform 
and change" (UNESCAP 1995, p. 47). For example, the Philippines has developed no clear 
policy guidelines on NGOs or their relationship with local governments. They are, thus, 
highly unstructured, and their relationship with local governments is often based on personal 
contacts (UNESCAP 1990). As a result of frequent turnover of local officials, NGO workers 
not uncommonly have to deal with new officials who are unaware of existing linkages or the 
tasks expected from them. In addition, many NGOs continue to be based in the capital or in 
cities and have been unable to expand their resources to rural areas and the populations most 
in need of their services. In Indonesia, some government agencies are reluctant to get 
involved with certain NGOs because the agencies lack information about their operations. In 
fact, some provincial officials have a controlling attitude toward NGOs and still regard them 
with suspicion. The Malaysian government has a dual attitude: it collaborates with the NGOs, 
particularly in implementing formal-education policies and youth and women's development 
programs, but confronts the NGOs when they seek to make the social and political systems 
accountable to the public (UNESCAP 1990). 
The approach to social-policy decentralization in the Southeast Asian region has not been 
uniform. In Malaysia, for example, the federal government administers decentralization at 
various levels. Central-government policy- and decision-making machinery is extended to the 
local grassroots level or to the village communities. The District Action Committee 
coordinates and integrates information and communications regarding economic and social 
development. Through this committee, federal- and state-level policy decisions and directions 
are conveyed to the various departments and villages. However, one of the problems 
encountered with this approach is the lack of integration and coordination in policy formation 
among the multitude of agencies involved in program planning at the local levels, with a 
resultant overlap in functions. Likewise, most of the social-development programs at the 
district level tend to be planned and implemented on a sectoral basis, resulting in inefficient 
allocation and distribution of resources. This is compounded by a related problem: the lack of 
grassroots participation and self-determination in the decision-making process (Choo 1989). 
In the Philippines, the 1991 Local Government Code specified the health, education, and 
welfare functions to be devolved to the local level. However, the effective implementation of 
this Code was constrained by insufficient financial resources, uneven administrative capacity 
of local-government leaders, lack of workable mechanisms to harness or tap the support of 
NGOs and the private sector, and lack of monitoring and evaluation standards (Osteria 1996). 
The Thai government considered decentralization of administrative authority to local 
governments as one of eight key policy measures established to pursue the following goals: 
• Decentralizing more public functions to LGUs; 
• Distributing more revenue to LGUs; 
• Holding elections of local administrators at all levels; 
• Creating an enabling environment in the formulation of local policies; and 
• Supporting LGUs in their administration of social-sector functions (Leoprapai 1996). 
In Indonesia, the implementation of decentralization took various forms, ranging from actual 
decentralization to "deconcentration" (Malo 1996), with local branches of sectoral ministries 
holding the responsibility for carrying out social-sector functions. 
However, for most government officials in Southeast Asia, decentralization implies a radical 
transformation in the direction and implementation of policies. It reflects a paradigm shift 
that alters the major front lines of attitudes and behaviour in local governance and the 
exercise of power. In practice, this means that local officials, beyond being political leaders, 
must also become area managers. As such, they must be able to set the direction of their 
localities' development plans while implementing various social-sector initiatives in 
partnership with NGOs and their constituencies. The new structure implies that local officials 
shift from being mere beneficiaries of government's largesse to being partners and critical 
collaborators in local governance. 
Among the major constraints on local officials implementing decentralization schemes are 
the following: 
• Inadequate resource support; 
• Basic reluctance of central governments to transfer responsibilities, personnel, and 
equipment to local governments, as central governments perceive local governments as 
being incapable of undertaking the specified tasks; 
• Fear that devolution leads to local power abuse, warlordism, and elitism, which are 
basic cultural features in parts of the region; 
• LGUs' inability to carry out the prescribed activities; 
• Nebulous roles and responsibilities of local leaders and sectoral field agents; 
• Absence of monitoring and evaluation standards; 
• Unclear power-sharing mechanism between LGUs and NGOs; 
• NGOs' and government agencies' opposing perceptions of the implementation of 
decentralization programs; 
• Differential viewpoints regarding the decentralization modalities for the social sector at 
the local level; and 
• Low levels of public accountability. 
Four factors affect the success or failure of decentralized programs in most countries in the 
region: 
• The degree to which central-government political leaders and bureaucracies support 
decentralization and local governments in cases in which responsibilities are 
transferred; 
• The degree to which the dominant behaviour, attitudes, and culture of local leaders are 
conducive to decentralized decision-making; 
• The degree to which policies and programs are appropriately designed to promote 
decentralized decision-making and management; and 
• The degree to which adequate financial, human, and physical resources are made 
available to the local governments in cases in which responsibilities are transferred. 
Conclusions 
Economic interdependence in Southeast Asia has increased at a phenomenal pace with 
increasing international trade and investment flows. This interdependence has been propelled 
by market forces that surmount official and private barriers to trade and investment. Four 
factors account for this: 
• Substantial income expansion as a result of sustained economic growth and increased 
trade; 
• Unilateral trade liberalization with the reduction of official trade and investment 
barriers; 
• Complementary formation of economic structures through direct foreign investment; 
and 
• Emergence and elaboration of cooperation schemes (Tan 1994). 
These countries have also been successful in raising saving and investment rates while 
attracting essential capital from abroad. However, policymakers are facing the challenge of 
maintaining social stability and enhancing social programs in the face of economic 
expansion. Industrialization and urbanization result in large-scale rural-to-urban migration 
and the proliferation of slums and squatter settlements. Although social indicators have 
recorded improvements in standards of living, large disparities still exist between rural and 
urban areas in standards of living and in access to, and use of, educational and health 
services. Despite noted increases in government expenditures on social services, their 
percentages in GDP and total government expenditures remain low (≤10% of GDP and 20% 
of total expenditures). Financial allocations to social services are vulnerable to overall 
macroeconomic difficulties, such as debt servicing. Higher taxation, increased prices, and 
reduced social spending may further disadvantage vulnerable groups. Reductions in subsidies 
and devaluation of local currency can increase food prices and result in malnutrition of low-
income groups. 
The Southeast Asian governments have underscored the role of good governance in social 
development through decentralization and devolution of responsibility and authority in the 
planning and delivery of social services. Institutions within the purview of local government 
have to be empowered to assume increasing responsibility and authority for social 
development. Equally important for good governance are efforts to get relevant groups to 
actively participate in policy-making, planning, and programing so as to improve the 
effectiveness of social-development interventions and ensure the equitable distribution of 
development benefits. Regional experience has revealed that dynamic involvement of the 
total network of social institutions, including NGOs and popular organizations, is required for 
effective and sustained development. Cooperation in research of critical concern also has an 
important role to play in strengthening future policy and program development. 
Lessons from social-sector decentralization 
The governments in Southeast Asia, irrespective of ideology, have had a common 
preoccupation with sustained social development to ensure progressively higher levels of 
well-being of their populations. However, decentralization to achieve this end has varied 
between and within countries, both in how it has been implemented and in the type of 
responses it has evoked. 
After several years of experimenting with decentralization as a way to reform social policies, 
countries in the region are now in a position to observe each other's social-policy 
performance and learn from each other's experiences. This review of these experiences yields 
a number of lessons. 
First, if the implementation of decentralized policies and programs requires local leaders to 
assume the tasks of social-sector planning and implementation, then the leaders need to have 
an ideological commitment and the implementers need to have the necessary technical skills. 
Experience shows that the skills required for policy formulation, program implementation, 
and resource mobilization can be acquired through training with the assistance of locally 
appropriate modules and programs. 
Second, beginning early in the process of policy change, those designing policy reforms and 
policy-decentralization strategies need to identify and mediate the inherent conflicts between 
sectoral ministries and LGUs to achieve the smooth implementation of programs. Although it 
is not unusual for many central sectoral ministries and LGUs to claim commitment to the 
tenets of decentralization, little progress is sometimes made in translating policies into 
effective action. One of the impediments to decentralized programs is the prevailing top-
down approach to policy implementation. To overcome this, implementers need a 
meaningful, flexible, and participatory strategy; stakeholders must be involved, beginning at 
the initial stage of policy formulation. 
Third, it is important to have the active joint participation of government agencies and NGOs 
in planning and implementing social programs at the local level. Effective community-based 
social organizations are, for this reason, another important element in implementing 
decentralization strategies if local leaders' actions are to realistically reflect local needs, 
mobilize community resources, and enforce the decentralization mandate. Village leaders, for 
example, can find the balance between community social needs and program inputs. The key 
factors, however, are local organizations that substantively involve the people and provide 
skills and institutional management capacity through participatory actions. 
Fourth, local governments must systematically address the issues of resource identification 
and mobilization to adequately finance social services. Overall, however, the effective 
implementation of decentralized social-sector programs depends on predetermined 
requirements, such as organizational structure, a functional bureaucracy, and mutually 
supportive horizontal and vertical relations in the management of policies and programs. 
Fifth, organizations at the lowest level of the hierarchy are often in a better position to 
address local problems. This depends on the capacity and creativity of local leaders and their 
constituencies. However, effective leadership at the local level is the critical factor in 
implementing and sustaining decentralization initiatives. Local leaders can draw from their 
strong family, community, and political linkages to mobilize resources for social-sector 
programs. It is not unusual for their lack of skills for carrying out organizational activities to 
be offset by their ability to provide traditional legitimacy, apply informal procedures, and 
mobilize community support. In many cases, given the passivity of most beneficiaries, a 
major way to enhance prospects for local social action is for leaders to co-opt the 
beneficiaries as major stakeholders in the programs. 
Finally, the delegation of responsibilities to local governments often raises issues of public 
accountability of local-government officials. A way to help them internalize the notion of 
accountability is to involve NGOs and the communities in program implementation. In this 
way, accountability becomes broad based. Leaders are more likely to manage programs that 
support local needs if they are held accountable to their constituencies. Accountability can be 
built into the structure of local systems if decision-making is shared by the local 
governments, sectoral field agents, and NGOs. 
When responsibilities are transferred from central to local governments, the latter often have 
to introduce measures with long-term impacts on the sustainability, efficiency, and 
effectiveness of decentralized social-sector programs. In such cases, the central agency is 
expected to contribute direction, technical support, databases, and resources to help local 
governments develop a structure and operational system. Quite often, this process presents a 
number of constraints. Implementers indicate that local governments often lack the ability to 
meet social-sector demands. They take over social programs and staff with existing 
arrangements based on a previous central structure designed to provide specific services. 
However, they are incapable of providing the same support that the central agency 
contributed to the program in terms of staff, equipment, and supplies. A second crucial 
concern of local governments is the identification of specific tasks and activities of the 
service-delivery units under decentralization. What social-sector programs, services, inputs, 
and supplies will be required by local governments? What specific program can they 
undertake, given their resources? These are some of the issues that local leaders and sectoral 
field agents have to address. Experiences show that it is essential that technical and 
monitoring standards be developed in cooperation with sectoral agencies and NGOs. A third 
concern has to do with vertical and horizontal linkages. Social-sector programs must establish 
linkages to ensure that the community is given the appropriate services. An important 
element in such contexts is networking among the various local-level units; among sectoral 
field units; among public, private, and NGO service providers; and between the service 
providers and the population. 
Overall experience in the region shows that strengthening local governments supports the aim 
of linking social-development efforts to the population at large. This is for several reasons. 
For one thing, local governments have the ability to meaningfully address social-sector needs 
at local levels, given that social-development problems are locality and population specific. 
For another, the coordination and collaboration of entities at local levels can help to establish 
holistic and culturally acceptable local programs. However, for this approach to be 
operational, responsibilities must be relinquished to LGUs, leaving central authorities with 
the responsibility for macrolevel initiatives aimed at achieving the country's overall 
development goals. Under these conditions, decentralization creates an atmosphere of 
collective commitment and shared responsibility. And this atmosphere encourages initiatives 
at all levels to allow people to make decisions affecting their lives. A decentralization 




EDUCATIONAL REFORM, EXTERNAL FORCES, AND INTERNAL 
CHALLENGES 
Jeffrey M. Puryear 
The most striking feature of educational systems in Latin America and the Caribbean today is 
change. The region's dramatic shift toward open economies, democratic governance, and 
state decentralization has made education crucial to continued economic success and social 
development. Global competition requires workers who understand science and technology 
and can adapt to rapidly changing conditions. Democratic rule requires citizens who are 
better informed and more responsible. The decentralization of public administration is 
placing a new emphasis on citizen participation, autonomy, and responsibility in provincial 
and municipal settings. 
Schools are not responding to these new demands. More children go to school now than ever, 
but the education that most receive falls far short of the requirements for economic success 
and social advance. 
The problems are striking. Latin America has the highest repetition rates in the world, with 
nearly a third of all primary students repeating a grade each year. The cost of teaching these 
repeaters has been estimated at several billion dollars annually. Only half the students who 
begin primary school will complete the cycle, leaving far too many children without a basic 
mastery of language and mathematics. In virtually every international test of reading, 
mathematics, and science, Latin American students perform poorly in comparison with 
students elsewhere. The region's involvement in the international scientific community is 
marginal. Despite having more than 8% of the world's population, Latin America and the 
Caribbean accounted for just 0.6% of the resources invested worldwide in research and 
development in 1990 and 1.5% of the scientific articles published worldwide in 1993. 
Teachers tend to be poorly trained, to have a low status, and to have few incentives for 
professional excellence. Pedagogy is dominated by the "frontal" model that rewards the 
memorization of facts and fails to develop student capacities to question, explore, work in 
groups, and learn on their own. 
Educational systems are also remarkably inequitable. Students from the poorest families 
score dramatically lower on achievement tests than do middle- and upper-class children. 
Most primary-school repeaters are poor and attend low-quality public schools. But public 
funds have been used disproportionately to expand secondary and higher education — levels 
of education most of the poor do not reach — rather than to improve public primary schools. 
For much of the region, good education is still a privilege of the wealthy and upper-middle 
classes, given at expensive private schools (IADB 1996; Puryear 1997). 
Public- and private-sector leaders are deploring the inadequacies of existing schools and 
calling for reform. Governments everywhere are revising their education policies. Bilateral 
and multilateral assistance institutions are offering to help governments improve the quality 
and quantity of their investments in human resources. The long-standing problems of the 
region's school systems have become all too apparent. Reform has become the norm. 
Almost as striking is the fact that much of the impetus for reform is coming from sources 
external to the educational systems, rather than from those internal to it. The challenges of 
global competition have forced governments to pay more attention to the quality of their 
work forces and to the schools that produce them. The information revolution has shortened 
the time it takes to communicate about policy innovation from one country to another and has 
made it easier for countries to compare their efforts with those of their neigh-bours. Foreign 
assistance institutions have become promoters of reform and the bearers of new approaches. 
The context for policy debate in education has increasingly become regional and global, 
rather than simply national. Education ministries are being pressed by heads of state and 
nongovernmental technocrats to produce better education more efficiently. Change is being 
imposed on education systems from without, rather than from within. 
As a result, education has become one of the most dynamic sectors of national policy-making 
in Latin America and the Caribbean. Major reforms are being attempted, and even greater 
reforms are being discussed. Ministries of education are delegating significant responsibility 
to provincial and municipal bodies. The management of schools is being decentralized, and 
parents and employers are being asked to participate. National testing regimes are being 
established. Concepts that have traditionally been resisted by actors within the educational 
system, such as parental choice, competition among schools, community involvement in 
school management, and performance-based pay systems for teachers, are now on the policy 
agenda. 
What are we to make of these challenges that globalization poses to the status quo within 
educational systems in this region? Do they signal a renaissance in the region's social-policy 
systems? Do they represent inappropriate meddling by outside forces? Can they promote 
economic growth and social equity? Can they make schools better? Will they persist? 
This chapter argues that we are witnessing a fundamentally healthy process, with significant 
potential to improve education in many countries. The pressures for change coming from 
outside the educational systems constitute an important corrective to the deeply conservative 
forces that dominate most public-education systems in the region. Such outside pressures 
should be welcomed, rather than feared. This chapter also argues that these challenges do not 
guarantee better schools. The required innovations must be tested and adapted. Moreover, 
significant forces are opposed to reform. Real progress will depend on how public-education 
systems — and governments more broadly — respond to these new ideas. Those that develop 
clear goals for their schools, measure new ideas by their potential to help achieve those goals, 
and decide to address the formidable political obstacles to change will be able to take 
advantage of the rich mixture of policy suggestions emerging from experience around the 
world. 
The next sections discuss the various factors affecting educational reform in the region, as 
well as some views on the positive and negative influence of these factors. This chapter 
concludes by outlining some of the key issues in need of further consideration in social-
policy reform in general and in educational reform in particular. 
Factors in educational reform 
Several factors that spur education reform derive from the region-wide shift to open 
economies and global competition. Two of these factors are especially important. The first is 
the growing centrality of knowledge as a production factor. The second is the increasing 
global character of information, communication, and economic activity. Both these factors 
are sharply increasing the demand for education. They are establishing a new and compelling 
economic argument for educational reform. They are also causing powerful actors outside 
educational systems — politicians, business leaders, development-assistance institutions 
(DAIs), and civil society more generally — to press for better schools and a better quality of 
education. 
The growing centrality of knowledge 
Many analysts argue that knowledge is central to post-industrial society and that its 
importance will only grow in the future (Drucker 1989; Reich 1991). Production, which in its 
most primitive form requires little more than capital and labour, now depends more and more 
on technology (Dahlman 1989; Lall 1990). We are experiencing a scientific and 
technological revolution that is sharply increasing the value added by knowledge to 
production. As technology expands and as technological cycles become shorter, the key to 
remaining competitive is to be able to create, evaluate, adapt, and exploit technology. 
Because technology depends ultimately on human resources, competitiveness is increasingly 
based on an educated work force, rather than on capital or natural resources. The spread of 
new technologies is creating a need for employees who know how to use them. Those who 
work directly with knowledge and information are becoming more central to production. For 
example, advances in microelectronic technology have led to the rapid spread of 
computerized machine tools, robotics, and computer-assisted design — all of which can be 
used to perform a variety of tasks and to produce a variety of products. They enable firms to 
change products rapidly in response to shifting demand but require a work force well versed 
in the fundamentals of technology and able to absorb and apply new knowledge on the job. 
Similarly, firms rely increasingly on sophisticated computerized databases and 
communications systems for their daily operations, requiring levels of knowledge and 
adaptability rarely needed by workers even a decade ago. Biotechnological advances have 
produced major gains in agricultural production but require workers who can interpret written 
instructions and properly combine complementary inputs, such as irrigation and fertilizers 
(Middleton et al. 1993). In more general terms, economic success now requires countries to 
develop a national technological capability, a key component of which is an adequate stock 
of high-quality scientific and technological human resources. Countries need graduates who 
understand modern technology and can adapt it to local conditions. They must be able to 
monitor emerging technologies, assimilate and adapt them, and devise appropriate strategies 
to exploit them (Lall 1990; Dahlman 1991). 
This line of thinking has reinforced the idea that human resources play an increasingly 
important role in economic competitiveness and growth. An impressive body of theory and 
evidence now suggests that investments in human capital, particularly in education, enhance 
economic competitiveness (Schultz 1961; Becker 1964; Barro 1991). 
We know, for example, that a strong relationship exists between school enrollments — 
particularly at the primary level — and subsequent economic growth. Countries that 
expanded enrollments sharply during the 1950s and 1960s experienced higher rates of 
economic growth during the 1970s and 1980s, even after other factors that contribute to 
growth are taken into account. 
A recent World Bank study found that sustained investments in primary schooling several 
decades ago were critically important to the success of the eight rapidly growing economies 
of East Asia — the "tigers" (World Bank 1993a). The historical evidence on this issue is so 
strong that many economists argue that at a certain threshold in human-capital accumulation 
economic growth accelerates. 
We also know that education makes farmers more productive. A study of 18 low-income 
countries recently concluded that 4 years of primary schooling made farmers, on average, 
nearly 9% more productive than those with no education. When complementary inputs are 
available — such as fertilizer, new seeds, and new machinery — the impact rises to 13%. A 
study in Peru showed that an additional 1 year of schooling for a farmer increased annual 
output by about 2%. Most economists argue that education not only makes farmers produce 
more with the same quantity of inputs but also enables them to absorb new information and 
makes them more willing to try new techniques (Lockheed et al. 1980). 
Finally, we know that the rates of return to investments in education are high, particularly in 
low- and middle-income countries. Workers with more education earn more money. The 
social rates of return to primary and secondary education in Latin America and the Caribbean 
have recently been calculated at about 18 and 13%, respectively, even without including 
possible spillover benefits that may accrue to employers (and to society) from having more 
educated workers. Those rates are generally higher than the long-run opportunity costs of 
capital (that is, the rate of return to alternative, noneducational investments). They suggest 
that education — at least, at the primary and secondary levels — is an excellent investment. 
On the basis of these findings, governments have shifted attention to education and health 
and have sought new policies and priorities in key areas of social and human development. 
Globalization 
Most spheres of human activity are becoming progressively altered by globalization. 
Communication is increasingly global. Knowledge and the news of events in one country are 
readily available to people in another. Culture is rapidly transmitted from one country to 
another. Increasingly, our reference point is the world, rather than the nation-state (ECLAC 
and OREALC 1992; Marshall and Tucker 1992). 
Globalization has had its most dramatic impact on economic competition. With open 
economies, trade becomes a global activity, and investment and technology become global 
commodities. Investment capital is actively sought, and flows of investment capital are 
global, rather than national. Competition becomes global, rather than national. As nations 
open up to the outside world, they identify promising new technologies, adapt them to local 
conditions, attract foreign investment, and monitor global markets for the best opportunities. 
The result is a global push for higher productivity, which causes employers to seek new 
technologies and workers who can apply them successfully. Remaining competitive under 
these conditions depends increasingly on the skills of a nation's work force. 
Some economists even suggest that globalization is creating a new stage of capitalism. 
Earlier, the dominant principle was "scientific management" (known as Taylorism), in which 
skilled managers and engineers directed relatively unskilled line workers in carrying out 
specialized, repetitive tasks (Marshall and Tucker 1992). Capital and corporations were more 
national than international and relatively stable. But the emerging global economy is much 
more competitive and much more dynamic. Producers must be able to adapt rapidly to a 
constantly changing marketplace. They need managers who can quickly move from one 
technology to another and production workers who can think for themselves and act on their 
own accord. Producers must invest not only in plant and equipment but also in a productive 
work force. In a world of global capital flows and rootless corporations, a country's work 
force is one of its few dependable assets. 
The spread of new ideas 
Globalization has spawned a third factor fueling change: the spread of new ideas about the 
ways education is provided. The debate about education has become global. New 
developments in economic theory, social policy, and public administration are transmitted 
rapidly around the world and discussed with great authority by local analysts and 
policymakers. Development banks, aid agencies, and international nongovernmental 
organizations (NGOs) transmit extensive information on the structure and performance of 
national educational systems. Schools are increasingly compared cross-nationally in terms of 
their costs, output, equity, and efficiency. Today, policymakers inside and outside the 
education sector have at their disposal a powerful store of ideas, data, and analyses they can 
apply to assessing national educational systems. 
Examples abound. Detailed education statistics for most countries are widely available from 
the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), the World 
Bank, and the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB). International educational 
comparisons, such as the Third International Math and Science Study (Schmidt et al. 1996), 
UNESCO's biannual World Education Report (UNESCO 1995), and the Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development's Education at a Glance project (OECD 1995), 
have become important sources of global comparative analysis of the evolution of 
educational systems. Policy measures endorsed at the World Conference on Education For 
All in Jomtien, Thailand, in 1989, have significantly altered the terms of the debate about 
educational policy in Latin America (WCEFA 1990). World Bank publications on 
educational policies have often become important benchmarks for policymakers in Latin 
America (Lockheed and Verspoor 1991; World Bank 1991, 1995b). IADB is producing 
powerful comparative analyses of the ways education is provided (Behrman 1993; IADB 
1996). Cross-national comparisons of national educational systems have become almost 
commonplace (Puryear and Brunner 1995; Álvarez and Ruiz-Casares 1997). 
The abundance of information and analyses has led countries to pay far greater attention to 
foreign experiences and ideas when considering educational reform. Countries are comparing 
their performance in education with that of countries around the world. National 
policymakers are just as likely to suggest adopting an approach tried in Chile, Singapore, or 
the United Kingdom as to use approaches developed locally. Local practice is increasingly 
influenced by practice abroad, and policymakers are less likely to try to reinvent the wheel. 
An extraordinary cross-fertilization of ideas about the ways education is provided is under 
way. 
New actors in educational policy 
Over the last few years, a host of new actors have come to play important roles in educational 
reform. Some of these actors, such as development banks and bilateral assistance agencies, 
are international. Many others are national but are external to national educational systems. 
All have become important factors pressing for change. Their efforts have often engendered 
significant resistance from those who have traditionally dominated educational systems, 
particularly teachers' unions and ministerial bureaucrats. 
Among the strongest of the new actors have been heads of state. Whereas in the past 
educational policy was lower on the political agenda and more often left to ministers of 
education, today presidents — such as Fernando Henrique Cardoso in Brazil, Eduardo Frei in 
Chile, and Cesar Gaviria in Colombia — have increasingly taken up the banner of 
educational reform, making it a central feature of their political platforms. Convinced that 
poor-quality schools are a major bottleneck to economic growth and social advancement, 
they are charging ministers of education with reform agendas and providing them with 
political support. Often, they are aided by technocrats from sectors of government other than 
education, particularly ministries of finance and planning, or from nongovernmental think 
tanks, whose views of educational policy are based firmly on modern economic theory. Such 
think tanks have on occasion proposed radical changes, such as cutting subsidies to higher 
education (as in Nicaragua), sharply reducing the power of education ministries (as in 
Argentina), promoting competition among public schools (as in Chile), and breaking up the 
monopoly of teachers' unions (as in El Salvador). Although their success has varied greatly, 
heads of state are becoming central players in the promotion of educational reform in Latin 
America and the Caribbean. 
Sectors of civil society — the consumers of education — traditionally little involved in 
educational policy have also begun to play important roles in debating and promoting 
educational reform. In the Dominican Republic, for example, two NGOs with strong business 
connections — Educa and Plan Educativo — worked with the academic, business, and 
professional communities to develop educational-reform plans that eventually had a strong 
impact on government policy (Zaiter 1997). In Nicaragua, a radical decentralization program 
for education has as its centrepiece the systematic involvement of parents in local-school 
management. 
Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Ecuador, and El Salvador have all established programs to bring 
diverse social sectors together to discuss educational policy. Nongovernmental groups in 
Brazil, Colombia, the Dominican Republic, Guatemala, Nicaragua, Peru, and Venezuela have 
worked since 1995 to generate a sustained process of national debate and discussion about 
educational reform among political, business, and professional organizations, under the 
Partnership for Educational Revitalization in the Americas (PREAL). PREAL is a 
hemispheric partnership of public- and private-sector organizations working for educational 
reform in Latin America and the Caribbean, jointly managed by the Inter-American Dialogue, 
in the United States, and the Corporation for Development Research, in Chile. The 
partnership promotes informed debate on policy alternatives, identifies and disseminates best 
education practices emerging in the region and elsewhere, and monitors progress toward 
improving educational policy. Participants include governments, nongovernmental actors, 
researchers, international organizations, universities, and the business community. Business 
leaders are showing increased interest in local and national educational policy (Puryear 
1996). The emphasis in all these initiatives has been to develop consensus regarding 
educational problems and their possible solutions among actors outside the educational 
system. Although their impact is not easy to assess, in large part because the road to policy 
change is seldom short or direct, several accounts suggest that consumers of education are 
beginning to play more important roles than in the past (Hernández Mella 1997; Reimers and 
McGinn 1997). 
A third group of actors playing increasingly important roles in the reform of education are the 
DAIs. These include organizations as diverse as development banks, international 
organizations, bilateral aid agencies, NGOs, and consulting firms. Some of them, particularly 
UNESCO and the United Nations Children's Fund, have long been active in education in 
Latin America. Others, such as the World Bank and IADB, have recently increased their 
work, becoming much more significant sources of information, analyses, and financing than 
in the past (McMeekin 1996). 
Several characteristics make DAIs particularly powerful in educational reform. First, they are 
often significant sources of funding. Although public expenditures on education dwarf even 
the sums available from the development banks, most public funds are closely tied to ongoing 
operations (particularly salaries) and cannot be easily shifted to other uses. By contrast, funds 
from DAIs tend to be flexible. They can be used to select, adapt, and evaluate new programs, 
giving them a significance far in excess of their share in public spending on education. In 
Latin America, funding from DAIs often constitutes a major source of discretionary public 
spending on education. During the 1990s, funding for education from DAIs averaged more 
than 1.3 billion United States dollars annually. Loans constituted most of this support, and 
they came almost entirely from the development banks (McMeekin 1996). 
Second, DAIs often produce some of the best information and analysis regarding education in 
the region. By virtue of their multinational character, human resources, and considerable 
funding, DAIs are extraordinarily well positioned to be key sources of information, analyzing 
national efforts, transferring policy innovations cross-nationally, and drawing policy 
conclusions. For example, the World Bank has become the single best source of data and 
analyses regarding education in Latin America and the Caribbean. Its technical reports, 
country analyses, and policy documents are required reading for both academics and 
policymakers, including those who disagree with the World Bank's conclusions. IADB 
recently stepped up its analytical work and is also becoming an important voice on 
educational policy. A comprehensive educational policy paper produced by the Economic 
Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean and UNESCO's regional office for Latin 
America a few years ago has had a major impact on policy debate (ECLAC and OREALC 
1992). 
This information is often of value to national governments. The development banks in 
particular have become a source of knowledge and experience not generally available locally 
and otherwise difficult to secure. Governments often seek to work with development banks as 
much for their technical expertise as for their money. 
Third, DAIs also provide political resources, such as legitimacy, clout, and cover, that are 
very useful to policymakers. For example, the blessing of a development bank or an 
international organization often helps to convince otherwise sceptical or neutral national 
groups to accept reforms. Economists from development banks may have more success than 
ministry-of-education officials in convincing those at ministries of finance and planning that 
certain educational policies are advisable. Also, DAIs provide governments with a convenient 
scapegoat for politically unpopular policy decisions. In the face of complaints, the 
involvement of a DAI allows the government to suggest that there was no real alternative — 
"the Bank made us do it." 
DAIs can perform these political functions precisely because they have the image of the 
impartial, authoritative expert whose word is based on science and reason, rather than on 
ideology or partisan politics. This expert status enables DAIs to depoliticize decisions — 
bestowing a nonpolitical stamp of approval on government decisions, which helps counteract 
allegations of political partisanship and patronage. 
Often, DAIs use their expert status prescriptively, criticizing national systems and policies, 
taking clear stands for or against certain policies and tying their support to those stands. They 
have also taken a top-down approach, working almost exclusively with top governmental 
officials and only occasionally developing contacts with other stakeholders in educational 
policy. 
Overall, then, the educational establishment in Latin America is being challenged to a degree 
not seen in the recent past, by forces that are largely external to its educational systems. Some 
of these forces are international; others, including heads of state, ministries of finance and 
planning, and technocrats based in local NGOs, are national but often work closely with 
international DAIs to develop reform policies. The demand for education is changing rapidly; 
the supply is under fire. 
Counterreform 
Pressures for change in the Americas' educational systems have not surprisingly met with 
significant resistance. Much of that resistance has come from teachers' unions, universities, 
and ministerial officials. Some has come from politicians and from some in the academic 
community. Considerably less resistance has come from parents, students, and employers — 
with the exception of university students who defend tuition-free higher education. 
Those resisting change have mounted a variety of arguments. One of the most common 
emerging recently is based on the notion that a neoliberal model is being forced on the 
country by foreign interests. The argument is that foreign actors, led by the International 
Monetary Fund and the World Bank, are forcibly imposing a cruel and inappropriate model 
on national educational systems. According to this argument, the motive for this model is to 
cut public spending, reduce teaching only to narrow, vocational topics that can be measured 
by tests, and shift education away from the public sector and into private hands. It is argued 
that the neoliberal model tends to be totally insensitive to national conditions and goals and to 
the needs of the poor. The discussion is often dominated by catch phrases — such as 
privatization and competition — which are assumed to refer to things so objectionable as not 
to even merit serious consideration (CEA 1997). 
This is of course a powerful argument. It arouses fears of foreign encroachment on national 
autonomy and fears of sacrificing education for financial gains. The issues are often 
presented in highly emotional terms that divide disputants into two sharply divided camps — 
one good and one bad — and that make reasonable discussion and consensus-building almost 
impossible. Too often, the result has been conflict and stalemate. 
Even more striking is the extent to which the current debate about educational reform is 
dominated by the traditional suppliers of public education — heads of state, the ministries of 
finance, planning, and education, and the teachers' unions. As striking is how little the 
consumers of public education — parents, students, and employers — participate in the 
debate. This state of affairs is simple enough to explain. Traditional systems of public 
education have created strong vested interests. Ministries of education control power and 
jobs. Well-organized teachers' unions hold a national monopoly on teaching positions. 
Politicians often control patronage within the educational system. These groups constitute a 
powerful political force in education; they benefit directly from the existing system and have 
strong incentives to resist change (Hausman 1994; Montenegro 1996; IADB 1996). The 
teachers' unions also have a powerful mechanism — the strike — to influence educational 
policy. 
Of course, the consumers of education also have interests at stake. But their interests are less 
direct and less visible, and they have fewer mechanisms to defend their interests. Most have 
little information about educational policy and no experience discussing it. The business 
community, traditionally unex-posed to international competition, has paid little attention to 
public educational policy. Middle- and upper-class parents generally send their children to 
private schools and do not have to suffer the deficiencies of public education. Thus, these 
groups — which control decision-making in public educational policy in most countries — 
have no compelling incentive to improve the quality of public schools; their interests are not 
directly at stake. The poor have no choice but to send their children to local public schools, 
regardless of their quality, and possess few mechanisms to influence educational policy. As a 
result, most of the effective interest in public educational policy in Latin America is with the 
suppliers of education, rather than the consumers. The supply has to a significant extent 
become the demand. 
Today, then, the growing forces seeking to reform schools in Latin America and the 
Caribbean have come face to face with powerful vested interests in traditional approaches to 
education. Despite considerable initiative, new thinking, and serious effort, fundamental 
changes have often been stymied. A major political battle is holding up reform. Genuine, 
pressing needs to improve education are going unmet. 
Conclusion: issues and possible solutions 
Several issues have emerged in the debate about educational policy in the Americas that merit 
consideration by governments and others concerned with making schools better. First, it is 
important to realize that new ideas are not the problem. Schools are very conservative 
institutions. New approaches are crucial to making sure that they do not fall behind in their 
mission. The availability of information and experience, foreign or otherwise, provides an 
extraordinary opportunity to identify promising approaches and to speed up eventual 
improvements. The Luddite impulse, which is so common in the debate on reform, needs to 
be firmly resisted. Governments should make it clear that good ideas are welcome, whether 
they come from a local municipality, Thailand, or France. 
That does not mean that all new ideas are good, however. Governments also need to take a 
critical approach to new ideas and an experimental approach to applying them. Governments 
need to have a strong technical capacity to evaluate experience elsewhere, determine which 
innovations hold the most promise, and adapt them to local needs and conditions. 
Governments also need to recognize that introducing even the most promising of new ideas 
can be extraordinarily difficult and requires great care. That means establishing — inside or 
outside government — a solid cadre of national technical advisors who can deal with foreign 
technocrats on even terms. These cadres should be charged with identifying promising new 
approaches, adapting them to local conditions, and devising strategies to introduce them, 
monitor their implementation, and adjust them as needed. New ideas may be good, but 
governments need to make them their own. 
Second, the terms of the debate need to be changed. Too much time is spent debating policies 
in terms of their associated ideologies, models, and backers. Whether an innovation is leftist 
or neoliberal, market or nonmarket, or promoted by teachers' unions or by the World Bank is 
beside the point. None of these labels reflects the real priorities of schools. Most of these 
labels are distractions, designed to promote the agenda of one or another vested interest. 
Instead, governments should insist that learning be placed at the centre of the debate, 
followed closely by equity and efficiency. Policy innovations should be judged first in terms 
of their probable impact on learning. If they improve learning, they deserve consideration, 
regardless of their source or associated ideology. Similarly, policies should be assessed in 
terms of how they affect equity — a major problem for most Latin American societies — and 
whether they promote the more efficient use of scarce resources. Only by keeping an eye on 
the goals of learning, equity, and efficiency are governments likely to successfully negotiate 
the rising claims of diverse interest groups. 
Third, governments need to add a political dimension to their efforts to reform education. The 
dominant approach to reform — in which technocrats come up with new policies and 
governments adopt them — is simply inadequate. Instead, there needs to be a process in 
which stakeholders from all parts of civil society — parents, business leaders, churches, the 
media, labour unions, and professional associations — participate in setting goals for the 
educational system and in discussing policy options. Emphasis should be on the kinds of 
schools needed to enable a country to achieve its social and economic objectives. The process 
should include agreement on how to measure progress toward the goals selected and 
participation by stakeholders in monitoring progress. 
This applies particularly to teachers, who have always been excluded from reform planning 
and have responded with fierce resistance. But it also applies to the consumers of education, 
particularly parents and employers, who traditionally have little information about schools 
and have not played an important role in calling for better education. By building broad 
agreement on problems and ways to address them, governments can help create a crucial 
element in making reforms succeed: a more sophisticated demand for education (Reimers and 
McGinn 1997). Once policy decisions have been made, their character and merit should be 
explained to the country, including the use of the media to reach a broad audience. The public 
needs to understand why certain policies have been chosen, how they relate to national goals, 
and what these policies are supposed to accomplish. The public also needs to realize that 
progress will take time, that quick fixes are uncommon in education. Even the most 
compelling reforms need to be marketed. 
Fourth, DAIs need to use less prescription and more discussion in working with countries. 
They need to pay more explicit attention to the political obstacles that governments face in 
promoting reform and help devise appropriate strategies to address them. DAIs should find 
ways to reach a broader range of education stakeholders — particularly those outside 
government. DAIs should also recognize the need in most cases to adapt and adjust new 
approaches. This does not mean that DAIs should sacrifice technical excellence for political 
expediency; rather, they should recognize that technical excellence often has important 
political prerequisites and that failing to address these prerequisites places technical 
excellence in jeopardy. 
The unprecedented challenges to traditional school systems have made education a 
remarkably dynamic sector of national policy-making in Latin America and the Caribbean. 
But real improvement will depend not only on the quality of new ideas but also on the quality 
of the implementation strategies that governments devise. Only governments that work with 
broader sectors of civil society to develop a clear vision for their schools and address 
intelligently the serious political obstacles that stand in the way of change are likely to make 





WHAT TYPE OF SOCIAL-POLICY REFORM FOR WHAT KIND OF 
SOCIETY? 
Daniel Morales-Gómez and Mario Torres A. 
Social policies are undergoing radical reform. The agendas leading these changes show 
similar characteristics across sectors, countries, and regions. At the same time, the 
experiences to date show considerable differences in the implementation and impacts of these 
changes. Reform efforts include the privatization of education, health, and social-security 
services; moves toward market-oriented provision of social services; decentralization and 
deconcentration of services, relying on local governments and communities for their delivery; 
establishment of fee-for-service schemes; targeting of social provision to specific 
populations; and increased bottom-up participation in policy design and implementation. 
The inspiration for these changes no longer rests with the welfare-state model of the 1940s 
and 1950s (Taylor-Gooby 1991; Hunsley 1992; Moon and Dixon 1992). Quite the contrary, 
the drive to reform public policies in the social sectors has its source in a philosophy of 
economic liberalism (Saul 1995; Vilas 1996; Petras 1997). Today, the reform of public 
policies in general, and of social policies in particular, is only one expression of what some 
argue is the rise of a new development paradigm that is redefining the role of the nation-state. 
One of the main expressions of this neoliberalism is the implementation of programs for 
economic reform based on the liberalization of prices, deregulation of markets, elimination of 
subsidies, elimination of trade barriers, privatization of state operations, and opening up of 
competition at all levels. Other manifestations include new forms of economic integration 
and partnerships and free-trade agreements assisted by increasing economic globalization, 
freer capital-investment flows across countries, heavier dependence on the role of 
information and communication technologies, and greater movement of labour across borders 
(UNRISD 1997). 
In this scenario, social-policy reform is one component of an international development-
policy agenda attempting to address a wide range of issues, including employment, poverty, 
low standards of human and social development, the negative conditions affecting particular 
population sectors, and economic growth. Many countries are thus under increasing 
transnational pressure to respond to complex development demands, in addition to those 
affecting their national economies. In part, because of the recognition of social development 
as an integral dimension of economic growth and, in part, because of changes in the role of 
the nation-state, governments have to respond to demands for more and better human and 
social development — demands that originate not only from within their national borders but 
also from transnational sources. Public policies are thus less and less an exclusive domain of 
the nation-state as defined by territorial or cultural boundaries. Many questions are raised by 
this phenomenon. Three seem to be at the top of the list: What is the meaning of current 
policy-reform approaches in the context of globalization? What is known about the effects 
and impacts of ongoing experience in social-policy reform? What kind of society are these 
new policies likely to create? 
Globalization and transnational influences 
Some of the lessons drawn from Africa, Latin America, and Southeast Asia show that 
addressing questions raised by globalization requires one to revisit the meaning of 
globalization in light of its impacts on human development. These lessons also show a need 
to acknowledge that most of the factors that shape globalization today are not new. In various 
forms and ideological expressions, the role of capital flows, trade, and geopolitical relations 
between countries at different development stages have been present since the emergence of 
imperialism in the past century (Magdoff 1969; Bukharin 1973; Petras 1978). 
What today is labeled globalization is the expression of a complex net of power relations 
between nation-states, perhaps only with broader and deeper ramifications than in the past. 
Thus, for example, despite the importance attributed to structural adjustment as a set of 
measures driving policy reforms, in the broader picture they are no more than a set of 
conditional measures reflecting relations of power between rich and poor countries that are 
different from those imposed by economic, political, and cultural imperialism in the past. The 
perception that nation-states have less power than before because of globalization is also 
relative. The history of this century is full of examples documenting how vulnerable political 
and economic systems are when examined in light of power relations between developed and 
developing economies. The colonial history of countries in Africa and that of the dependence 
of Latin America on more developed economies reinforce this view. 
What is new about globalization and its transnational dimension in the late 1990s is the 
rapidity with which globalization is taking place and the depth of its effects on the makeup of 
societies. This is due, in part, to the collapse of the East–West divide and, in part, to an 
unprecedented revolution in information and communication technologies, which is speeding 
up the effects of two fundamental features of globalization: the liberalization of trade and the 
rapidity of capital flows (Tanaguchi and West 1997). The depolarization of the world has 
resulted in the transformation of traditional centre–periphery relations, making them truly 
transnational. Yet, at another level, there is a new depth and scope to the impacts of these 
transnational forces. With primary emphasis on the economic, political, and military relations 
between more and less powerful countries, the forces of globalization reach areas that until 
recently were strictly national domains. In essence, transnational influences are directly 
affecting the capacity of societies to shape their basic social-provision systems, the 
mechanisms protecting their cultural identity, and the values underlying their national 
development plans and forms of governance. 
To an extent, globalization is a label identifying yet another more subtle and complex but no 
less evident process of social transformation at the end of the 20th century. Ultimately, 
globalization represents a process of profound penetration of local ethical systems by a set of 
values brought about and sustained by economic imperatives, trade, and mass 
communication. In this context, the impacts of transnational influences on countries' 
vulnerability are more likely to be perceived as long term or irreversible than when the 
effects of globalization are reduced to a purely economic dimension. Nowhere is this more 
evident today than in the transformations of the public policies and systems on which social 
and human development depend. 
Although this is not the first time in history that powerful ideas and values have been key 
ingredients in relations between countries and between cultures, today the recipient societies 
seem to offer more fertile ground for them to take root. The values, ideas, images, and goals 
underlying transnational influences portray an abstract, ideal society, where economic 
progress, technological development, social upward mobility, and individual success blend 
together as an appealing, short-term, achievable objective. The only requirement for this ideal 
society to become a reality is the desire and willingness of its citizens to change and to adjust 
their social structures, institutions, and political and economic practices to a predefined blue-
print that belongs to no particular nation or culture. This penetration of local value systems is 
assisted by the wide spread signs of a successful capitalist system. For some, this is 
encapsulated in the notion of a "new world order," framed in a neoliberal ideology, which 
presents itself as sustained by and promoting value-neutral goals of efficiency, order, and 
democracy, equal opportunity for success, open access to knowledge, free flows of capital, 
and new forms of partnership based on more horizontal power relations. 
These pressures on the large majority of the world's population in the South have an impact 
that can no longer be explained solely as an outcome of underdevelopment. Globalization is a 
two-way street. Explosive demographics in developing countries, for example, are forcing 
traditional local structures to change. Because of these numbers, the effects of poverty, 
alienation, and social exclusion in developing countries have spillover effects on wealthier 
countries. It is difficult to ignore, for example, that the rural–urban social and economic 
structures in the South are overflowing with millions looking for opportunities for a better 
social and political niche. This has dramatic impacts on political institutions, cultural 
practices, solidarity systems, forms of governance, and labour markets. Tade Aina (this 
volume) and Kwaku Osei-Hwedie and Arnon Bar-on (this volume) show that the 
combination of population growth and limited resources in Africa is one of the factors at the 
root of the development crisis in that continent. To a lesser extent, this is also true in 
countries the world over. 
However, some transnational influences are positive. International pressure for minimum 
environmental standards, basic human rights, and minimum provision of essential services — 
such as those needed to provide immunization, nutrition, and literacy — are positive 
transnational influences. Nevertheless, the combined effects of globalization forces on 
developing countries are likely over the long term to weaken rather than strengthen the 
capacities of these countries to make independent policy decisions. 
Although globalization brings about increased interdependence between countries at different 
stages of development, this process may make developing countries in the periphery more 
vulnerable. Andrés Pérez Baltodano (this volume) argues that globalization reduces the 
capacities of modern societies both to overcome contingencies and to provide citizens with a 
sense of "ontological security." This is particularly relevant to understanding the ways 
transnational influences are reshaping social policies in developing countries. In a globalized 
world, the state has less capacity to create social safety nets without either external assistance 
or drastic cost-saving measures. This is the case for many developing countries, where the 
welfare state has been traditionally weak or nonexistent and where there is no welfare-state 
institutional base to minimize the impacts of social-policy reforms induced from outside their 
borders. 
The current drive to change the social-policy agenda is, in part, an effort to adapt policies on 
the assumption that economic growth would be staged and demographic growth would be 
slow and, in part, an effort to bring existing human and social capital up to the levels of 
economies and productive systems operating globally rather than locally. However, 
globalization is taking place in a world in which economic growth has been inequitable and 
demographic trends have been explosive. In this context, globalization has differential effects 
on the makeup of social policies, depending on the case and conditions of the affected 
countries and their status in the world economy. In this regard, Luis Ratinoff (this volume) 
argues that the vulnerability created by globalization is not the same for all societies. For 
developing countries, it is likely to be even harder, as they need to deal with previously 
existing conditions of dependence, scarcity of resources, and lack of control over policy 
decisions and instruments. However, even if globalization makes states more vulnerable and 
dependent on external factors, the state is institutionally in most cases still the only 
instrument for mediating the impacts of this process on societies. 
One of the public-policy challenges emerging with globalization is thus to make the state 
more effective and efficient in its role as mediator of transnational forces and still effectively 
promote social and human development. Another no less critical challenge is to make private 
interest into a positive force in social change. Globalization may provide access to new 
resources of capital, technology, knowledge, and people, but even in such circumstances, 
transnational influences represent quite different opportunities, depending on the case, and 
may lead to very different social-policy systems. 
The meaning of social-policy reform 
Some of the chapters in this book have shown that the notion of social-policy reform conveys 
different meanings in different settings to different actors. Although policies that address 
social development and basic needs have been in place in various forms in the modern state, 
the view that these policies are part of an interrelated public-policy system is relatively 
recent. The need to look at public policies from an integrated perspective is partly a need to 
minimize the predominance of economic policies in setting development goals. In part, it is 
also the result of predicating as a universal model the pattern of state–civil-society 
interactions born out in industrialized, developed countries. 
In light of this, social-policy reform today has at least two predominant meanings. On the one 
hand, the notion of social-policy reform serves as a value framework and orientation 
regarding the governance of the systems responsible for equity and social justice. On the 
other hand, social-policy reform is seen as an ongoing process of change in a number of 
public policies and programs, with a view to readapting, changing, or eliminating them 
through efficient and effective technical solutions. According to the former view, social-
policy reform is a value orientation guiding public-policy decisions concerning allocation of 
resources. According to the latter, it is a de facto readaptation of selective public policies to a 
new pattern of sociopolitical organization no longer based on the welfare-state model; the 
concern is now with the introduction of corrective measures in a governance system to 
change the design, objectives, or forms of delivery of social-policy programs, seeking greater 
efficiency and a closer and more effective response to the problems of vulnerable groups. 
Often, these two meanings complement each other and set the profile and the direction of 
various approaches to public-policy reform. 
Common to most approaches to social-policy reform in the West in the 1980s and 1990s is 
the rejection of the welfare-state model. The classic portfolio of social-support systems has 
changed, including the principle of universality, a central-government management system, 
free-access to basic services, and state-driven provision of key services such as education, 
basic health care, and social security. This is happening despite the differences in the 
modalities and significance of the welfare-state model from country to country and between 
developed and developing countries (Lynn 1992; Esping-Andersen 1994; Muller and Wright 
1994). In most of the developing countries, the classical welfare-state model never 
materialized to the extent that it did in the North. In other countries, as in postcolonial Africa, 
where it was more a theoretical-political construct than a feasible policy option, the welfare 
state was never fully present. In other regions, such as in Latin America, some countries 
enjoy advanced welfare-state models. Despite this diversity, policy reform has acquired 
fundamental importance in the management of public-policy systems. The notion of social-
policy reform thus provides a conceptual and analytical framework for examining the 
relationships between different approaches to dealing with the management and redistribution 
of social and economic capital. 
At this point, it is useful to distinguish between the concepts of social-policy reform and 
social reform. Social policies are instrumental to social reform, which is a broader process. 
Social reform is defined by international agencies, such as the Inter-American Development 
Bank (IADB) and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), as the policies, 
specific instruments, and processes to incorporate all sectors of the society into the process of 
growth in a context of better welfare (BID–PNUD 1993). In this regard, policies and policy 
instruments to achieve a more equitable distribution of the benefits of economic growth, the 
progressive incorporation into society of excluded sectors, and the adequacy of the supply of 
and demand for goods and services for the satisfaction of basic needs and for human 
development are key components of social reform. 
Social reform involves the promotion of equity through a broad system of public policies, 
approaches, institutions, and services to provide opportunities for all. Social-policy reform is 
one means to doing this more efficiently and effectively. In this sense, social reform and 
social-policy reform are more than just actions taken for the sake of the poor or just the 
means to transfer resources to alleviate social problems (Iglesias 1993). Both are ways to 
reach a broader goal: to make society intrinsically more equitable and just. If this is accepted 
as a point of departure in conceptualizing social-policy reforms, it becomes of great 
importance to determine the type of society pursued by a reform process and the types of 
policy put in place to achieve it. What should the societal aim guiding the agenda of social 
reform be? This is the main question. 
Social-reform processes with single-issue agendas — such as modernization, fiscal balance, 
improved quality of life in urban centres, the environment, creation of productive 
employment, or improved quality of labour — are often insufficient (Emmerij 1993a), and 
they are unlikely to lead to sustainable change. Some critics would even argue that single-
issue policy reforms currently implemented, for example, in economics, the environment, 
education, and health are not conducive to social reform over the long term but respond to 
short-term political objectives. In this regard, the integration of social-policy reform plays a 
critical role. 
Framework and dimensions of social-policy reform 
In light of the above, the current notion of social-policy reform must be understood broadly 
as the process of global trends changing the parameters of the welfare state in its various 
versions in both developed and developing societies through sectoral public-policy 
approaches and specific governance measures, such as targeting, decentralization, fees for 
service, and privatization. This view of social-policy reform, however, must be placed within 
the framework of the values it promotes and the various dimensions of its implementation. 
A value framework 
The current approaches to social-policy reform are oriented to a large extent by the goals of 
neoliberalism. This, in turn, rests on a value system that emphasizes reliance on the market's 
capacity to stimulate higher levels of performance in public-investment decisions and in the 
provision of social services. 
A central argument for this approach is that by relying on market mechanisms for the 
satisfaction of basic needs and for the allocation of resources governments can 
simultaneously achieve several desirable objectives. First, the market allows a government to 
attain intrinsic social benefits from the free competition between the supply of and demand 
for social services. The underlying assumption is that the market naturally selects the best, the 
cheapest, or the most convenient service. Second, the market is the easiest way to mobilize 
available resources from profit and nonprofit organizations. Implicit is the view that under 
other circumstances these resources would not be channeled to meet social goals or to the 
target groups. Third, the market leads to the development of independent citizens with a 
capacity to make choices based on individual preference. The assumption here is that the 
market promotes the free consumption of social-sector services and avoids clientelism, 
dependence on state provision, and, ultimately, waste. 
The utopianism of globalization rests on the belief that open markets will eventually 
destabilize the oppressive conditions causing poverty and exclusion. In practice, however, 
this view of the role of the market is misleading. Although trade serves as an avenue for 
innovation, one needs to distinguish between the ideal of the free exchange of goods and 
services and the actual existence of markets open to all population sectors. Open markets in 
developing countries are more a project than a reality. The utopianism of globalization rests 
on the view that markets are open, at least in principle, to all members of society, with access 
limited only by taste, preference, or power to consume. In practice, in developing societies, 
one finds small, local, fragmented markets. It would be a mistake to consider the free flow of 
goods and services across borders as indicative of markets open to all social sectors for it may 
indicate only the circulation of merchandise among preexisting markets. 
The overall rationale for this thinking is based on a complex set of ideas about what makes a 
modern society work effectively and efficiently. For example, it is assumed to be a society in 
which political concerns favour social justice, one in which the majority of the population, 
particularly the poor, do not suffer most of the impact of fiscal overexpenditure caused by 
poorly functioning systems of social-service provision (MacKintosh 1995). In this scenario, 
the answer is to reduce costs by reducing expensive state bureaucracies and by relying on a 
mechanism — the market — to secure an unbiased minimum balance. A related view is that, 
in an increasingly global environment, facilitating long-term economic and social recovery is 
not just an internal, national responsibility. Countries must honour their debt and show 
efficiency in public management to avoid alienating the international financial community 
and the private sector, both with resources that are indispensable. A complementary view is 
that if abuse and waste are to be avoided, access to services may no longer be an inherent 
personal right. Rather, the community and the individual must take responsibility for their 
own welfare. This can be achieved in different ways: through direct participation, fees for 
service, or taking actions to avoid poverty becoming a way of life and therefore a permanent 
state of welfare dependence. These carrot-and-stick arguments are believed to make public-
system reforms a vehicle for the reduction in social spending and a way to demonstrate to 
investors that governments are reliable and have control over public expenditures (Moore and 
Robinson 1994). 
Therefore, according to the value system underlying the current approach, social-policy 
reform rests on three related conditions: that the state does not interfere in the allocation and 
management of resources for social spending; that it spends its resources effectively and 
efficiently; and that various of society's organizations are given opportunities to act and 
participate. If these conditions are met, then it is believed that the problems of social and 
human development would receive a better response than with older public-policy solutions. 
In practice, this social-engineering logic explains many reform attempts implemented in Asia, 
in Latin America, and, to a lesser extent, in Africa. Examples can be found of reforms 
involving the decentralization of educational spending and services. Some experiences with 
the process of decentralizing education from state to regional, provincial, or municipal 
governments in countries as distinct as Chile, Ghana, and the Philippines were driven by 
efficiency considerations but justified on the expectation that such moves would help to 
address the key problems of access to and quality of education. The assumption was that by 
having the main actors involved in the educational process — providers, users, and 
beneficiaries, including the private business sector — better arrangements would be found to 
cover existing demand, to monitor quality more closely, and to evaluate progress. In practice, 
however, evidence shows increasingly that this happens only rarely and that, to a large extent, 
it is because the capacity to undertake these tasks is not present (Samoff 1995). Attempts 
have also been made to privatize social-security systems (Guhan 1994; Paul and Paul 1995; 
Zhang and Zhang 1995; Mesa-Lago 1996). One of the underlying assumptions of neoliberal 
social-policy reform is that if pension funds are privatized, they will compete to give the best 
service, citizens will get directly involved in the administration of their own pension 
retirement plans — thus taking better care of their own future — and national systems will be 
determined independently of pressures from particular clients. However, experience in this 
area has been mixed, and in most cases it is still too early to assess the longer-term 
consequences of such changes. 
However, this set of values, adopted by many governments, raises strong reactions among 
sectors of civil society, in particular the community of nongovernmental organizations 
(NGOs), which holds that social justice should be the driving force behind government 
actions. These opposite views often present a serious dilemma in determining the rights and 
wrongs of today's public-policy changes. Although some voices argue that the collective 
values of social responsibility expressed in the welfare-state model should not be forgotten 
and that current social-policy reforms are producing more marginalization and exclusion 
(Lusting 1994; Stahl 1996), when it comes to balancing resources and demands, there are no 
clear-cut operational-policy options to be implemented at a national scale. A number of 
factors contribute to this dilemma. First, there is the power and influence of those promoting 
the market as a social-provision regulator. Second, it is so by default: none of the alternative 
proposals can fully satisfy the efficiency requirements proposed in the neoliberal 
development paradigm. Third, objective financial and political problems weigh against the 
viability of the welfare-state model in places where it has been operating. Fourth, the 
traditional alternative, the "real" socialist system, no longer appears to be an alternative. 
Understanding the values shaping current social-policy reform also provides a useful 
framework to situate the role of the political and technocratic elites in international 
organizations and in governments promoting policy reforms, as well as the role of civil 
society. To a large extent, the largest part of the populations affected by such reforms is often 
marginal to the debate or to the actual choices made to address the problems in social services 
and social-security systems, except for standard electoral political participation. In most 
developing countries, the majority of the population remains marginal to the management and 
evaluation of the national social-service system. This is the case despite noticeable advances 
during the last three decades, including advances in educational coverage, community health 
services, and the expansion of social-security systems (UNDP 1996). At the same time, it is 
common to find more and more people depending heavily on informal safety nets, relying on 
themselves or on informal systems for social services (Campbell 1993). This is happening 
even more in countries where social protection is not fully developed and where large sectors 
are not involved at all in formally sharing social benefits. This is, in part, because these 
population sectors have never been covered under any kind of welfare system and, in part, 
because they continue to rely heavily on traditional social safety nets operating parallel to any 
public system. 
Evidence shows that social-policy reform in the 1980s and 1990s has not directly involved 
the larger population sectors most affected by these policy changes. There are also indications 
that in many cases, processes of consultation have been primarily political exercises. 
Experiences to date show that the neoliberal values guiding the reform process are producing 
social exclusion at a time when the visibility of the poor, their political power at the ballots, 
and their capacity for social protest are greater than before (Bessis 1995). The political 
practices surrounding policy changes continue to be unaccountable; corruption in the public 
administration remains a persistent problem; and the dominant attitude of some elite groups 
toward the existing inequity is indifference. 
As the debate regarding the value system behind social-policy reform is complex, one may 
prefer to look at the empirical dimensions of the processes of social-policy reform. Several 
questions can be raised. Should efficiency be the predominant goal of public-policy reforms? 
Are the market and competition improving the quality, quantity, and relevance of social 
services? Is the market capable of serving as a vehicle to respond to basic needs with less 
waste and greater effectiveness? Are the values of competition and self-reliance conducive to 
a citizen's ethos that is more sensitive to equity and sustainable development? Is it realistic to 
rely on individuals' and communities' capacities to improve social-service provision, even 
when resources are limited? Empirical studies to respond to these questions are difficult to 
find but may help in identifying policy options and analyzing the practical implications of the 
values underlying current social-policy reforms. From a research perspective, there is a need, 
for example, to follow up on the implementation of sector-specific reform processes and the 
extent to which they may be exacerbating existing contradictions between pervading poverty, 
calls for less public involvement in social-service provision, and the prevalence of political 
and economic practices insensitive to growing social needs. 
Social-policy reform as an ongoing process 
Although social-policy reform is a fact in many countries, the adoption of this agenda is not 
an exclusive outcome of recent economic pressures to deal with decreasing fiscal resources, 
nor the sole outcome of growing basic-needs demands. The shifts in existing social-policy 
paradigms in most countries reflect a more complex combination of factors that has evolved 
over time. In addition to economic and social pressures, we are witnessing the combined 
effect of demographic, technological, cultural, and political changes that have radically 
transformed the context in which the welfare-state model emerged after World War II. 
Changes in population growth in developing countries, in the age structure of their 
populations, and in their epidemiological profile, coupled with increasing urbanization, 
democratization, massive rural–urban migration, growing complexity of public 
bureaucracies, and persistent social and economic inequities, have all eroded the conditions 
permitting the existence of the welfare state. In developing regions with a relatively long state 
tradition, such as Latin America, the implementation of the welfare-state model advanced 
considerably in some countries. In Argentina, Chile, and Uruguay, for example, the model 
was implemented through particularistic mechanisms for the integration of social groups. In 
countries such as these, public officials, unions, selected artisanal groups, the military, or 
some sectors of the urban work force had social services available to them through different 
institutional regimes for public education, health care, social security, and pensions. 
Retirement and pension plans, for example, were different for workers and public servants. 
Today, however, this kind of "particularistic" approach is no longer feasible. Social structures 
have changed in spatial, sectoral, and occupational terms in the last 50 years, and there are 
competing demands for limited resources. This evolution of development in social-protection 
systems gives fertile ground for national and transnational pressures to reform public-policy 
systems. The need for reform, a product of the evolution of social-support mechanisms 
typical of postwar welfare systems, adds an important dimension to the assessment of the 
public-policy changes occurring in many countries today. 
Within this perspective, social-policy reform results from a number of policy and program 
decisions involving various modalities of financing, managing, or delivering services in 
education, health, social infrastructure, shelter, social security, and welfare programs tailored 
to particular groups in need. In many cases, these changes are not introduced or debated in 
the framework of a formal approach to reform but are part of regular government operations 
or decisions made as a part of a larger public-policy package, with little public debate. In 
other cases, these types of change are debated and even decided by referendum but often 
taken in isolation from the broader public-policy realm. In yet other cases, these changes are 
not targeted directly but introduced as part and parcel of macroeconomic policy changes, 
such as in several countries in Africa during the last 20 years (Gruat 1990; Ponte 1994; 
Ardington and Lund 1995). 
Experiences with decentralization of educational and health services, the privatization of 
social-security systems, and the targeting of antipoverty programs are as varied as the 
countries where these forms of social provision have been implemented. Chile, China, Ghana, 
and Viet Nam provide common as well as quite different lessons (IDRC 1996; Osteria 1996; 
Konate 1997). In countries where social-policy reform results from the evolution of existing 
social-protection systems, the social-policy agenda is driven by a broad combination of 
factors, including public demands, political expediency, internal pressures from interest 
groups, international loan conditions, or simply the need to update existing social-protection 
systems. Often, the evolutionary change of social-protection systems leads to changes that 
involve a range of programs at different stages of implementation. These changes are often 
mediated by the capacity of the civil society to move toward more advanced and mature 
stages of social-protection policy. Brazil, Chile, and Colombia and some of the "tigers" in 
Southeast Asia are examples of countries where this process has been fairly smooth. In Chile, 
though, many of the major changes to national social policies began under political 
dictatorship, with political parties, unions, and other popular organizations under government 
control, thus making civil-society dissent almost impossible. This casts doubt on the 
replicability of the "Chilean miracle." In some countries, however, the population resisted 
drastic changes in social-policy systems, even as part of a routine process of improving those 
that already existed. In Bolivia, Uruguay, and Venezuela, for example, the reform of the 
pension system was rejected or opposed by the population and the unions. Similar examples 
of this are found in Kenya and Zimbabwe. 
Even if the natural evolution of social-policy systems is accepted as a dimension of public-
policy reform, there is still a growing feeling that in today's global circumstances, we suffer a 
profound lack of knowledge about what is really going on. This is not only something felt in 
civil society. Development banks are inquiring about the real impacts of loans supporting the 
reform of social policies or the implementation of social programs following the new 
parameters, especially those for which one can cite no precedents or formal and 
representative assessments of success. Vast amounts of money are spent with uncertainty 
about the impacts of these investments. We have no clear response to questions such as the 
following: Who benefits and loses with these changes? What are the enduring measurable 
outcomes? What are and how can one address the expected and unexpected impacts? What is 
lacking is the systematic assessment of the expected and unexpected results of the new policy 
approaches in the short and long term. In other words, we lack extrinsic evaluations. At the 
same time, it is important to highlight that evaluations of social programs in terms of their 
objectives — intrinsic evaluations — are not scarce. 
THE EFFICIENCY DIMENSION — Efficiency is a central goal of the neoliberal proposal for 
social-policy reform and an expression of the value system promoting it; this dimension 
requires special attention (Schelager 1995). The "efficiency dimension" in social-policy 
reform responds to an instrumental view of social policies vis-à-vis economic policies. 
Social-policy reform in this framework is a means to establishing a fiscally balanced, globally 
competitive economy with low inflation, low unemployment, and a minimum of well-
functioning and cost-effective mechanisms for social protection. Accordingly, two criteria are 
used to assess social-policy performance: low cost and high potential for capital gains. If at 
any point the social-policy system contravenes these criteria, social policies need to be 
changed. 
In this framework, social-policy reform is an instrument to reinject efficiency into the 
economy through a variety of mechanisms aimed to change the management and governance 
of social-sector systems and the services they provide. In industrialized countries, the 
argument is as follows (OECD 1997, p.6): existing social policies were designed for a period 
when there was full employment, when families were stable, and where the 
most pressing social concern was to ensure that the elderly could benefit from 
the fruits of economic growth by using taxes to transfer income to them from 
the working-age population. 
This is no longer the case. The family and the labour market as a base for the welfare state 
have suffered drastic changes. The phenomenon of jobless growth is critical to any 
government's capacity to maintain systems of reasonable social protection while keeping 
costs low and capital accumulation high. The conclusion is that existing social policies are 
essentially inefficient: it costs too much to deliver them; they do not produce the quality of 
outcome required by the economy; they often involve waste as they are insufficiently fine-
tuned to help those most in need; and in an environment driven by market mechanisms, social 
services should not be protected from the dynamic of supply and demand. Accordingly, steps 
must be taken to lower costs and increase efficiency. 
In most attempts to reform social-policy systems, the efficiency dimension is a driving force. 
Among the telling examples are the reforms of pension systems in Latin America (Uthoff 
1995; Mesa-Lago 1996; Siri 1996; Osorio and Ramirez 1997); the reform of the social-
security system in China (Zhang and Zhang 1995); and the reforms of the health system and 
social safety net in South Africa (Gruat 1990; Bhorat 1995; Pillay and Bond 1995). A 
frequently encountered view is that economic efficiency and social welfare are somehow 
opposite forces. It has taken several years of attempting structural-adjustment measures with 
dubious outcomes for governments and for international financial institutions (IFIs) to realize 
that adding a "human face" to reform, making the reform processes more participatory, or 
strengthening social safety nets to enhance human capital are not detrimental to the capacity 
of economies to adjust or of societies to grow (Blank 1993). We have, however, still a long 
way to go. Governments and IFIs need to realize that making only their discourse more 
sensitive to social- and human-development goals is not enough; it is not enough if the policy 
measures implemented change only in the letter. 
On the positive side, concern with the efficiency dimension has brought about new ways of 
looking at both the direction and the content of social policies, particularly in considering 
education, health, and social-security options. Pressure to make these systems more efficient 
has forced a range of actors from government and from civil society, particularly the private 
sector, to reconsider their roles in policy implementation and service delivery and define 
more focused expectations of these systems. 
THE TECHNICAL DIMENSION — The "technical dimension" of public policy takes at times a 
central role in shaping both the "what" and the "how" of social-policy reform. Because of the 
sensitive nature of social policies, both politically and in terms of social justice, often 
attention is mainly directed to the policy process. This tends to focus the debate on the 
technical value of policy blueprints, modeling exercises, formal political proposals, and the 
mechanics for coordinating public consultations and identifying social demands. 
When reform processes are approached from this angle, often concerns are focused on the 
most appropriate and technically efficient ways to provide education, basic health services, or 
social security; the most convenient mix of roles of individuals, institutions, communities, the 
market, and the state for the provision of these services; and the best models of programs to 
be replicated. This leads to a concentration on the technical management of proposals that 
range from state-dominant schemes to community-based arrangements, from highly regulated 
scenarios to free-market-oriented provision of services, or from social promotion to profit-
oriented arrangements. Although voices of opposition may always exist, what predominates 
is the opinion and evidence of a technical elite, who recognize no clear articulation of 
alternative options other than what "has been proven" or what "is based on hard scientific 
evidence." This can give the impression that there is no technically suitable alternative to a 
given policy option. 
Given the relatively elitist character of this dimension, the extent to which the affected 
populations are involved in the process of policy innovation and in the identification of 
concrete benefits of policy changes is a critical issue. The assumption is that some technical 
modalities affecting the management of policies or programs, or both, allow us to better 
address the issues of equity, equality, and social justice. Still, however, the degree to which 
the technical strength of policy proposals is decisive is unclear. Empirical evidence 
concerning the contribution of technical solutions to success is insufficient and highly 
debatable. 
IN SUM — The efficiency and technical dimensions of social-policy reform are not mutually 
exclusive. They are present to some degree in any process of social-policy reform. As such, 
they affect policy proposals, processes of implementation, evaluations, and policy 
recommendations. The differential weight of these dimensions contributes to making the 
understanding of the concept and the practice of social-policy reform difficult. It also 
contributes to making the analysis and assessment of outcomes and impacts arduous. We 
have therefore still a long way to go in understanding the effects of policy reforms on social 
and human development. Further research is required to answer questions such as the 
following: What type of emphasis in the reform of social policies is most suitable for 
reaching higher social development? What are the alternatives to the predominant neoliberal 
approach to public-policy reform and the value system it entails? Can the current social-
policy approaches create the capacities to learn and participate required for social and human 
development in the next century? Although it is difficult to find responses to these questions, 
they are urgently needed because long-term development possibilities continue to be 
compromised by ongoing policy changes affecting the provision of social services. A 
discussion of risks and opportunities brought about by the process of reform will further 
underline the need to assess the effects of these policy changes. 
Risks and opportunities 
If in a globalized world, the longer-term development goals are higher levels of social and 
human development, social-policy reform is a critical public-policy issue. This requires 
giving up the view that development is mostly the result of financial resources, technical 
capacities, good intentions, and dynamic national or international engines of innovation and 
progress. Part of the yet-undefined "new development paradigm" (Broad and Foster 1992) 
that seems to underlie current-reform approaches implies not only giving, in principle, a 
human face to development but also making it, in practice, a process of building decision-
making capacities that remain after the development agents move on. 
Achieving this in a framework of social-policy reform implies weighing the risks and 
opportunities that reform processes entail. It means examining how and with what degree of 
success social-policy reforms promote new value systems, generate new and more effective 
institutional arrangements, and develop more effective means to enhancing social 
participation, particularly at local levels. 
Who wins and who loses with the new value orientations? 
As argued throughout this book, the process of social-policy reform is an opportunity for 
carrying out more than just a series of technical changes of a given public-policy system. It is 
also an opportunity to change social-development values and perceptions, particularly in 
terms of the prevailing social ethos and people's individual values. 
Approaches to social-policy reform today take neoliberal social values as given. This is 
evident in the case of Latin American countries after the period of military regimes. Although 
many of these countries went into a process of redemocratization and reform of their public-
policy systems, including their social-sector policies, the predominant view of desirable 
change has been driven by neoliberal economic ideology (Petras 1997). Neoliberal values 
often represent different value options to those societies that have gone through a mix of 
collective, socialist, and traditional value systems as alternatives to the colonial or postwar 
liberalism in social-service provision. In such contexts, social-policy reform can become an 
opportunity to change the values orienting the social role of the state and the individual, 
promote new ways to distribute individual and public responsibilities, create new attitudes, 
including the view that market institutions and open competition are the most effective means 
to achieve greater private and public accountability. This includes reformed pension systems 
based on personal savings accounts and the creation of new attitudes in parents associations 
and consumer groups organized to monitor educational processes or the production of reliable 
goods and services. It is also important to recognize that such policy reforms exacerbate the 
unexpected consequences of neoliberal social values. These can translate into persistent 
conditions of poverty, a lack of commitment to the poor, financial speculation, proliferation 
of underground economies, and weakened traditional social safety nets. These traditional 
social safety nets become vulnerable to market fluctuations or to global trends and 
incertitude. How to take advantage of the opportunities and how to face these risks are 
questions yet to be addressed. 
Experiences across regions show that social-policy reforms tend to rest on and promote at 
least three neoliberal values. First, they promote the value of individual decision-making, 
rather than reliance on collective decisions. A desirable individual feature vis-à-vis the 
provision of social services is thought to be one of an educated consumer. The assumption is 
that if people make the right individual decision in the social-goods market, a selection will 
be made of the services that are most cost-effective and of the best quality. However, 
experience with the privatization of higher education in Chile showed that such measures can 
reduce individual decision-making and lower the quality of service (Espinola 1991; Tedesco 
1991). Experience indicates that individual selection processes are not necessarily smooth 
and that what is more likely to emerge is an array of poor-quality services to serve primarily 
the poorer sectors of the population. Second, these social-policy reforms promote personal– 
private, rather than state–public, responsibility, as the central motivation to organize and 
provide social services. Based on the principle that individual decision-making is key, 
personal responsibility is perceived to go hand in hand with the right to chose. Relying on the 
state for the provision of social services not only takes away from the individual the 
opportunity to choose but also removes from the social-services system itself the incentive to 
do better. Additionally, it is assumed that state provisioning of social services tends to build a 
fertile ground for abuse on the part of users and for poor quality on the part of providers. 
Third, these social-policy reforms promote participation as a means to generate citizen 
involvement in the process of public-policy decision-making, implementation, and 
evaluation. At one end, this forces traditional decision-making centres to be open to public 
scrutiny. At the other end, it universalizes the perception that popular participation and public 
consultation are effective mechanisms for policy change, though in practice empirical 
evidence shows that this is the case in only very few social settings. More often government 
bureaucracies are incapable of managing the diversity of consultation processes, and 
information on success is anecdotal (Malloy 1991). 
These value orientations, predominant in public policy-making today, are not new. In one 
form or another they have been at the core of Western development discourse since World 
War II, through the advocacy-for-democracy and the peace movements of the 1960s, the 
market-oriented economic development stream of the 1970s and 1980s, and the discourse of 
the 1990s on sustainable and human development. However, in at least two ways these value 
orientations show a novel twist. One is their predominance in the visions of a wide range of 
international organizations and conventions for which they have become part and parcel of 
the type of society they promote. The other is the strong reaction these values generate among 
a mix of groups, ranging from community-based organizations to religious and 
fundamentalist groups that are devoted to maintaining traditional structures and practices that 
may be incompatible with current social-policy reform. Although these influences can play 
determining roles in shaping social-policy reforms, it is unclear whether they can articulate 
social-policy models as true alternatives to the neoliberal social-policy reform. Global trends 
may prove stronger than expected in shaping social-policy reforms at national levels. 
Values do not exist in a vacuum. They affect and are affected by the relations of 
correspondence and contradiction that at different times reflect particular forms of social 
ethos and social, economic, and political conditions determining the development of a given 
society. These are key factors in the implementation of the neoliberal agenda of individual 
decision-making, personal responsibility, and citizen participation in many developing 
countries. In many instances, the neoliberal agenda is based on values that make no sense or 
represent no advantage to those most affected by the policy changes — the poor. Persistent 
unemployment, lack of opportunity, financial mismanagement, and corruption of public 
administrations, among other factors, create environments that easily become obstacles to the 
development of individual initiative, citizens' commitment to finding solutions to local 
problems, and even their willingness to accept greater responsibility. Most eroding are factors 
of abject poverty, unemployment, inequity, and corruption of the institutional and legal 
systems, which contribute to an atmosphere of total absence of social cohesion (Bessis 1995). 
This raises several questions in the analysis of the values underlying social-policy reforms: 
What are the preconditions for the successful adoption of the values implicit in social-policy 
reforms? Who shares the new values promoted by these reforms? Who is in a position within 
the social structure to take advantage of them? How can policy changes incorporate these 
types of consideration? 
Processes of reform go beyond particular technical considerations, specific sectors, or 
individual national or transnational pressures. Reforms need to be designed and planned in 
the context of broader goals for social development. Thus, for example, unless people make a 
major effort to change institutional practices — particularly in political and judicial circles — 
and introduce effective mechanisms for public accountability, the new values promoted by 
neoliberal reforms can easily degenerate into an opportunity for the privileged, rather than the 
poor. Experiences in this regard are multiple. Private financial groups, for example, have 
found the call for private-individual pension programs extremely encouraging, as they 
represent a highly profitable business. The opening up of the education market has brought 
about the proliferation of worthless education and training programs. And the privatization of 
health has institutionalized two-tier health-care systems. In most cases, these experiences 
show that individual decisions, personal responsibility, and citizen involvement make sense 
only if the process of policy change is open; the relevant information is available for 
decision-making; politicians and profit-oriented organizations are responsible and 
accountable; and space is given for people to have a say in public policy. Otherwise, the 
focus on reform becomes the cynical rhetoric of people and institutions with too much to win 
and too little to lose. 
Practical questions need to be addressed. At one level, we need to know what other values 
can complement and balance the assumptions of the reform approach and what kind of 
institutional arrangements are needed to make the realization of these values feasible. At 
another level, a series of questions can be raised related to social cohesion, which is central to 
the success of any change in the public-policy system. 
Policy reforms: social cohesion or "equitable" exclusion? 
Social cohesion is not just a value but a fact that is observable with social and economic 
indicators of equity and participation. In principle, social cohesion is the base of sustainable 
development. In practice, it is the glue keeping economically different sectors of society 
together in circumstances of rapid change. It is of great importance to understand the impacts 
on social cohesion of the new social-policy reforms. How, for example, can competition and 
individual decision-making strengthen or undermine social cohesion? Are societies 
traditionally oriented by values other than the neoliberal better able to maintain their 
mechanisms of social cohesion once reforms are introduced? How is social cohesion affected 
by neoliberal values at the level of individual behaviour, the family, and the community? Are 
these reforms building new forms of social cohesion? 
Responses to these questions are difficult. However, current trends in social-policy reform 
seem to make one issue clear. In a global environment, it is no longer possible to idealize the 
type of social cohesion promoted by the welfare-state model in most developing countries or 
in traditional, non-Western societies. Evidence cannot be ignored that the welfare-state model 
has advanced in a fragmented way and that only upper- and middle-class and selected popular 
groups have enjoyed real benefits (Lynn 1992; Esping-Andersen 1994; Muller and Wright 
1994). The welfare-state model matured only in a few developing societies, such as 
Argentina, Chile, and Uruguay. Most cases, however, show a series of common features: the 
rural and the poorest populations remained marginal in terms of access to key services 
provided by the welfare system; political expediency led to more attention being placed on 
coverage than on quality; the best services often went to the urban and most organized social 
groups; and systems were scarcely affordable. A typical outcome of these experiences in 
societies in which social policy was perceived to be a state responsibility was that individual 
and more collective social responsibilities were ignored. In many cases, statements like "it is 
not my responsibility, but the responsibility of the state" or "this is not my money but public 
resources" epitomize justifications for disregarding personal involvement in public or 
community issues or for demanding a more careful management of public funds. The 
advocates of neoliberal reforms argue that the new value orientations may correct this kind of 
reasoning and behaviour as they promote more reliance on a "responsible citizen and 
informed consumer." 
Global economic trends, a widespread economic crisis, and the global restructuring of labour 
markets have blurred the boundaries between social classes at the middle level and have 
deepened the polarization at the extremes of the social spectrum. The division between those 
with and those without opportunities not only persists but is even more profound than before. 
This is evident among the youth of lower socioeconomic strata and in countries where the 
middle class was traditionally a driving economic force. One of the consequences of this 
phenomenon is a widespread decline in solidarity values as reflected in the crisis of key 
social institutions, including the traditional family. Rates of family breakdown, one-parent 
families, and abandoned children have increased in developed and developing countries, 
bringing additional pressures on social-protection systems where they exist. 
Demographically, the proportions of socially and economically excluded populations and, in 
some societies, the aging economically active populations are likely to increase the burden on 
social-security systems in the years to come, to the point that public-support systems in their 
current form will be unfeasible. To expect the political pressure of transnational social- and 
human-development agendas or the market to turn this around is unrealistic at best. Market 
mechanisms are led by profit maximization and not by solidarity or principles of social 
equity, and international-solidarity agendas are often without the resources to implement 
corrective measures. 
A final critical implication of the current trends in social-policy reform and their values is in 
the area of social equity. Values implicit in the reforms encourage the marginal, the excluded, 
and the poor to take steps to mobilize their individual and community capacities to achieve 
greater equity. However, not much is said about the responsibility of the other sectors of 
society. There are few indications, for example, of the extent to which the new values are 
assumed by the members of the elites or the extent to which they inspire new actions from 
elites and privileged groups to promote more equity. Similarly, no clear cases with any 
significant results are to be found of reform processes in which local, dominant elites have 
demanded better income distribution or more affirmative action on social policies. Those few 
examples that can be found show quite the contrary. The latest figures for developing 
countries show that income distribution has improved very little in a few countries and that it 
has not improved at all or even worsened in the majority (World Bank 1995c, 1996). 
The lack of positive results, however, is not simply an issue of values per se. The 
globalization of the economy and the processes of regional integration are forcing capital to 
go elsewhere for profit opportunities. In this context, the reform perspective may be seen as 
an attempt to counterbalance some of the effects of globalization, as it argues for making 
improvements in the quality of social services and for making labour costs more competitive. 
In fact, this is one of the reasons cited to reform retirement, social-security, and pension-plan 
systems in many countries. The assumption is that if this is done, developing countries will 
be in a better position to compete and less vulnerable to global fluctuations. And, it is 
premised that, from an equity standpoint, the new value orientations may help to promote 
new opportunities for employment, income, and equity. However, these new values also risk 
contributing even further to the disregard for equitable income distribution and mechanisms 
to create opportunities for social cohesion and solidarity, for example. 
Policy reforms: alleviating or hardening the poverty? 
One of the most important implications of the new value orientation is a progressive 
reconceptualization of what is needed to alleviate poverty. In some cases, this has led to the 
design and implementation of poverty-alleviation programs as part and parcel of broader 
reform processes. However, the impact of these programs on poverty levels is unclear. In 
part, this could be the result of problems in the design and implementation of these programs. 
In part, it could be that the notion of programs targeted to alleviate poverty as a means to 
create social development is in itself flawed. 
Experiences with poverty-alleviation programs based on a transfer-oriented approach, 
whereby the goods and services required for subsistence are delivered to the poor directly, 
show mixed results. Often, a direct-transfer approach becomes less effective over time, as the 
benefits tend to dissipate in higher prices paid for services. Maintaining such programs is 
often beyond the fiscal capacities of virtually any developing country. In part, this is because 
of limited resources; it is impossible to adopt more differentiated approaches to enable the 
poor to decide on their own consumption patterns, based on their priorities and defined by 
their own circumstances and cultures. 
Although central to the neoliberal reform ideology, most direct-service delivery poverty-
alleviation programs ignore a central and potentially sustainable asset of the poor, their 
personal capacities. This is only partially related to education in the formal sense. Trained or 
otherwise, the income of the poor often depends on the products of life learning and the value 
of the services they can sell in the market based on the assets they have. In this regard, 
poverty in a market-driven society is to an extent a problem of the low quality of assets the 
poor can sell in the job market, low volume of market sales of these assets, or of low market 
prices. 
Experiences show that even within the context of neoliberal reforms, programs to alleviate 
poverty often fail to increase these assets. To do so, poverty-focused approaches to social-
policy reform would need to include measures to reach one or more of the following targets: 
• Increase the quality of assets of the poor, including but not limited to relevant 
education and training; 
• Increase the volume of their market sales, by generating a meaningful range of 
employment opportunities, including those in the informal sector; 
• Increase the prices of the services they sell, by increasing productivity through 
upgrading the quality of labour, expanding the range of complementary support 
services available to the poor and the community; and 
• Introduce productivity-enhancing technical change (Adelman 1986). 
Whether or not these are real options, the issue is that unless capacities are built among the 
poor and unless ethical and social practices are rooted in the local culture, attempts to change 
poverty and policy measures to alleviate poverty risk being ineffective. 
Empirical findings on "hard" poverty in some Latin American countries, such as Chile, show 
that poverty persists despite assistance programs. To many, this is the manifestation of values 
and practices corresponding to a culture of poverty that is difficult to change. In this sense, it 
could be argued that the new value orientation promoted in neoliberal reforms is an 
opportunity to change negative values among the poor by promoting more initiative and less 
dependence. To many more, however, this evidence shows that the problems of poverty are 
deeper and that the new values promoted by reform are a perfect political justification to 
blame the poor for all that happens to them and introduce measures that favour a small 
proportion of the population. 
 
 
Policy reforms: "universal" coverage with "segmented" quality 
Another implication of the values promoted in social-policy reforms is the issue of coverage 
and quality of social services. A key question is the extent to which greater reliance on 
individual choice and on market competition in practice improves coverage and quality of 
service. 
Despite problems of accountability and quality in most developing countries, considerable 
progress has been made in social-service coverage, thanks to what was being done under the 
welfare-state model. However, reform trends rest heavily on the assumption that open 
competition can do better. It is assumed that competition on the supply side and freedom of 
choice on the demand side will improve these two key social-policy aspects. The example 
often used is the progress made in several countries in education and, in some cases, in 
health-care services (Emmerij 1993b; Dillinger 1994; Bardhan 1995). Introducing modalities 
of public–private competition for schools or hospitals is perceived as a social innovation that 
may bring better services and eradicate the clientelism that plagues traditional and welfare-
state social-policy systems in most of the developing world. This is also proposed as an 
alternative in situations in which social policy and social-service systems have to be built 
from scratch. 
However, competition positively affects coverage and quality only in selected cases. 
Coverage is improved, for example, only if more people have access to the market, which is 
not always the case for the poor. In societies in which conditions of inequity are deeply 
rooted, the benefit of expanded coverage to the poor through competition is often 
counterbalanced by a decrease in quality. In a competitive service market, the poor may in 
principle have greater access to services, but in practice this happens at the lower end of the 
quality spectrum. Among the most common challenges in monitoring this type of situation is 
the lack of information, whether about the performance of services (for example, schools, 
clinics, pension plans) or about differential benefits (for example, different medical-insurance 
plans, market value of diplomas or social-protection schemes). This affects not only the 
assessment of reforms in these aspects but also the capacity of consumers to chose the best 
options. 
The underlying assumption of neoliberal social-policy reforms with regard to coverage and 
quality is that a service market is available with good choices and current information to 
allow the individual to make the right choice. However, countries where service provision 
has been liberalized show that market mechanisms may render good results in service 
provision only if at least three conditions are met: individuals can make informed choices; an 
ethos and regulatory system among producers exist to provide the best products and services; 
and institutional mechanisms are in place — including legal and administrative provisions — 
to ensure high quality and monitor the results. A critical question is whether these conditions 
exist in most developing countries. Because the answer is most likely to be no, the challenge 
is to develop them. 
The idea of markets open to all social sectors implies many things. For markets to operate 
within an equitable framework, the first requirement is to have legal regulatory institutions 
and effective enforcement mechanisms supported by a judiciary with the material and 
qualified human resources to monitor quality and fair competition. In a globalized world 
economy, most developing countries find themselves at a disadvantage in this regard. 
Second, each population sector needs the conditions for and the capacity to access the market. 
In part, the idea of a global society suggests that this is a reality. In practice, however, large 
sectors of the population, particularly the poor, remain excluded. The third requirement is 
information about what the market offers and the comparative advantages of different goods 
and services. Although this is at the reach of most sectors of the population, the opening up of 
markets through information has not so far been accompanied by better income distribution 
or more productive employment; thus the illusion of a utopian society is created that in actual 
practice is out of the reach of the large majority. 
It can be argued that the poorer the society, the more difficult it is to have effective market 
mechanisms. This is, in part, because information systems, democratic and participatory 
mechanisms, communication, and institutional and administrative procedures are also 
lacking. Competition for the provision of services, for example, can be promoted only on the 
assumption that a sufficient market capacity exists to offer a wide range of services and that 
some kind of system of rights for obtaining the benefits of such services is in place. This is 
not always the case in developing countries, where quality control of social services provided 
through market mechanisms is most probably highly speculative. 
New institutional arrangements: precipitated dismantling of the state? 
The emphasis on reform is also changing the character of the institutional frameworks 
supporting social policies. New institutional arrangements result from the reduction of the 
state's role in social-service provision, decentralization of financial and administrative 
functions to local entities, and the move to greater reliance on the private sector, particularly 
the profit-making organizations and NGOs. 
In many cases, these new arrangements overlap or enter into conflict with the institutional 
frameworks in place, which rest predominantly on the welfare-state model, such as in some 
countries in Latin America, or relying heavily on traditional structures at the community and 
family levels, such as in countries in Africa and in some countries in Asia. The new 
arrangements brought about by reforms appear in different contexts of state–civil-society 
relations and various degrees of maturity of market institutions. This makes the successful 
implementation of reforms more difficult. Thus, privatization of education and health care, 
for example, come to depend to a large extent on a capacity to develop a range of local-level 
institutions to provide the opportunities and a range of choices of good-quality education and 
health services accessible to those in need. Something similar happens with the establishment 
of new pension-plan systems that depend heavily on institutions to support and sustain them. 
Where this is not the case, the privatization of pension plans tend to put many people's life 
savings into the hands of private enterprise, without reliable mechanisms for control and for 
ensuring accountability. Experiences with decentralization, privatization, and delegation of 
responsibilities for the delivery of key services to lower levels of government show that 
social-policy reforms are highly likely to render more positive results if at least some type of 
state institution remains in place, local-government institutions are strong, and market 
institutions dealing with social goods and services are regulated. However, this is more often 
the case in more developed societies, large urban areas, or sectors more integrated into the 
global economy than in developing countries. 
A critical issue for assessment is the extent of the risks and opportunities across the whole 
spectrum of institutional situations accompanying social-policy reform. In terms of the 
impacts of reforms on the institutional arrangements supporting existing social-policy 
systems, for example, there is the risk of increasing the marginality and vulnerability of 
poorer sectors. Thus, given new pressures to reform, these processes may create conditions in 
which the poorest groups continue to exhibit little institutional capacity to have a say in the 
public-policy process. And, the reform processes may actually weaken the institutional 
structures in place for the poor. In some countries, this is the case with middle-class groups 
who have lost their political capacity to influence social demands. The reforms also risk 
promoting institutional arrangements that, in practice, increase the control of social assets by 
new local-level bureaucracies, making the services less accessible to those with less power. 
In such cases, the new policy-reform trends may decrease the vulnerability of the existing 
social-policy system to political clientelism, opportunism, or corruption but do so at the 
expense of excluding large sectors that could benefit from those services. 
A key question is, therefore, about the type of mechanisms required to ensure that new 
institutional frameworks for social policies — decentralization and privatization, in particular 
— attain their objectives, with a clear understanding of who gains and who loses in the 
process. It is also important to understand better how policy-reform processes can ensure that 
stakeholders have the opportunity to assert their rights and that new institutional actors fulfill 
their responsibilities. To an important degree, addressing these issues needs to take into 
account the new ways resources are generated and allocated, the ways decisions are 
accounted for, and the ways local institutional capacities are developed to accomplish the 
objectives of reform. 
The new institutional arrangements promoted by social-policy reform require new 
administrative procedures, financial modalities, information systems, mechanisms of 
accountability, and new forms of accessibility. How this happens and the outcomes depend to 
a large extent on the values guiding the reforms and on the range of new institutional 
procedures put in place to ensure the "success" of the new reform ideology. In this regard, it 
appears that the advocacy dimension of policy reform has until now led the discussion, with 
very little input from systematic evaluations of achievements and results. However, if the 
institutional-arrangement side of reforms is neglected, there is the risk of frustrated 
expectations of decentralization and privatization. 
Until now, there seemed to be considerable faith that key elements of the reform process 
would follow from the efficient market allocation of resources and a capacity to offer the best 
choice based on competition among providers. At the same time, however, very little 
attention is being given to the need to manage these new institutional arrangements. To many, 
the reliance on institutional market mechanisms to provide accessible and good-quality social 
services raises some major concerns. In some developing countries, the limited economic and 
administrative capacity of the state and the weak development of local governments make the 
regulation and monitoring of new institutional market mechanisms very difficult, particularly 
the monitoring of the intervening actors and the quality control. Even in a region with mature 
state structures, such as Latin America, experiments with decentralization and privatization 
are facing difficulties, such as the lack of institutional infrastructure to support the changes. 
One of the outcomes of this phenomenon is additional pressure on traditional organizations. 
It helps to look at the pros and cons of centralized versus decentralized and profit- versus 
nonprofit-oriented social-service provision. These are two of the key modalities of social-
service provision promoted in social-policy reforms that have direct institutional 
implications. To many, central-state management of social services was prematurely 
discarded. After the first push during the 1980s to find alternatives to state management of 
services, the incapacity of the state is becoming a self-fulfilling prophecy. After ongoing 
processes of reform, state agencies in many countries were dismantled because 
decentralization was advocated. State agencies suffered a devastating impact with the 
restructuring of public policies, in many cases losing their most valuable human resources 
and institutional and legal frameworks. There are several examples of this. A well-known 
case is the deterioration of public education in countries where delegation of responsibilities 
to municipalities and privatization were the norm. In some instances, these measures have 
created vicious circles for teachers who face decreasing salaries, increasing teaching hours, 
less attractive working conditions and protection, and a general degradation of the teaching 
profession. Ultimately, this impacts on the quality of education. The dismantling of 
educational systems by public policies directed to cut costs by reducing teachers' salaries and 
school resources and altering the institutional makeup of educational systems is beginning to 
provoke a serious crisis. If this happens, and the crisis takes root, it will take 20–30 years to 
find a solution (Rama 1993). In social policy, accumulation of gains and continuity of 
processes are essential. Periods of "no investment," when accumulation and continuity break 
down, are not as easy to recover from in social policy as in economic investment. Under these 
circumstances, little can be expected from decentralization if other public policies move in a 
different or opposite direction. Empirical evidence indicates that with very few exceptions, 
local entities are unprepared to carry out decentralized operations. This type of example is 
beginning to raise new questions about the need for central management to lead the processes 
of policy reform and ensure they are sustainable. 
Something similar happens with privatization occurring without clear market rules. To 
operate efficiently, markets require mature regulatory institutions, which, especially in 
developing countries, do not emerge spontaneously. Several examples show that in the 
absence of an effective state and central government, privatization is unfeasible. This is partly 
attributable to private investors' need for guarantees over and above the power of peers, 
competitors, or community-based institutions, supports at the root of the principle of private 
enterprise and fair competition. Examples of developing countries that have achieved steady 
economic growth and social development show that central and strong government capacity 
to lead the reform process is essential. It is not by chance that some of the most successful 
examples of privatization in developing countries are in authoritarian states. This obviously 
raises a number of questions. 
Even in an ideal situation, where the changes brought about by reform imply a move from 
state control to NGOs and traditional structures, the importance of centralized systems has 
not disappeared. The NGOs' record is in many respects good — on project administration, 
access to beneficiaries, development of innovative forms of program delivery, etc. — but 
there are also strong indications that NGOs depend very heavily on external sources of 
funding and are in most cases effective only at the microlevel. Traditional structures also 
have their difficulties. Although they may have a number of positive cultural, political, and 
economic characteristics at some levels, they are not always the ideal vehicle for providing 
social services. They are often subject to a variety of local pressures and discriminatory 
practices in terms of gender, race, ethnicity, and age. 
If nothing else, this shows that the institutional frameworks of the new social-policy reforms 
carry several risks, including the unnecessary dismantling of central-state agencies, the 
precipitated endorsement of private-sector management, the questionable reliance on NGOs, 
and the involvement of traditional actors and structures with no major evaluation of their 
weaknesses and strengths. In this context, the major opportunities still appear to be in more 
effective, efficient, universal, and democratic mechanisms for social-service provision, with 
adequate mechanisms to assess their performance. 
Social participation: asking too much from people? 
Current social-policy reforms promote institutional arrangements on the assumption that 
these new policy processes create the capacity among stake-holders to participate more 
directly in public policy and thereby enable people to have a greater say in decision-making. 
These new institutional settings are expected both to prevent clientelism and to overcome 
corporatism and thereby to better provide services and respond to broader demands. 
However, as an integral part of the political system or by default, in many developed and 
developing countries clientelism and corporatism are still the modalities by which the power 
structure — modern or traditional — responds to basic needs. 
The corporatist approach to social participation is ultimately about the social division of 
interests among groups with differential power to decide who gets what and when (Saul 
1995). In practice, this means that particular groups in society, owing to their position in the 
power structure and to the political mechanisms at their disposal, obtain greater benefits 
while others, at the bottom of the power scale, are more likely to face losses. By changing 
existing institutional arrangements, social-policy reforms are expected to provide alternatives 
and bring a balance that will improve coverage and access to social services through other 
mechanisms, including — at least, in principle — enhanced universal social participation in 
decentralized or privatized institutional delivery of social programs. 
In the experience to date, a key question is how is this expectation being met? It is strongly 
indicated that in corporatist systems, people who are not integrated in some way or who are 
marginal to existing social safety nets are likely to continue having little institutional capacity 
to put pressure on new social-policy systems. At best, their success seems to be at the 
microlevel, with little or no chance of broader impact or replication. Examples are found in 
social safety nets and welfare programs tailored to women or youth groups or the extremely 
poor in traditional societies or those tailored to rural workers, the unemployed, or the elderly 
in modern systems. A risk often encountered by social-policy reforms is that of having effects 
opposite to any of those aimed for in principle. Rather than increasing access to and 
participation in services for the most vulnerable people, reform measures encapsulate and 
treat them as special cases and thereby enhance the power of groups already integrated into 
the social-protection system. Experiences so far in Latin America, at least, seem to show that 
this is what is happening (BID–PNUD 1993; IADB 1996). For example, a discussion is 
ongoing in some countries in that region about the fact that the leading "reformed" social-
policy institutions (that is, private pension plans, decentralized private educational services, 
private health and insurance programs, etc.) may favour the participation of more, rather than 
fewer privileged groups. Seen in the broader social-development context of the region, this is 
not surprising. Traditionally, social innovations have followed the established allocation of 
privileges, benefits, and social assets. In that context, unless there are effective ways of 
monitoring by, for example, a central-state agency, it is highly probable that the well-to-do 
classes will be the winners with social innovations. 
Another issue is the extent to which social participation in new institutional settings is an 
effective means for dealing with equity. This issue goes beyond the actual processes of 
reform and links with the value framework underlying the reform approach. The reform 
approach contains doses of unfounded expectations about the capacity of local institutions 
and social participation of popular, indigenous, or local groups in the design and 
implementation of public policies, particularly in corporatist societies (for the case of 
education, see Morales-Gomez and Torres 1990). What few proponents of the reform 
approach to public policies recognize directly is that participation is possible and effective 
only when knowledge is fully available about the problem to be solved, about alternative 
options and their risks, and about the decision-making and power mechanisms. This, 
however, is not always the case, particularly in corporatist societies, where by definition 
knowledge is an asset of the elite. In this context, quite often social participation turns out to 
be rhetorical and instrumental to the power structures, and in the end, the people expected to 
participate become apathetic. 
Empirical evidence shows two kinds of apparently contradictory situations. On the one hand, 
open social protest has come to the surface with increasing frequency and unbelievable force. 
Recent events in Albania, Bolivia, Ecuador, Indonesia, Kenya, and Venezuela are telling 
examples. In Albania, people went into the streets to protest the massive bankruptcy of 
private pension plans. In Ecuador, people protested the macropolicies of structural 
adjustment. In Bolivia, Kenya, and Venezuela, public unrest was the combined effect of 
public-policy reforms, political corruption, and growing poverty. More recently, in Indonesia, 
as a result of structural-adjustment measures, food riots have begun to break out. News about 
all kinds of civic unrest resulting from privatization in countries around the world is not 
uncommon. On the other hand, people's participation in local activities remains elusive. 
People are not getting involved in the same dynamic way in the new policy consultations in 
some countries. The explanation for this could be negative past experiences, lack of 
opportunities, insufficient information, or simply the lack of political power and resources to 
make participation worthwhile. In practice, the reform approach has failed to encourage 
greater participation among those who are most likely to be excluded. Even in cases in which 
some degree of participation has been achieved, the issue remains one of making it effective. 
If there is one lesson learned, it is that the participation of target groups, beneficiaries, or 
users in a reform process does not by itself necessarily guarantee a solution to a social 
problem. An example is the participation of parents in schools boards. In well-educated 
sectors, the parents will doubtless be quite able to contribute, monitor, and evaluate the 
educational process. However, in the poorest neigh-bourhoods, the results may be nil, unless 
the process includes ways to help the parents with professional orientation and information. 
This type of example multiplies across social sectors and geographic areas (Bray 1996). The 
opportunity to have a say in public policy is valuable only if one is in a position to identify 
needs and articulate demands. 
Without doubt, the modalities of participation brought about by the institutional arrangements 
of social-policy reform also risk strengthening the negative aspects of traditional power 
structures. Under certain circumstances, these same structures can become vehicles to create 
effective social safety nets, for example, if former social policies had limited significance or 
the state still has limited capacity. However, in such contexts, the new balance of power has 
to come from the involvement of new stakeholders and traditional leaders. 
Looking ahead 
One of the points made in this book is that social-policy reform is in various ways an ongoing 
process in many societies. This reform movement has transnational features and tends to be 
based on the assumption that the reform of public policies is a feasible way to overcome the 
limitations of available financial, institutional, and human resources to deal with social 
development and the problems with the welfare-state model. 
The social-policy reform processes taking place today in most developing countries, with 
support from IFIs and other international organizations, represent a major shift in the current 
value orientations and in the existing institutional frameworks through which basic human 
needs are addressed in most countries. This book has argued that in the context of these 
trends, it should not be blindly assumed that the social-policy reforms have been a success, as 
much of the current development discourse seems to claim. We have still to cover 
considerable unknown territory. 
The process of policy reform in the social sector has just started. There is no reliable evidence 
based on systematic research to prove that efforts have been successful or to show that they 
are sustainable. To declare with confidence that the policy-reform approach to improving 
social-sector policies is effective would take years. This is partly because of the time required 
to monitor, assess, and obtain meaningful results and partly because local capacities to assess 
the policy-reform processes do not exist in most countries where these changes are taking 
place. 
An important consideration to keep in mind in examining current trends in social-policy 
reform, from both an international and comparative-development perspective, is that the 
policy-reform approach is currently predominant in many countries because, despite the 
many risks, it presents opportunities. In social-and human-development terms, most countries 
find themselves at the end of the 20th century without alternative meaningful policy options 
to deal with basic needs, global poverty, and growing social exclusion. At least in principle, 
the policy-reform approach offers an avenue to address these problems. Thus, to many, 
social-policy reform is not a matter of ideology but of pragmatism. 
However, even if this is the case, a question central to this book is whether this type of 
proposal has any real prospect for success in a global environment. There is little doubt that 
this question needs further debate. Existing evidence is insufficient to make a final 
judgement. At one level, the discussion has until now focused excessively on the perceived 
material benefits of social-policy reforms in terms of eradicating extreme poverty, upgrading 
human resources, improving competitiveness, and increasing productivity. Over time, 
research will probably show that some social-policy reforms have been a mix of success and 
failure, with more collateral effects than originally expected. If this is true, then we urgently 
need to develop ways to monitor and assess ongoing processes of reform to draw knowledge, 
lessons to be learned, and recommendations to help introduce the mechanisms needed to 
make corrections. 
Even if this is done, it is critical, however, in the overall assessment of these processes, not to 
lose sight of the fact that the policy-reform approach is by design or by default a proposal for 
achieving social development with its own internal ethos. We therefore urgently need to 
understand the directions of current transnational models of social and human development 
for recipient societies; the potential of market mechanisms to promote social and human 
development in the context of public-policy reforms; and the new mechanisms needed to 
guide the design, implementation, and evaluation of reform processes in societies redefining 
their roles in the global scenario. These are key questions to which answers are not yet 
available. 
The reform approach to social policy is a call to build social institutions and develop 
individual practices based at least on three conditions: the capacity to make independent and 
informed individual decisions; personal responsibility, as opposed to corporate responsibility; 
and the significant involvement of citizens. From another perspective, the reform approach 
also raises issues of social cohesion, new approaches to defining poverty, and alternative 
ways of dealing with issues of efficient coverage, quality of social service, and social equity. 
How effective these will be is still unknown. 
At the end of the day, the success or failure of social-policy reforms will depend most on how 
much the actors involved in the process are ethically committed to human development. This 
involves not only policymakers but also teachers in the classrooms, physicians and nurses in 
hospitals, public officials on ministerial committees and in the public bureaucracy, politicians 
in cabinets or on parliamentary committees, mayors in municipal offices, and citizens in 
general. This is more important than more financial resources, more technocratic solutions, 
and more adjustments to formal policies. No doubt, all the elements of the standard 
adjustment approach are necessary, but it is not the first time that they have proven 
insufficient. 
The experience of the last three decades with public-policy reforms and changes in political 
democracy shows that top-down reforms can do little with a lack of participation and 
commitment, indifference of elites, and political and economic opportunism. Without 
question, the population at large and stake-holders need to be involved in policy processes. 
Participation in public policy-making by itself, however, is not enough. The less privileged 
cannot, by this means alone, overcome their lack of resources and access to power, which are 
intrinsic to their poverty. To be successful, the reform approach to social policies must go 
hand in hand with the examination of risks and opportunities presented by policy reforms 
from a social-development perspective. 
In the current global environment, policymakers will continue to propose and implement 
structural-adjustment policies and reformed social policies on the assumption that they are the 
best ways to deal with the challenges of sustainable development, given that the world's 
population will reach 10 billion by 2050, with a social and natural environment even more 
degraded than now. Economic policies will continue to play a critical role in providing the 
increasing numbers of accessible employment opportunities and material goods required to 
ensure social welfare. From a human-development perspective, social-policy reform for the 
promotion of social development is expected to produce "more human value" in terms of 
learning capacities, better ethical practice, and stronger and longer lasting social commitment. 
The capacity to produce human value is the final criterion for assessing the effectiveness and 
efficiency of social policies and, by extension, of other development actions, including 
economic development. Economic development provides the material instruments and 
opportunities for growth and progress, but social policies produce the intrinsic social forces 
allowing growth and progress to equitably benefit people. 
Still, the reform approach to social policies raises many questions and doubts. An empirical 
response to these issues requires research and evaluation. Research is needed to know about 
what is going on and with what results, in terms of both achievements and gaps. Evaluation is 
needed to assess expected and unexpected results and is the only way to introduce timely 
corrections and design alternative policy options as these are required. From an immediate, 
pragmatic point of view, it is almost irrelevant in the context of current global trends to ask 
whether or not to implement policy reforms. The issue, now, is how to do this. 
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